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CHAPTER I
THE NAVAL CALLING IN THE 1880'S:
NEW THREATS AND OLD PROBLEMS
This is a study of the role of the Naval War College in the
professionalization of the U.S. Navy and the effects of that
process upon the shaping of naval policy from the founding of the
College in 1884 to its temporary discontinuance in 1917 during
World War I.At first glance, these early decades appear impossibly
remote. Adm. Stephen B. Luce, the founder of the Naval War
College, was also a strong advocate of sails for men-of-war at a
time when this subject was still very much a live issue.1 One of the
early staff members, Comdr. Bowman H. McCalla, was court
martialed for "having cut a crewman with his sword, "2 in an era
when swords were used for more than ceremony.
On the face of it, the pioneers of the Naval War College seem
closer in spirit to Capt. Horatio Hornblower than to Arleigh Burke
or Elmo Zumwalt. Yet it was in these early years that, for better
or for worse, the basic structure and philosophy of the War
College was established. The 1880's and 1890's were the age in
which all the great American professions, from public health to
forestry, from social work to city planning, began to emerge in
their modern form, and many of the struggles, triumphs and
defeats of that era have left lasting marks on these callings. This is
especially true of the naval profession.
The events of these early years continue to exert a profound
influence on the Naval War College, and indirectly, upon the entire
Navy. A recent study of the legal profession concludes that "to
think like a lawyer at Harvard in 1969 was no different ...than at
the beginning of the twentieth century ...law school was still a
church with its essential dogma preserved." 3 As far as the
development of professional education in the United States is
concerned, it may well be true, as historian John Shy has
suggested, that "the explanatory importance of events should be
reckoned, not by proximity, but by priority in time." 4

2
Among naval men, there has always been a sort of tacit
awareness that these early years were somehow special and
important. Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner, in introducing his
far-reaching changes in the Naval War College program, explained
that they represented a "return to our great traditions-to the
strategic and historial contribution of men like Mahan: to the
t a c t i c a l a n d operational studies of men like William
Sims.... " 5
The interest of these early years has probably also been
enhanced by the frequent criticism leveled at the present-day
Naval War College by critics both inside and outside the service.
Admiral Turner referred to the "creeping intellectual devitaliza
tion in all of our war colleges since World War 11," 6 while
Assistant Secretary of Defense Nicholas Katzenbach described the
curriculum of all the service colleges in the early l 960's as
"something between a Great Issues course and an extended
administration briefing. " 7 "American military schools," observed
two students of military education in the 1950's, "have not
furnished intellectual leadership in the investigation of military
subjects ...they are not pushing out the frontiers of knowledge in
their professional fields. The principal analysts and writers on
military affairs today are civilians. " 8
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that many
officers would wish to return to the days when the Naval War
College, with men like Luce and Mahan, Henry C. Taylor and
William L. Rodgers, provided the nation's intellectual leader
ship in naval affairs. As Lt. Comdr. Thomas Buell wistfully
observed of the l 920's and l 930's, when the College was still
living on the intellectual capital of these years, "naval officers
were supreme in the study of naval warfare. They were the
experts!'' 9
Since World War II, the War College has attempted to recapture
some of the creativity and vitality of the early years, particularly
in regard to naval strategy.Comdr. Napier Smith, in a study of the
postwar Naval War College, observed that the "search for a new
maritime strategy or doctrine upon which the Navy could base its
existence and define its mission ...runs through the entire period
of post-war events at the Naval War College. There have been
many efforts, individual and collective, formal and informal, but
as yet the new Mahan has not appeared." 1 0
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This study attempts to identify and explain the elements in the
naval service and in American society which made possible the War
College of Mahan's day and to show how the very successes of the
War College in the pre-World War I period laid the foundations for
the failures and inadequacies of the later years.
The founding of the Naval War College was the result of certain
peculiar conditions in the U.S. Navy during the 1870's and 1880's
but, in a larger sense, it was also an episode in the great wave of
professionalizing growth and consolidation which swept the
United States during the last decades of the 19th century. Social
scientists are far from agreement about the precise definition of
"profession" and "professionalization" or even about the utility
and meaningfulness of such concepts for social research. For
purposes of the present study, however, we will define pro
fessionalization as the process by which an occupational group
acquires or develops a specialized, theoretical body of knowledge
related to its area of expertise, develops a heightened feeling of
group identity which is usually accompanied by the emergence of
professional associations and journals, and takes on a body of rules
and standards which regulate its relationship to the public. 1 1 In
the America of the 1880's, no occupational group had yet
achieved full professional status. But in such old-line occupations
as law and medicine, and in newer ones like education, engineering
and social work, there were stirrings in that direction. In medicine
the spectacular discoveries of the 1870's and 1880's in the fields
of microbiology, parasitology and antiseptic surgery were
beginning to transform that venerable calling. By the turn of the
century, doctors trained in the new sciences were demanding and
receiving statutory authority to regulate and limit entry into their
field and to set stricter standards for medical schools, hospitals
and the administration of public health. The American Medical
Association, the capstone of a network of local medical
associations throughout the country, claimed a membership of
over 9,000 by 1890 and had begun to drive the homeopaths,
allopaths, folk healers and patent medicine men from the
scene.
Similar developments were occurring in the field of law where
the American Bar Association was discovering the advantages of
formal law school training and controlled admission to practice
through the state bar examination. Teachers, with their newly
discovered "science" of "pedagogy," and social workers with their
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even more nebulous science of "social case work," were also
beginning to demand recognition and control of entry into their
occupational fields.1 2 These developments among the would-be
professions in the United States were to culminate in the first
decade of the 20th century. In the 1880's, they were barely
visible. Yet the movement had begun.
The naval officer corps was at least partially professionalized by
the 1880's. Since 1845, the Naval Academy at Annapolis had
provided a good system of selection and training and, in 1873, an
embryonic professional association, the U.S. Naval Institute, was
founded. Yet, the naval officers had so far failed to develop that
specialized, theoretical body of knowledge which would prove so
important to the other young American professions and which
would entitle them to claim the status of a distinct body of
practitioners possessed of a unique expertise.
Indeed, a variety of factors had combined, by the beginning of
the 1880's, to bring the entire future of the officers corps into
doubt. The first of these factors was a continuing series of
technological innovations in all branches of naval architecture and
engineering which seemed likely to transform the nature of war
itself. In the era of wooden sailing vessels changes in the design
and construction of warships had been so gradual as to be almost
imperceptible.1 3 The frigate Constitution, completed in the
l 790's, was still operating effectively in the 1830's, untroubled by
obsolescence. With the introduction of a practical means of steam
propulsion, however, warships gained a degree of tactical freedom
which they had never previously enjoyed. Steam machinery
evolved rapidly from the simple side-lever engines which powered
the paddle-wheel gunboats of the 1830's to powerful, highly
efficient, triple-expansion engines capable of driving a screw
propelled man-of-war at speeds of up to 20 knots.
At the same time that steam was replacing sail, iron and steel
were replacing wood as the basic material of hull construction.
Iron ships could be made much larger in size than wooden ships
and were less susceptible to destruction by fire. Most important,
only iron-hulled ships could support the increasing amounts of
armor with which warships were being protected by the 1860's.
The introduction of armor protection was necessitated by
spectacular increases in the power of naval guns. By the 1850's,
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rifled ordnance firing explosive shells had begun to replace the old
smooth bore cannon armed with solid shot which had won the
naval victories of the Nelson era. From the battle between the
Monitor and the Merrimac in Hampton Roads to the early 1890's
naval guns steadily increased in range, accuracy and penetrating
power. Breechloaders replaced muzzle loaders during the 1870's
and 1880's. Muzzle velocities increased from less than 1,300 feet
per second in the 1860's to about 2,100 feet per second during the
1880's. 1 4 Steel projectiles were introduced in the 1880's and a
new type of "quick-firing" gun capable of firing up to 14 rounds
per minute was in use by the early 1890's.
Armor ran a frantic race with ordnance in these years. The
earliest ironclads, built in France and Britain, had wrought-iron
armor of about 4-½ inch thickness. By 1866, this had increased to
9 inches, then to 14 inches in H.M.S. Dreadnought, in 1875, and,
finally, to 24 inches in H.M.S. Inflexible (1876). By the end of the
1870's, steel had begun to replace iron as the material for armor
and by 1881, the French Navy was producing steel armor up to 20
inches thick. In the early 1890's, the American engineer H.A.
Harvey perfected a method of producing hardened nickel steel or
"Harveyized steel" more than twice as strong as old wrought-iron
armor.
While guns and armor were growing in size and cost, a new
weapon, the self-propelled or "automobile" torpedo, had been
introduced in the 1870's. Carried by small, very fast ships, the
torpedo, with its capability of causing a powerful underwater
explosion directly against the hull of a ship, posed a threat to even
the largest naval vessel. By the 1880's, torpedoes and torpedo
boats were in general use in all navies.
As the new engines of war grew in size and power, they became
ever more technically complex. In 1862, the most powerful ship in
the Union Navy, the ironclad frigate New Ironsides, carried only
one machine: her main engines, consisting of two steam cylinders.
All other work aboard the ship: steering, communication, loading
and firing the guns, was performed by hand. In the battleship
Iowa, completed in 1896, there were 71 different machines. The
main engines had 37 steam cylinders and all work of steering,
communications, lighting, ventilation and gunnery was performed
by machine. 1 5
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The rapid changes in technology excited and fascinated Ameri
can naval officers. Every new weapon or refinement of a new
weapon, every new technical device, was avidly discussed over the
wardroom tables and in the pages of the U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. 1 6 "It was a time," recalled Capt. Harry S. Knapp,
"when material things held the stage. " 1 7
Although fascinated by the new technology naval officers found
it more than a little threatening. The advent of the armored
steam-driven warship had rendered obsolete much of the tradi
tional knowledge and lore of the line officer trained in the age of
sail. What had been an essentially static system of naval warfare
based upon wooden sailing ships had now been replaced by a
complex, extremely dynamic system of war based upon steam
navigation, electricity, armor, torpedoes, mines and long-range
guns. In this new world, it could reasonably be argued, the
engineer, the metallurgist and the ordnance expert were more
fitted to operate the new ships of war than the traditional line
officer.
Engineers and other technical experts were not slow in asserting
their claims to authority in naval matters.Mechanical engineer Ira
N. Hollis explained to readers of the Atlantic Monthly that "the
modern ship is a machine ....All the problems on a modern
battleship are engineering in their nature and there is no problem
that cannot be solved by the man whose ...education has been in
mechanics." Rear Adm. Bowman H. McCalla, a strong partisan of
the line, acknowledged in his "Memoirs" that by the 1870's "it
was quite apparent that if engineers were taught navigation with
some ordnance and seamanship, they would be as efficient in
those branches as officers of the line; and with the additional
experience in steam engineering would be more [italics in original]
competent to command warships." 1 8
The line officers reacted to the "threat" of the engineers in a
variety of ways. They attempted to restrict the numbers, status
and rank of engineers in the Navy and experimented with the
training of "cadet engineers" at Annapolis. The engineers angrily
responded in kind to this attempt by the Navy to reduce them to
"second-class citizenship." 1 9 "The venality with which line and
staff tore at one another not only disabused navalists but served to
prevent professional integration for years to come." 2 0
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If technical change was a relatively new problem for the naval
officer, there were other factors affecting his public image which
were far from new. Traditional American attitudes and values
strongly militated against recognition of the need for a profes
sional officer corps. As de Tocqueville has observed, in the United
States, " ...the ever increasing numbers of men of property who
are lovers of peace, the growth of personal wealth, which war so
rapidly consumes, those tendencies to pity which are produced by
equality of conditions, will all tend to quench the military
spirit.... Military men fall to the lowest rank of the public
servants.They are little esteemed and no longer understood." 2 1
In the American view, war was the province of the amateur and
of the genius. The real strength of the country lay in its citizen
soldiers, springing to arms at the moment of danger, backed by the
industrial and technical genius of the American people. As social
reformer Henry George bluntly observed, "the American Republic
has no more need for its burlesque of a Navy than a peaceable
giant would have for a stuffed club or a tin sword .... If war
should be forced upon us, we could safely rely upon science and
invention which are already superseding navies faster than they
can be built. " 2 2
Leadership in war would be provided not by "West Point
martinets " but by natural geniuses like Washington and John Paul
Jones. In a review of Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's Memoirs, literary
gadfly Thomas Wentworth Higginson, himself a distinguished
volunteer officer, declared that "so much stronger is the republi
can instinct than any professional feeling which West Point can
create that Grant ...never looked at things for a moment from
the professional soldier's point of view, this was the key to his
success." 2 3 In 1888, Navy Lt.Carlos G. Calkins ruefully admitted
that "the existing military and naval services are often regarded,
even by their supporters, as mere peace [time] organizations liable
to be replaced by improvized organizations in time of war." 2 4
The 1870's and 1880's were characterized by what one writer
has termed "business pacifism. " 2 5 Not only was a professional
Navy superfluous, according to this view, but war itself was
rapidly becoming an anachronism which would eventually .dis
appear with the progress of modern civilization. The strong strain
of Social Darwinism in 19th-century American thought tended to
reinforce these beliefs.
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While in some countries Social Darwinism had been used to
justify or even glorify war, the most influential expositors of
Darwinism in the United States, writers like Herbert Spencer, John
Fiske and William Graham Sumner, took a different view. They
emphasized economic progress and drew an unfavorable compari
son between industrial efficiency and the wastefulness of war. As
society became more economically advanced, war would gradually
be eliminated. "The very heterogeneity of the military art," wrote
John Fiske, the popular American "philosopher" and historian,
"the increasing complication both of the implements and the
methods of warfare, renders war ever more costly and makes the
community less willing to engage in it." 2 6 Naval officers like
Alfred Thayer Mahan might protest that "an untroubled assurance
of peace is no guarantee that war will not come. " 2 7 But many
Americans continued to believe with Herbert Spencer, Andrew
Carnegie and John Fiske that war was merely a remnant of a more
barbarous age. "Probably at no very distant period," predicted
Fiske, "warfare shall have become extinct in the more civilized
portions of the globe." 2 8
Whether or not he agreed with Fiske that world peace was just
around the corner, it was hard for the average American to believe
that his own country, separated from the Great Powers by the
broad oceans, had any need for a large army or navy. Writing in
1890, Secretary of War Redfield Proctor came close to declaring
that the United States possessed absolute military security. "The
military resources of the nation have been so recently demon
strated and its network of railroads is so adapted to a rapid
concentration of troops on any threatened point, that no hostile
force is likely to seek an encounter with us on our own soil. A
small army sent upon our shores could not hope for success; it is
not probable that any large one will run the risk." 2 9
These attitudes toward war and the probability of war were
reflected in the condition of the Navy. After the Civil War, the
American Navy had fallen on evil days. In 1884, it still consisted
mainly of old wooden cruisers of the Civil War vintage and some
overage monitors which had been "repaired" and "repaired" again
until nothing of the original ships was left but their names. "Never
before has the Navy sunk so low," lamented Commander Mahan.
"Up to the [Civil] War, and for a short time after it, we had
always ships that could find equals and cope with them.
Now ...we have not six ships that would be kept at sea by any
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maritime power." 30 Virtually all our old ordnance was useless for
the purpose of war," recalled Bradley A. Fiske 40 years later, "and
there was nobody who knew anything about the new ordnance
except from reading about it." 3 1
T h e pre-Civil War seniority system, designed to protect the
Navy from political influences, was still in effect and guaranteed
that if an officer lived long enough and avoided spectacular dis
plays of incompetence he would,in his turn,ascend unto admiral.
By that time, he would probably have passed the age of 60. The
fortunate survivors usually could spend but a year or two at ad
miral 's rank before reaching the compulsory retirement age of 62.
A surplus of officers made promotion maddeningly slow. In
1877, the Navy had 59 officers for each ship.32 Some men who
had been lieutenants in 1869 were still lieutenants in 1881 and
many of them had passed 50 years of age.3 3 While the rate of
promotion decreased,the pay remained stationary and the officers
were to get no raise until 1897.
The routine of life in a forgotten peacetime navy was
stultifying. As one lieutenant observed in 1883, "every officer is
compelled to spend so many years in performing the same routine
duties that he is apt to allow himself to fall into habits unfavorable
to mental growth." 3 4 He went on to note "the unfortunate
aspects of delayed responsibility " and the benumbing effects of
repetition and routine. The officer was not impressed with the
intellectual calibre of the theoretical work then being done by his
colleagues.
The prevailing character of this [ contemporary naval] litera
ture may be described as tending to amateurishness .... Only
a few writers attempt the solution of practical problems of
naval warfare by scientific and modern methods. Others
persistently separate science from its applications or practice
from principles. Others indulge in the feeble antiquarianism
of a pre-scientific period. 3 5
Under these conditions, the more ambitious or imaginative
officers felt completely frustrated. "The daily routine of man-of
war life was, after all the novelty had worn off,not very inspiring.
'Is this all?' it was asked; 'is this the sole fruit of four years of
hard study at the Naval Academy?"' 3 6
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Naval officers were well aware of the pos1t10n which they
occupied in the eyes of the public. Lieutenant Calkins observed
that "so long as it is authoritatively stated and generally believed
that a large part of the Navy are spending their time in idleness or
in the performance of needless and trifling duties, so long will the
Navy fail to hold its place in public estimation." 3 7 "I confess to a
feeling of mingled impatience and bitterness when I hear the noble
duties of a naval officer's career ignored," exclaimed Comdr.
Alfred Thayer Mahan. "No wonder the line officers of the Navy
are themselves carried away by a humility which falsely dwarfs
their profession." 3 8
Confronted with the combination of public indifference and
professional stagnation, many officers became mere timeservers
while others buried themselves with great thoroughness in some
technical branch of their calling, ordnance or electricity, engineer
ing, or international law. To the founders of the Naval War
College, however, this trend toward "technicism" 3 9 (the tendency
among officers to emphasize technical skills at the expense of
general military knowledge) seemed an unsatisfactory solution to
the officer's dilemma. They proposed a far more sweeping cure.
They aimed to transform the naval officer corps into a truly
professional body capable of ordering and controlling the new
technology of war.
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CHAPTER II

THE OLD MAN OF THE SEA

The small band of reforming officers who undertook to trans
form the Navy in the 1880's had a twofold objective. First, to
develop the Navy into a true profession by making the naval offi
cer the practitioner of a purely naval art, not merely an applica
tion of some civilian art or science. Second, to insure for the
officer a place in the public .esteem and a voice in the conduct of
national affairs by demonstrating that his profession was necessary
and, indeed, vital to the general welfare. To aid them in their task,
the reformers turned for inspiration to four areas of knowledge
which enjoyed great prestige in the late 19th century: "science" as
they understood it, history, German military thought, and Ameri
can business management. Their leader was Stephen B. Luce.
Stephen Bleecker Luce was appointed a midshipman in the
Navy by President Martin Van Buren in 1841 at the age of 14. 1
The new midshipman was first sent to the receiving ship North
Carolina, Commodore Matthew C. Perry commanding. There he
learned the rudiments of seamanship and had the national emblem
tattooed on his arm. ("No American Sailor who was a sailor would
be without it."2) After 6 months, he went to sea.
The sea was his home, his nursery, his university. Before he was
25, he had been around the Horn four times, crossed the Equator
eight times and twice circumnavigated the globe. Years later he
would write of "the demoralizing influence" which too much time
spent ashore could have to apprentice seamen. 3
In the long days at sea, Luce spent much of his time off watch
reading. His favorite books were Addison and Steele, Dickens and
works on science and history.4 Contemporaries remembered him
as a slight, handsome young man about 5 feet 7 inches in height.
"His face was thin and delicate, his eyes a steel penetrating blue
which always twinkled, the mouth firm, with wavering lines in the
corners indicating an easy capability of suddenly becoming grave
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and stern." 5 Although relaxed and easygoing with a keen sense of
humor, "there was always a temperamental reserve, a dignity
which no one ever failed to appreciate." 6 "I do not think he ever
had any really intimate or familiar associates," recalled one of his
contemporaries. 7
At the outbreak of the Civil War, Luce was serving as Assistant
to the Commandant of Midshipmen at Annapolis. He remained
there for the first weeks of the war but was finally able to get to
sea as watch officer on a frigate. He joined U.S.S. Wabash at New
York in May of 1861, saw action at Hatteras Inlet and at Port
Royal, commanded a howitzer launch and a gun division on the
Wabash, then was ordered back to the Naval Academy.
In the summer of 1863, he got away in command of the U.S.S.
Macedonian on the midshipmen's practice cruise to England. When
the ship arrived at Plymouth, Luce learned that he had been
preceded there by a Confederate cruiser which was still in the area.
Undeterred by the fact that his old sailing frigate was no match for
a modern steam cruiser, Luce had the ship painted black with
yellow spars, shortened the masts, and, flying the Spanish flag,
headed for the Bay of Biscay to try to lure the raider under his
guns. 8 He was unsuccessful.
Luce spent the remainder of the war on blockade duty between
Savannah and Charleston. The return of peace found him back at
the Naval Academy, this time as Commandant of Midshipmen
under David Dixon Porter.
Luce now took up the monotonous duties of a naval officer in
the "dark ages of the American Navy." But, "time did not stale
nor custom wither" him. By the time he assumed command of the
North Atlantic Squadron in 1884, he was the most learned officer
in the Navy, its foremost seaman, its outstanding tactician, and
perhaps its leading maverick. On the course upon which he was
about to embark, he would meet with frustration, disappointment,
even occasional malice. Yet, he never soured or despaired. "There
was no martyr's pose, no appeal for sympathy, no self-p�ty, no
contempt for those who did not think as he did, no bitterness, no
reproaches." 9
Luce was the leader of the fight against technicism in the Navy.
He saw clearly that if the naval officer was ever to develop into a
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real professional and the Navy into an effective fighting force, the
naval officer must cease to be exclusively a navigator, a seaman, a
hydrographer, or an engineer and become a specialist in his own
unique field-the conduct of war.
"Your profession is the profession of war and yet you do not
study war" he told a group of line officers. "Fancy a
university man aspiring to the honors of the legal profession
and ignoring the law school and the science of law . . . . It
must strike anyone who thinks about it as extraordinary that
we members of a profession of arms should never have
undertaken the study of our real business." 1 0
On one occasion, Luce flatly declared to his brother officers that
history showed that good soldiers, familiar with the principles of
strategy and tactics had been more successful in fleet actions than
experienced sailors who were ignorant of these principles. 1 1
As Bradley Fiske, one of the Admiral's younger followers put it,
Luce wanted the Navy to think about the Navy as a whole. "Our
officers seem to suffer from a species of mental astigmatism."
Luce once observed: "We make ample provision for specialization
but none for centralization. There is no provision for an educated
directorate." 1 2
To provide the educated directorate, Luce had for some time
been urging the establishment of a graduate school for the training
of senior officers "in the art and science of war." His initial effort
in this direction was an article entitled "War Schools" in the Naval
Institute Proceedings for 1883. Luce envisioned his Naval War
College as "a place of original research on all questions relating to
war and to statesmanship connected with war." 1 3 The most
important field of study for an officer, Luce contended, was naval
strategy. However, for all practical purposes, naval strategy did not
exist in the 1880's. How, then, was the officer student to learn
"the highest branch" of his profession? "The only way is to study
the science of war as it is taught at our military schools and then
to apply the principles to military operations conducted at sea."
The particular "military schools" that Luce had in mind were
the Army's Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and the new
Infantry and Cavalry "Schools of Application" which had been
established by General Sherman at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas in
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1881. Luce was particularly impressed by the "Department of
Military Art and Science" at Fort Monroe. He quoted with
approval the statement of Gen. John 0. Tidball, Commandant of
Ft. Monroe, that the course of studies was "not limited to what is
necessary for merely expert artillerists but one which aims to
qualify officers for any duty they may be called upon to perform
or for any position however high in rank. " 1 4,

The Army schools derived their inspiration from the example of
German military education. Their model was the great Berlin
Kriegsakademie which had been founded by Gen. Gerhardt von
Scharnhorst in 1810 to train officers for high command and
general staff work. Officers were admitted to the Academy after
having served 5 years in the field and passed a rigorous
examination. The course was 3 years in length and included
lectures and discussions of tactics, fortification, administration,
geography and military law. About one-half of the course was
devoted to the history of war "which embraces all of the details of
strategic principles of the great campaigns together with tactical
principles." 1 5 In the 1870's, the school had an enrollment of
about 300 officers.

The Prussian system of education stood for a new concept of
the military profession. According to the Prussian view, war was a
distinct body of knowledge which could be taught in a school.
Like any other profession, the profession of arms could be
mastered only by long years of study and practice.

While this concept of war rejected the 18th-century idea that
war could be carried on by amateurs (so long as they were
gentlemen), it also rejected the 19th-century view that war was the
province of the charismatic leader or the born genius. The German
school system stood for the belief that ordinary men of
intelligence, if well trained and properly organized, could carry
out any of the tasks of high command. "It cannot be denied,"
observed an American officer, "that the military and theoretical
qualifications required of candidates for appointment as officers in
the German Army are not so high as in some other European
countries but this inequality is shortly made to disappear by the
subsequent course of training and discipline they receive. " 1 6
The German methods were well suited to the rapid changes in
the technology of war which began in the latter half of the 19th
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century. The superior efficiency of the German Army was
demonstrated in an impressive manner in the campaigns against
Austria and France. After 1870, Germany largely replaced France
as the model for military men. "The professional officer ... in
Europe regarded the German system as the peak of military
efficiency. Greeks, Rumanians, and Turks trekked to Berlin to
study."1 7 As early as 1859, about 50 percent of the military
literature of Europe was produced in Germany and in the 1870's
and 1880's the prestige of German military writers was higher than
ever.1 8 Higher military schools patterned on the German Kriegs
akademie were started in France and Great Britain-the Ecole
Militaire Superieure in 1878 and the Royal Military Staff School
in 1873.
The man who did most to bring the new German techniques of
military education to the United States was Emory Upton.A West
Point graduate, Upton had risen to the rank of Major General in
the Civil War while still in his twenties. After the War, he had
served as Commandant of Cadets at West Point and had devised a
new system of infantry tactics.1 9 In 1876, bored with life in the
peacetime Army, he persuaded Sherman and Secretary of War
W.W. Belknap to send him on a tour of Europe and Asia to study
military institutions and techniques there. On his tour Belknap
instructed him to pay particular attention to the "German schools
for the instruction of officers in strategy, grand tactics and applied
tactics."2 0 Upton eventually visited Japan, China, India, Persia,
Russia, Italy, Austria, Germany, France and Great Britain, and
returned in 1878 to publish a book on his tour, The Armies of
Asia and Europe. In it he observed that:
Abroad it is the universal theory that the art of war should be
studied only after an officer has arrived at full manhood and
therefore most governments have established post-graduate
institutions for nearly all arms of service where meritorious
officers may study strategy, grand tactics and all the science
of war.
He recommended that the U.S. Army "establish schools with
similar constitutions." "In order still further to increase their
usefulness at least two officers from each regiment ought to attend
the course and to stimulate their zeal those who distinguish
themselves should be rewarded by detail to some of the staff
departments." 2 1
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When Upton was appointed to head the Artillery School at Fort
Monroe, Virginia, he revamped its curriculum and introduced
courses in "Universal History," "The Operations of War," and
"Military Logistics." "My aim," Upton wrote, "is to train a corps
of officers who in any future contest may be the chief of reliance
of the government. " 2 2
Luce had first met Upton when he had been assigned to duty at
the Artillery School in the late 1870's. With Upton's encourage
ment, he began to plan for a similar school in the Navy which
would do for naval officers what Upton's school was attempting to
do for the artillery men. The Naval War College was to be based on
the same revolutionary idea that had inspired the German Staff
Schools: the idea that war could be taught and learned. It was
opposed to the much older idea held instinctively by most
American officers that generalship was a product of genius and
intuition.
Luce's experience at the Artillery School helped to crystallize
his ideas about a Naval War College, but he had already become
acquainted with the idea of "scientific war" during his Civil War
days. Once, during the campaign against Charleston, General
Sherman had said to him: "You Navy fellows have been
hammering away at Charleston for three years but just wait until I
get into South Carolina; I will cut her communications and
Charleston will fall into your hands like a ripe pear." "After
hearing General Sherman's clear exposition of the situation,"
recalled Luce, "the scales seemed to fall from my eyes. It dawned
upon me that there were certain fundamental principles under
lying military operations-principles of general application
whether the operations were conducted on land at sea. " 2 3

or

Since the principles of strategy were of general application, one
method of "discovering" them would be to have military strategy
taught to and studied by naval officers. The other method was to
study history in order to discover examples of the correct
application of the principles in past naval campaigns.
Luce was a firm believer in the "lessons" which could be
learned from history. He was fond of quoting Bolingbroke's
aphorism: "History is philosophy teaching by example. " 2 4 His
view of history was shared by Comdr. Henry C. Taylor, an officer
who would later play an important part in the development of the

18
Naval War College. Taylor believed that "we can tell the probable
course of events if we can find some set of conditions in the past
like those present now . . . if you can find in history conditions
very much like them you can then ascertain the measures which
were then applied and note their success or failure, then, in the
light of that experience, you can decide on the measures you
should adopt. " 2 5
In taking this view of history, Luce and Taylor were in accord
with at least some of the members of the young and fast-growing
American historical profession. Had not Frederic Bancroft, the
elder statesman of American historians, declared that "the
movements of humanity are governed by Law," and had not
Henry Adams predicted that "should history ever become a true
science it must expect to establish its own laws. " 2 6 The majority
of American historians, it is true, did not hold this view of history
but rather agreed with James Ford Rhodes that the task of the
historian is "to tell a story and leave the philosophy to others." It
was from the Adams school, however, that Luce and his followers
derived their inspiration. To them it was not enough that history
should produce objective fact. They were confident that it would
reveal "universal laws" as well.
It was understandable that in the intellectual atmosphere of the
late 19th century, Luce should refer to this new field of
knowledge, naval warfare, as a "science." Science had always been
something of a panacea in America and the 1880's was the period
when the new "evolutionary sciences" as distilled by John Fiske
and other popularizers were carrying all before them.2 7 The
prestige of science or more accurately of applied science and
technology among naval officers was very high. As Luce put it:
"Science is contributing so liberally to every department of
knowledge and has done so much towards developing a truer
understanding of the various arts that it seems only natural and
reasonable that we should call science to our aid to lead us to a
clearer conception of naval warfare." 2 8 "No less a task is
proposed," he told the Secretary of the Navy, "than to apply
modern scientific methods to the study and raise naval warfare
from the empirical stage to the dignity of a science." 2 9
The particular "method" that Luce had in mind was the
comparative method. "I take the ground that naval warfare can
best be studied by the comparative method adopted by the great
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scientists with such eminent success," he wrote to Navy Secretary
William E. Chandler in 1884.3 0 The new science would use this
method by comparing military operations with naval ones in the
study of military strategy and by comparing historical situations
with the present in the study of naval history. For Luce this was
the very essence of science. "It is by the comparative method that
we have been led to a knowledge of the most important
phenomenon of the science of life. Anatomy for example only
becomes scientific through comparative anatomy."3 1
The idea that their neglected calling was actually in the nature
of a science was quite congenial to progressive naval officers who
were soon proclaiming with Bradley Fiske that "the principles of
strategy do not change anymore than the principles of mechanics
do."3 2 Rear Adm. Daniel Ammen informed the first class at the
Naval War College that "the opening of this institution indicates
the necessities which arise to nations in the march of science."3 3
And a year later, Alfred Thayer Mahan would inform their
successors that strategic principles "belong, as it were, to the
Order of Nature of whose stability so much is heard in our
day."3 4
Despite all the learned comparisons which the reformers drew
between the natural sciences of their time and the science of war,
their concept of science was actually that of an earlier age. It was
in fact the concept of science held by Hume, Montesquieu and
other 18th-century philosophers including Luce's favorite, Boling
broke. These men had attempted to construct a "science" of
politics from the comparative study of constitutions and constitu
tional history much as Luce and his followers were attempting to
establish a science of strategy based on the comparative study of
military and naval history. There is a close similarity between Luce
and Taylor speaking of "fundamental principles" to be drawn
from the study of history and Hume's statement that:
Mankind are so much the same in all times and all places that
history informs of nothing new or strange in this particular.
Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal
principles of human nature by showing it in all varieties and
situations and furnishing us with material from which we
may become acquainted with the regular springs of human
action and behavior. 3 5
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Just as the 18th-century philosophers had "gone up and down the
field of history looking for man in general," 3 6 so Alfred Thayer
Mahan was soon to go up and down the field of naval history
looking for the "unchanging principles of strategy." What the
philosophers had failed to do for politics in the 18th century,
Luce and his followers now confidentially prepared to do for naval
warfare.
Luce had already begun his campaign for the College with a
letter to his friend William C. Church, editor of the Army-Navy
Journal. "The scheme is so feasible," wrote Luce, "that it only
needs a little talking and writing up to get the thing started.
Should you take hold and give us a hand please keep my name
out. " 3 7 Church did take hold and for the next 10 years, the
Journal loyally reported the progress of the College, defended it
against its enemies, and praised its friends. Luce furnished Church
with an ample supply of news and often wrote letters to the
Journal under a pseudonym attacking his own articles in order to
draw attention to them. In addition, Luce occasionally sent
Church a "little editorial squib" which Church would run under
his own name. Few readers suspected that many of the Journal's
ardent editorials supporting the War College had been written by
Luce himself.3 8 Luce's most powerful ally in the fight for the
Naval War College, however, was the silent, imperturbable Senator
from Rhode Island, Nelson W. Aldrich.
Aldrich was just beginning his second term in the Senate but he
had already proven to be a master of parliamentary strategy and
established a place among the inner circle of Senate Republics. A
reporter who knew him well in later years observed that "Mr.
Aldrich is a chess player with men." 3 9 A more unlikely alliance
could not be imagined than that between the fiery Navy reformer
and the phlegmatic, inscrutable Senate conservative. The basis of
their partnership was once revealed by Luce in a letter. "The
interests of the Navy and the people of Newport running in the
same direction, we can pull together for our mutual advantage." 4 0
In August 1883, Luce sent to Aldrich a copy of his "War
Schools" article and pointed out the practical advantages of the
plan for the city of Newport. The establishment of a war college
would "give an authoritatively different character to Coasters
Harbor Island, elevate the tone of the [Narragansett Bay Naval]
Station, and give stature to the county and state. " 4 1
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Luce's real reasons for wanting the War College at Newport,
however, had little to do with pork barrel politics. His tour of
duty at the Naval Academy, when it had been temporarily
transferred to Newport during the Civil War, had convinced him
that the city was the finest site available for the training of
seagoing officers. The climate was more healthful and invigorating
than Annapolis and "the character of Narragansett Bay invites all
kinds of exercises afloat ....When the Government builds torpedo
boats, the Bay will be the place for their exercises and it will be
part of the course at the school ... to have students instructed in
practical use of the torpedo in attack and defense." 4 2 In addition,
Newport was close to the "great educational centers" of Boston
and "many men of letters and writers of distinction [made]
Newport their summer home." 4 3

Yet not all summer residents of Newport were literary men.The
Newport of Luce's day was also the Newport of Cornelius
Vanderbilt and Ward MacAlister, of magnificent millionaires'
"cottages" where, as one breathless journalist informed readers of
Munsey's Magazine, the rich "played tennis in bathing suits," and
indulged in "other enjoyments not usually associated with surf
bathing." 4 4 Luce emphatically denied that the fascinations of
high society might distract officer students from their duties.
"Students will not go into society" he told a reporter; "as a rule,
they have their families here and cannot afford to accept
[invitations]. Also, they must give close attention to their
exacting studies.' '4 5

The Admiral's insistence on having the War College at Newport
aroused the opposition of the bureau chiefs, particularly Capt.
Earl English, Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting,
who had charge of naval training facilities at Newport and who
had not been consulted about the choice of a site and of Capt.
Francis M. Ramsay, Superintendent of the Naval Academy, who
felt that the College was a threat to his institution.4 6

To aid in the campaign, Luce was able to enlist his old chief,
Adm. David Dixon Porter, the Admiral of the Navy and an old foe
of Captain English.4 7 Porter was now 70 years old and had begun
to despair of seeing any improvement in the Navy. Although he
bore the grandiose title of "Admiral of the Navy," he found his
advice ignored by successive administrations and, like his colleague
in the War Department, William T. Sherman, was largely reduced
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to fuming impotently at the machinations of the "politicians"
who ran the service. Certainly, the new Secretary of the Navy
William E. Chandler held out no great prospect of radical change.
If Chester A. Arthur brought a faint odor of backroom politics
to the Presidency, his new Secretary of the Navy, William Eaton
Chandler fairly reeked of it. A graduate of the Harvard Law
School, Chandler had entered politics in his native New Hampshire
and risen to become speaker of the state legislature. In public life,
his name was linked to such characters as James G. Blaine and Jay
Gould. As Secretary of the Republican National Committee in
1876, he played a leading part in the maneuverings which won the
Presidency for Rutherford B. Hayes. This earned him his share of
enemies and in 1880, the Senate had refused to confirm him as
Solicitor-General. Appointed Secretary of the Navy by Arthur in
1881 to placate the Blaine faction of the Republicans, he managed
to find reasons for awarding the contracts for all four of the
Navy's new steel cruisers to his good friend, the shipbuilder, John
Roach. When the ships, as might have been expected, turned out
to be poorly built, too slow and too expensive, his Democratic
foes were not slow in charging him with lining his pockets at the
expense of the Navy.
Yet Chandler cannot be dismissed as simply a "hack poli
tician."4 8 He brought a vigor and imagination to the office which
its earlier, more sleepy occupants had lacked. He understood the
needs of the Navy well, even if, as a practical politician, he could
often do little to meet them. So it was that when Porter secured
an interview for Luce with Chandler, the old seadog found a
receptive audience.
Luce presented his plan to Chandler in a conversation which
lasted several hours. The best location for the school, he told the
Secretary, would be Newport, not Annapolis, since Newport was
the best deepwater port on the coast and would be much cooler
during the summer months than Annapolis.4 9 The College should
have a staff of five officers who would constitute its "academic
board." Their function would be to plan the curriculum and the
practical exercises.
Like the Artillery School, the Naval War College was to be a
"school of application" where new tactical ideas could be tried
out in the field. For this purpose, Luce recommended that "there
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be attached to the school a steam sloop of the most modern design
fully equipped for torpedo service" and "as soon as practicable,a
torpedo boat of high speed as well as several steam cutters
equipped for ramming." 5 0
Concerning the curriculum, Luce was less specific. He did
recommend that Hamley's Operations of War be used as a text and
suggested a number of subjects on which papers might be
written,5 1 but on the whole, he was unwilling to tie the hands of
the staff in developing the curriculum.
Chandler was impressed. "Warfare has now become so much a
matter of science and precision," he observed, "that it would be
utter folly not to set all the younger officers to studying modern
developments ....A post graduate instruction in the Navy as well
as the Army seems to me inevitable." 5 2 The Secretary arranged
for Luce to present his plan to a meeting of the Line Bureau
Chiefs. These men, the Chiefs of the Bureau of Navigation,
Ordnance, and Steam Engineering, were the professional heads of
the Navy, the Chief of Navigation occupying a position com
parable in influence to the present Chief of Naval Operations.
Commodore John G.Walker,Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,
was alone among his colleagues in being enthusiastically in favor of
the scheme. The other Bureau Chiefs,custodians as they were of
the status quo in the Navy, were unimpressed. Capt. Montgomery
Sicard of the Bureau of Ordnance, a somewhat taciturn man,
treated it in a manner bordering on derision." 5 3
The support of Walker, however, was enough and Chandler
proceeded to appoint a board headed by Luce to consider the
question of "post-graduate courses or schools in the Navy." In
1877, at Luce's urging Secretary of the Navy R.W. Thompson had
ordered an officer abroad to "study the systems of naval
education in foreign countries with a view to establishing a post
graduate course. " 5 4 His report had been buried. Luce was
determined that the same thing should not happen to the report of
his Board. He was careful to ensure that the other two members
of the Board, Capt. William T. Sampson, later of Spanish
American War fame, and Comdr. Caspar F. Goodrich,would be in
sympathy with his ideas. On 6 May, he wrote to Goodrich: "If
you will kindly look over the article entitled 'War Schools' in the
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Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, you will find my ideas
sketched out .... Whenever you feel prepared to meet and draw
up plans for the operation of such a school ... inform me and I
will convene the Board." 5 5
The controversy over Newport as the site for the new school
had grown so heated that Luce advised Senator Aldrich that he
felt it best not to have the Board make any recommendation as to
location. Once the Board's findings were accepted, the choice of a
site could safely be left to the Secretary "always providing he
determines correctly" and did not recommend the "notoriously
unhealthy vacant naval hospital at Annapolis." 5 6
After a series of meetings aboard the New Hampshire, at
Newport, the Board issued its report. It was the most complete
and systematic argument for higher military education that had
ever appeared in the United States. The Board pointed to "the
recognized necessity for an advanced course of military and naval
education in the United States" brought about by "the constant
changes in the method of conducting naval warfare imposed by
armoured ships, rams, torpedoes and high powered guns." 5 7
Although they conceded that "the science of war cannot be
mastered through books alone," the Board insisted that:
...a complete study of the operations of war on land and at
sea is absolutely essential....Campaigns that have depended
for success upon the co-operation of a fleet; campaigns that
have been frustrated through the interposition of a fleet; the
transfer by water of a numerous army and their landing
under the guns of a fleet ...naval expeditions which have
ended in disaster that could have been foretold through an
intelligent study of the problem, and the great naval battles,
which illustrate and enforce many of the most immutable
principles of war, should be carefully examined and rendered
familiar to the naval student.
A Naval War College would provide "a place where our officers
will not only be encouraged but required to study their proper
profession: war." 5 8
The authors ended their brief with a warning. "The almost t�tal
absence in this country of adequate naval forces adds to the
burden of responsibility imposed upon our naval officers and
makes the War College an absolute necessity."
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In its somewhat tangled prose, the Luce Board's report summed
up the attitudes and hopes of the progressive camp of the Navy.
All the ideas were there: the confusion over changes in tech
nology, the faith in history and in the "immutable principles" of
naval strategy, the frustration at the condition of the Navy and the
stubborn conviction that the proper study for warriors was war.
Today it is difficult to realize how startling Luce's proposals
must have seemed to most of his contemporaries. Professional
education in the United States was then in its infancy. Less than
10 years before Christopher Langdell had succeeded in introducing
the case method into the curriculum at the Harvard Law School.
The first business school in the United States, the Wharton School
at the University of Pennsylvania, was 2 years old. "Medical
schools" abounded but modern medical education did not yet
exist.5 9
Yet even the proposal for a graduate professional school was
not as unorthodox as Luce's suggestion that this school should be
a center for research as well as training. Only 6 years before,
Daniel Coit Gilman had startled the trustees of the new Johns
Hopkins University by announcing that "remote utility is quite as
worthy to be thought of as immediate advantage," and proposing
that the new institution devote itself primarily to scholarship and
research.6 0 In 1884, Johns Hopkins was the only real graduate
school in the country. Everywhere, serious research, in non
technical subjects, was viewed with suspicion. In the early 1890's,
James Bryce had remarked on "the lack of serious and sustained
thinking" among Americans. "Abstract reasonings they dislike,
subtle reasonings they suspect; they accept nothing as practical
which is not plain, downright, apprehensible by ordinary under
standing." 6 1 President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard, writing to the
Hopkins trustees in 1876, had advised against attempting to
establish a graduate school in the United States because "I should
doubt very much whether any such institution . . . could cut loose
from the community in which it is placed." 6 2 Into this America
Luce proposed to launch his school "for original research on all
questions relating to war."
On 6 October 1884, a few weeks after he received Luce's
report, Chandler issued General Order No. 325: "A college is
hereby established for an advanced course of professional study to
be known as the Naval War College." 6 3 Commodore Stephen B.
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Luce, then commanding the North Atlantic Squadron, was
detached and ordered to report as the first president of the
College.
To the officers serving with Luce in the North Atlantic
Squadron, the infant Naval War College seemed a poor substitute
for the headship of a line Bureau, which an officer of Luce's
achievements could normally expect at the end of his career.
Though they did not say so aloud, many of his friends thought
that the old seadog might be getting a bit softheaded to throw
away his chance of eminence and power for a new fangled scheme
with little chance of success. 6 4
At the end of October, Luce left the Atlantic Fleet off
Newport, and was rowed over to the site of the War College on
Coasters Harbor Island. The school's only building, a huge
ramshackle affair, which had formerly been used as an asylum for
paupers, stood bleak and empty in the gray October evening.
Bradley Fiske and some of the other officers from the squadron
had come over with him to say goodbye. Then they were gone and
Luce was left standing with his messboy on the steps of the War
College. Picking his way up the rickety stairs, Luce placed his hand
on the door and announced to the empty grounds: "Poor little
poor house, I christen thee United States Naval War College." 6 5
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CHAPTER III
THE FIRST YEARS
The short New England summer was already drawing to a close
in September of 1885 when the first class of student officers
formed up on the parade ground in front of the Naval War College
building to hear Rear Adm. Daniel Ammen, an "Old Navy" hand
and Grant crony, deliver the opening address. To lend added
dignity to the occasion, Luce had invited the prominent citizens of
Newport as well as friends and relatives of the officers to attend.
"The green was covered with platoons of men from the training
squadron, uniformed in white, and performing rapid infantry and
artillery evolutions. " 1
As Ammen surveyed the neat rows of white hats below him, he
might have been thinking of his own experiences as a young
officer in the Gulf Squadron in the 1840's, of Sam Houston and
Fremont and Zachary Scott and perhaps reflected for a moment
on how times had changed. "The merely perfunctory officer will
never do," he began solemnly.2
The rest of the speech, a disorganized, rambling affair, was a
disappointment. So was the first class. In their report the Luce
Board had recommended a class of 50 officers of the rank of
commander and above. The first class consisted of eight officers,
all lieutenants. Most of these men had been sent from the Torpedo
School on Goat Island and "considered that they had been
shanghaied." 3
Several officers who had agreed to give lectures could not be
present because the Navy Department had failed to assign them to
the College.4 Those who did come, Gen. J.C. Palfrey, Comdr.
Henry C. Taylor, Gen. George Gordon and the noted historian
John C. Ropes, paid their own way. 5 The only regular members of
the faculty present at the first session were Lt. Tasker H. Bliss of
the Army, who lectured on military strategy and tactics, and J .R.
Soley, a New York lawyer and professor at the Naval Academy
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who lectured on international law. A civilian and an Army officer
were not a combination likely to impress the shanghaied students.
The War College build�ng itself was in much the same condition
as when Luce arrived. Admiral Porter on a visit 2 years before had
found it "so foul from occupation by paupers that it is unfit for
human habitation." 6 Navy engineers who surveyed the building
estimated that it would cost $36,000to repair and renovate it.7 A
week after Luce arrived the Bureau of Construction announced
that it was transferring all the furniture of the building to the
training ship New Hampshire since "the building has now been
given to the Bureau of Navigation." 8
The first session lasted one month. Soley lectured on interna
tional law daily at 10:00 a.m. and Bliss on military science at
11:30 on Mondays. Tuesday and Thursday afternoons at 1:00
p.m. were devoted to lectures on various topics including a series
by Ropes on Grant's campaign in Virginia.
The only apparent result of this first session was to arouse a
storm of criticism over the presence of an Army officer at a naval
school. One high-ranking officer declared to Luce that "he would
rather see the whole project abandoned " than have that scandal
ous state of affairs continue.9
Young "Tad " Bliss was only 30years old when he was assigned
to the War College but he already exhibited many of the
intellectual qualities that were to win him such widespread respect
in later life. He had served as an instructor at West Point,
published a learned article on the Russo-Turkish War, spoke
French, Spanish, German and Russian and whiled away his time
reading ancient Greek. "My desire is that you should have the very
best man we have for the position," the Adjutant General had
written in answer to Luce's request for a lecturer in military
science, "and if I can get the Secretary to approve,I feel you will
have probably the most desirable officer in the Army for the
place." 1 0
Bliss had at first been reluctant to accept the appointment and
insisted that his first lectures be given on a trial basis.1 1 As a
lecturer at the War College he soon became the equal of Mahan in
popularity.A reporter who attended one of his courses on military
strategy noted that "the class ...took notes,asked questions and
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followed the lectures with a closeness that was surprising." 1 2 Bliss
was later to play a leading role in the founding of the Army War
College, and served as its first president.
Few people seemed to realize that without Bliss the "compara
tive" method which was to make naval warfare a science would be
unworkable. He was the link between the new military science as
developed in the European staff schools and the naval officers who
were to apply it to sea warfare.In November, Luce was obliged to
write to the Secretary of the Navy:
I learn now that the department disapproves of the detail of
an Army Officer as instructor. The absence of this officer
would materially change the most important object of the
curriculum. The recommendation ...was made with a
special view to a comprehensive course of study in the art
and science of war and by a method which will have the
merit it is believed of being entirely original with our
Navy.1 3
William Sampson advised Luce "as a matter of policy" to give
the critics a chance to produce a naval officer to teach military
strategy. "I confess it would be a bit ridiculous ...yet if anyone
will come forward, accept for the sake of peace until the college is
well started.... " 1 4
The Navy grudgingly allowed Bliss to stay and the Army
grudgingly allowed the College to "borrow" him a while longer
but the problem of obtaining an instructor in military science was
to remain a perennial headache during the early years. In 1896,
President Henry C. Taylor found himself still unable to get one on
a regular basis.1 5
Undeterred by the setbacks of the first year, Luce began almost
immediately to plan for the next year's course.In addition to Bliss
and Soley, Lt. William B. Hoff, one of the Navy's foremost
students of tactics, was added to the faculty as Professor of Naval
Tactics and Lt.John F. Meigs, a design expert, as lecturer on Naval
Gunnery.
For the most important post, that of Professor of Naval
Warfare, Luce had originally selected Lt. M.R. MacKenzie, but
MacKenzie was unable to accept.1 6 Looking around for a
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replacement, Luce remembered his old acquaintance Alfred T.
Mahan, the son of "Old Dennis" Mahan who had taught military
tactics to future generals of both sides at West Point before the
Civil War. At the moment Commander Mahan was down on the
coast of Peru in rather unexciting command of the old wooden
sloop Wachusett.
Mahan and Luce had served together at the Naval Academy
during the Civil War and Mahan had been Luce's executive officer
on the Macedonian. Luce knew him as a scholarly officer with an
interest in history and with views on naval strategy similar to his
own. In addition he had recently published a book on the naval
campaigns of the Civil War, The Gulf and Inland Waters. Perhaps
Mahan might be the man.
In September 1884, Mahan replied to Luce's letter of inquiry.
"I should like the position, like it probably very much. I believe I
have the capacity and perhaps some inherited aptitude for the
particular study; but I do not on questioning myself find that now
I have the accurate knowledge that I should think necessary. " 1 7
His next remark must have warmed Luce's heart: "I take it the
subject you propose to me involves an amount of historical
narrative specially directed toward showing the causes of failure
and success, thus enforcing certain general principles. " 1 8 Here at
last was the man to find the "immutable principles" of naval
strategy.
Although Mahan had written that he would need at least a year
to prepare and that he "ought to go home at once," he was not
relieved for another 8 months. In May he wrote Luce a gloomy
letter explaining that because of his heavy responsibilities as
Commander of Wachusett he had had little time to prepare for his
duties at the Naval War College and could not be ready for
lecturing in the autumn of 1885. He despairingly offered to resign,
but Luce, either because of faith in Mahan or the difficulty of
securing a replacement, decided to stick to his original choice. 1 9
Mahan was finally relieved a few weeks later and arrived at Mare
Island Navy Yard, in California, in late September 1885. He spent
the winter in New York, studying and preparing his lectures. When
he arrived in Newport in the summer of 1886 it was to find ·that
Luce had been ordered back to the North Atlantic Squadron and
he had been appointed the new president. "Le College c'est moi,"
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he muttered ironically to himself as he surveyed the nearly empty
building. 2 0 At the time of Mahan's arrival the College's furnishings
consisted of four desks and twelve chairs borrowed from the
nearby Training Station along with a chart of the Battle of
Trafalgar. "There was but one lamp available which I had to carry
with me when I went from room to room by night and, indeed,
except for the roof above my head, I might be said to be camping
out. "2 i
When Mahan moved his family to Newport in October, the
repairs to the building were still incomplete. The Mahans took up
residence in the classrooms and were obliged to move out every
morning "before the lectures. " 2 2
The second course began in the fall of 1886 with 20 officers in
attendance, again, mostly lieutenants or below. Luce brought the
Tennessee into Newport for 10 days so that the students could
practice tactics with her launches but for the most part Mahan was
on his own. A naturally pessimistic soul he had little hope for the
experiment he had been handed but he was determined not to
surrender without a stubborn fight. 2 3
The Navy Department, on its part, seemed to have forgotten the
College. Only the Bureau of Equipment, which resented having the
Coasters Harbor Island building and grounds taken, from its
empire, continued to follow the College's career with interest,
impatiently awaiting a chance to win back its lost possessions.
For 1885 Congress refused to provide any money for the
College in the Naval Appropriation Bill "fearing that this might be
construed into a justification for having a College with civilian
professors and lecturers paid out of the Treasury. " 2 4 Lest the
Navy have any heretical thoughts in this direction, the Naval
Affairs Committee recommended that the College not be men
tioned in the Appropriations Bill. They did agree to include an
item of $6,000 in the Sundry Civil Appropriations Bill for the
maintenance of the building but this was for 1 year only.
The following year there was no appropriation and the Bureau
of Equipment gleefully prepared to reclaim its lost property. They
reckoned without Mahan and his determined little band. When the
money ran out, Mahan and his staff were able to raise $100 by
selling scrap left over from repairs which had been made on the
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house during the summer. As winter came on, however, the
College found itself without fuel. Mahan then took what was for
him a drastic step and one which his stern old father would
certainly never have approved. "It was decided to send in the
requisition for coal anyway, even though there was no appropria
tion against which to charge it." 2 5 By the time the ponderous
bureaucracy of the Navy Department took cognizance of the
crime, the coal was already stored securely in the basement of the
War College.

Under Mahan the curriculum began to assume the basic pattern
it would retain for the next 5 years. Much stress was placed on the
idea of voluntary individual study rather than formal instruction.
Luce conceived of the War College as more of an institute than a
school. Officers should be sent to the College "not to hear
lectures, which are very well in their way, but to study."
According to Luce, "it is one of the principles of education that
the process in the acquisition of knowledge shall be one of
self-instruction.... What the learner derives by mental exertion is
better known than what is told him. " 2 6 " This is not a school and
you are not scholars," Caspar F. Goodrich told an early class.
"What you will learn and take away with you depends on you." 2 7
Officer students were expected to be at the College at 9 a.m.
and to remain there until 1:30 p.m. That was all. Many of the
lectures, library periods and,later, war games, were entirely volun
tary. "The whole endeavor was to convince officers of the useful
ness of the College and not to force them to do anything." 2 8

The course still consisted entirely of lectures and "practical
exercises " but the lectures were greatly expanded and placed on a
regular basis. The regular staff now included Bliss in Military
Strategy, Soley in International Law, Meigs and Hoff in Naval
Tactics and Mahan in Naval History and Strategy.A typical course
of lectures for the period included:
The War of 1812
Naval Gunnery
The Proposed Isthmian Canal and
the Caribbean
Naval Strategy
Strategic Features of the Pacific Coast
Strategic Features of the Gulf Coast

Theodore Roosevelt
J.F. Meigs

C.H. Stockton
A.T. Mahan
C.H. Stockton
A.T. Mahan

Drawing of a class at the Naval War College from Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, January 26, 1889
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Strategic Study of the Lake Frontier
Naval History
Coast Defense
Coast Defense
Military History and Strategy
and Tactics
Tactics of the Gun
Tactics of the Ram
Tactics of the Torpedo
Fleet Battle Tactics
War Games
Naval Logistics
General Staff and Intelligence
International Law
The Ship as Gun Platform

C.C. Rodgers
A.T. Mahan
D. Kennedy
H.L.Abbott, USA
T.H. Bliss, USA
J.F. Meigs
P.F. Harrington
D.Kennedy
A.T.Mahan
W.M. Little
C.C. Rodgers
C.C. Rodgers
J.R.Soley
R. Gatewood2 9

The "practical exercises " presented more of a problem. In their
report the Board had recommended that "the North Atlantic
Squadron should be assembled annually at Newport and should
practice squadron evolutions with the assistance of the War
College Staff." From the beginning, Luce and Porter had
attempted to have ships attached to the College for the purpose of
tactical exercises. In his Report for 1885, Admiral Porter had
suggested that the Navy's experimental torpedo ram, the Alarm,
"now lying useless at New York be sent to Newport and fitted
with an 8-inch or 10-inch rifle and some four other pieces of
different sizes.... There is no other way by which officers can
make themselves familiar with modern heavy rifles." 3 0 Having the
Alarm at Newport, the Admiral contended, "would greatly
increase the desire of the men to attend the College." Besides,he
added sarcastically, "the Alarm, armed as I propose,will be better
adapted to coast defense than the whole home squadron,which is
not perhaps saying much." 3 1 But although Porter continued his
agitation and although Luce wrote to his Congressional ally,
Senator Nelson A. Aldrich, that "it is essential to have the Alarm
sent here at once," 3 2 the ship remained at New York.
In 1888, Luce came up with an even more grandiose scheme. He
sought to turn the North Atlantic Squadron into a great
laboratory for the War College. When Luce assumed command of
the Squadron, the American Navy had never held regular fleet
maneuvers. Except for the Atlantic Squadron ships usually did not
even cruise in company and when they did a commodore was
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usually grateful if they simply avoided colliding with one another.
The new commander promptly changed all that. "When Luce took
command of the North Atlantic Squadron we ceased to spend the
summers at the principal New England watering places and the
winters at New Orleans and went into the most intensive tactical
maneuvers." 3 3 Officers found themselves ordered to get under
way in all types of weather or to repel a torpedo attack, or to put
a landing party ashore. It was not unusual for the "Great Drill
Master" to run a ship aground in the soft mud and calmly inform
the youngest officers that they had one hour to get her off.3 4
Luce now proposed that the War College plan the maneuvers of
the Atlantic Fleet and use them as a laboratory to test its new
strategic and tactical theories. As he wrote to the Secretary of the
Navy:
The channel Squadron of England, the French Squadron of
Evolutions, the principal squadrons of Russia, Germany and
Italy are all engaged during certain seasons of the year in
practicing with modern arms and in the tactics they im
pose ... we ought to follow this excellent example. The
North Atlantic Squadron has entered into a more comprehen
sive system of instruction than is known in any other navy.
The fundamental idea is to make theoretical instruction and
practical exercises go hand in hand. In the lecture room
certain tactical propositions are laid down to the officers
under instruction. Their merit is then tested in the school of
application, the squadron.3 5

I

Luce's reference to "the principal squadrons of Europe" may
have been designed to make his proposal appear less radical than it
actually was and thus more palatable to the Navy Department. In
fact the "maneuvers practiced by European Navies were very
unambitious in nature and were primarily designed to give
commanders practice in altering formation and in station keep
ing. " 3 6 Even in the Channel Squadron "the study of naval
strategy was not promoted much by the maneuvers which usually
gave one side a hopeless task to perform." 3 7
It was not surprising that the Navy Department in the 1880's
would look askance at the idea of turning the fleet into a "school
of application." Moreover, Luce for a number of reasons, was
already out of favor with the new Secretary of the Navy William
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C. Whitney. Consequently, nothing was done to implement his
suggestions and it was not until after the turn of the century that
fleet maneuvers planned by the College began to be held. As late
as 1910, a member of the College staff observed that "although
there have been occasional maneuvers in which the College has
taken part as umpire or otherwise, on the whole, very little has
been accomplished in this direction." 3 8
Unable to hold the "practical exercises" on the grand scale
envisioned by Luce, Mahan was compelled to look for a less
expensive substitute. Lt. William McCarty Little, a retired officer
serving on the staff, suggested that steam launches might be used
in place of ships as the Tennessee's launches had been the previous
summer. At first, however, the College was unable even to have
any launches assigned to it. In exasperation Mahan suggested that
"twelve baby carriages be obtained and wheeled around the parade
ground since in any case they will be more colorful and
picturesque." 3 9
Finally, the launches arrived and well-to-do Newport residents,
t aking the air, were sometimes surprised to observe the "nice
young men" from the War College sputtering wildly around the
harbor in their steam launches, as they conducted their lesson in
the "school of application."
The "nice young men," most of them lieutenants or below who_
were sent to the College in these early years, were not generally on
fire with a zeal for learning. Selected at random by the Bureau of
Navigation they were often men of considerable experience who
resented being sent to a school "to teach them their duties." 40 "A
large proportion of these officers," recalled Caspar F. Goodrich,
"had been sent to Newport very much against their will. They
were dissatisfied and very antagonistic toward the College." 4 1 At
first the work of the College seemed irrelevant if not downright
bizarre. "We did not see, even 'the captains of ships, who ought to
have seen, did not see, what the campaigns of the Archduke
Charles had to do with the profession of naval officers," 4 2
recalled Bradley Fiske.
Not all the impressions were negative. After the shock wore off
many officers were pleased with the opportunity to do some pard,
uninterrupted thinking about the problems of naval warfare. "I
wish my course had been twice as long," declared Lt. Comdr.
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Charles J. Train, "for the study of grand strategy is not one to be
lightly taken up and easily dropped. "4 3 Mahan's lectures were also
a popular feature. "The War College seems to have had quite a
boom this season," reported Commodore Walker to Luce; "I am
happy to hear Mahan's lectures have been such a success. "4 4
Men who had not attended the College, however, were hard to
convince. It is a curious fact in the history of the War College that
the men who attended it often left "converted," but that they
were hardly ever able to inspire their fellow officers with any
interest in going there themselves. As late as 1911, Luce concluded
that "the great majority of line officers have so far failed to
appreciate its value as an educational institution. "4 5
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CHAPTER IV
THE USES OF HISTORY
Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade,
whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of
the world and consequently the world itself.
Sir Walter Raleigh

History of the World

At the time of its founding the Naval War College was a
completely novel experiment. There were no other schools of its
type anywhere. The only comparable institution, the Royal Naval
College at Greenwich, offered only "strictly technical courses for
the training of sub-lieutenants, naval constructors, etc. which had
no relation either to the process of fighting or to the principles of
war." 1
The Naval War College had, in effect, been established to teach
subjects which did not yet exist. Utter confusion prevailed among
naval officers on the subject of tactics while strategy as a
systematic study could scarcely be said to exist. The U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, the Navy's most learned publication, did not
run a single article on strategy or tactics from its founding in 1874
until 1886.2 Mahan, after surveying the state of the art, declared
that:
There is an entire lack of textbooks upon which to base a
course of instruction ....There is nothing in the range of
naval literature to place alongside the many and elaborate
treatises in the art of war on land in its various branches.
Much indeed has been written. But what has thus far been
produced is for the most part fragmentary, representative of
special views, partial and unsystematic in treatment. No
attempt has been made to bring the whole subject under
review in an orderly well-considered method.3
"The first great fact that presented itself to us," Luce remarked,
"was that in all that related to naval tactics, naval strategy and the
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naval policy of a state, not only were there no instructors but
there were no textbooks. "4 It now fell to Mahan to bring order
out of the "fragmentary, partial, and unsystematic views" of his
colleagues.
Mahan took up his task at a time when the pace of naval
competition had begun to quicken. The French Navy was growing
rapidly, as was the Russian fleet. The Italians were building a pair
of monster battleships, and in Germany the new Emperor Wilhelm
II was becoming interested in naval matters. In September 1884,
the British journalist W.T. Stead published his famous article "The
Truth About the Navy" in the Pall Mall Gazette, touching off the
first of the "Navy scares" that were to become common in
England in the next 30 years.
Even the lethargic Americans had begun to show an interest in
naval expansion. When Mahan received his call to the College the
United States had no modern warships in commission. A few
months later, in 1884, Congress had authorized the construction
of three small "protected" cruisers and a dispatch boat; the first
ships of the new Navy. By the end of Cleveland's administration in
1889, the Navy had 38 modern warships with a total displacement
of over 100,000 tons. 5 In that same year the new Republican
Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin F. Tracy, informed the Congress
that the United States would need "two fleets of armored
battleships," one fleet of twelve for the Atlantic and one fleet of
eight for the Pacific. 6 By March 1890, Congress had approved a
bill providing for the construction of three "sea-going coast line
battleships designed to carry the heaviest armour and most
powerful ordnance." 7
This sudden enthusiasm for naval expansion in an era which
was otherwise characterized by the traditional American in
difference to foreign affairs has never been adequately ex
plained. 8 To contemporary apologists and advocates of naval
building, however, the reasons seemed clear enough.9 For one
thing the booming manufacturing industries of the United States
seemed to suggest the possibility that American businessmen
would soon begin to look abroad for foreign markets to dispose
of their "surplus." An expanding foreign commerce, of course,
required a larger Navy. "We should protect American commerce in
foreign ports, and on the high seas to secure now much-needed
extension of American commerce," urged Representative J.
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Warren Keifer in 1885. "We need seagoing vessels ... to police the
high seas; gunboats and torpedo boats for coast defense." 1 0
An even more popular argument for naval preparedness was the
defenselessness of the American coasts. The United States, it was
claimed, was vulnerable to attack by any one of a dozen powers
with navies stronger than her own.As one representative put it,
With this humiliating condition of our Navy staring us in the
face and with the consciousness of our utter weakness and
inability to protect our flag when assailed by the smallest
naval power of Europe or even by Chile .. . can any
gentleman stand in his place and say that the appropriation
for new vessels is adequate.1 1
"Harrowing pictures of British, Chilean, Brazilian and even
Chinese warships shelling New York, San Francisco and Buffalo"
were frequently conjured up by big Navy Congressmen for the
edification and instruction of the voters.1 2
A few Congressmen, however, had formulated a much more
sophisticated argument for naval expansion. Representative Wash
ington C. Whitthorne appealed to history to illustrate the truth
that "those nations which have attained highest rank in dominion
and civilization have flourished most in wealth and prosperity
when they had a prosperous merchant marine." 1 3
By 1890, the stage was set for Mahan. A number of conditions
both real and imaginary had combined to convince the public, or
at least the Congress, that a large Navy was desirable. In the words
of one writer the ideas behind naval expansion "had already been
collected in a thought-reservoir from which Mahan drew." 14
Nevertheless, these ideas by no means constituted a systematic
doctrine and they were far from being universally accepted, even
in the Navy. The Congressional debates of the 1880's on the whole
reveal a remarkable lack of agreement about the uses and purposes
of a Navy. Although some statements may be found which seem
to presage Mahan they are not really representative of the debates
as a whole.
The lack of consensus on naval strategy and policy was reflected
in the naval building programs of the 1880's with vessels like the
Maine and Texas, neither battleships nor cruisers but something in
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between, and cruisers like the Columbia and Minneapolis as large
and fast as ocean liners but with a meager armament of one 8-inch
and two 6-inch guns.1 5
American naval policy had always been defensive in character
and this outlook was still much in evidence during the 1880's.
"Discussion of rams, mines, torpedo boats, gunboats and moni
tors, running to scores of pages in the Congressional Record,
revealed the extent to which Senators and Representatives were
still thinking in terms of passive coast defense.1 6 Only 4 years
before the publication of Mahan's first book a board of high
ranking Army and Navy officers headed by Secretary of War
William C. Endicott had outlined an extensive program of
fortifications for 10 major seaports. For New York alone the
board recommended 95 heavy guns and 144 mortars to be
mounted in "turrets, armored casemates, barbette batteries, and
mortar batteries" as well as submarine mines and 18 torpedo
boats.1 7
Typical of a large segment of Congressional opinion at the time
were the views expressed by Representative Samuel R. Peters of
Kansas in 1890:
There is now no such thing as a naval action .... Why, Mr.
Chairman, if men high in the Navy are to be believed the only
resistance that can be made to these foreign battleships is not
b a t t l eships but fortifications ...the only safety for New
York for Charleston for Pensacola is the fortification system
that we can build and equip with modern guns. Our cruisers
can go and prey upon the commerce of the enemy and our
forts can defend our seacoast against the navies of the
world. 1 8
Representative William Vandiver of California was even more
positive. "These battleships are unsafe. Set such ships upon
mid-ocean and the first discharge of a broadside from their
formidable guns would sink them to the bottom of the sea." 1 9
Like the Congressmen, military writers in the 1870's and 1880's
tended to think of naval warfare in terms of coast defense and
commerce warfare and sudden descents on the enemy's coast.The
experience of the recent Franco-Prussian war in which the
powerful French fleet had been unable to prevent a swift defeat at
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the hands of Germany seemed to confirm the view that the days
of Nelsonian naval warfare had passed.
In France the so-called Jeune Ecole group of naval strategists
believed that the day of the large heavily armed and armored
vessel had passed. 2 0 The torpedo had rendered the · big gun
superfluous, while defensive power could best be secured by speed
and by building a large number of small very fast units.2 1 The
Jeune Ecole believed that the key to success in war was nqt the
defeat of the enemy fleet but the destruction of his economic
power. As Gabriel Charmes, one of the leading spokesmen of the
school, declared: "Will not the ruin of Marseilles and the capture
of the packet boats of our maritime companies be altogether as
disastrous as the destruction of some forts outside Toulon or the
scattering of our battle squadron?" 2 2
In England, attention was focused on coastal defenses and the
few men like Sir John Colomb and his brother Sir Phillip Colomb
who protested that the proper place to meet the enemy's fleet was
on the high seas were largely ignored.
Many influential American naval officers also believed in the
efficacy of commerce warfare. Adm. David Dixon Porter declared
that "One vessel like the Alabama roaming the oceans would do
more to bring about peace than a dozen unwieldy ironclads." 2 3
Even Mahan had originally believed that for the United States "the
surest deterrent will be a fleet of swift cruisers to prey on the
enemy's commerce .... This threat will deter a possible enemy,
particularly if coupled with adequate defense of our principal
ports." 2 4 As for "command of the seas," an American naval
officer writing in 1889 dismissed the idea with the observation
that "command of the seas based upon fleets strong enough to
shut hostile squadrons in their ports [has never been] approached
by any power except Great Britain ...and she has never been able
to maintain it for any long period.... The construction of a fleet
of battleships to secure command of the sea ... is unlikely to be
approved by Congressmen because of expense and by professional
opinion on the ground that types must [soon] become obso
lete.... " 2 5
It was to bring order out of the strategic confusion of the
1880's and to combat the heresies of coast defense and commerce
warfare that the Naval War College had been founded.Capt. Henry
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C. Taylor told an early class that the lack of actual experience in
large-scale naval warfare over the past 80 years had encouraged the
growth of many erroneous beliefs.
It has bred fancies in our brains, very positive fancies, and, in
many cases positively wrong .... In the last 20 years there
have been a large number of officers who have stated that
there would be no more fleet fighting ...nor has it been in
the newspapers alone that we have heard commerce destroy
ing upheld as a good and cheap way of making powerful
maritime nations sue for peace .... In no way does a War
College appear more needed than to dispel such ideas by
bringing to bear upon the matter, the united attention of a
number of officers of matured experience who ... may
combat fallacies dangerous to naval efficiency and national
safety.2 6
In the War College crusade to stamp out the naval heresies of
the 1880's, Mahan, as Professor of Naval Warfare, occupied a
central place. In his studies of history and strategy Mahan was
attempting to do two things: first, to show what seapower was,
and, second, to show how it should be used. He was thus
attempting to answer two distinct but related questions: "What is
the Navy for?" and "How should the Navy be used?" 2 7
His answer to the first question made him the most influential
historian of his time. "Control of the seas," he urged, was "an
historic factor which had never been systematically appreciated
and expounded." In a careful study of European history in the
17th and 18th centuries, he attempted to show how seapower was
"vital to the national growth, prosperity and security of great
nations." 2 8 He demonstrated how control of the sea had often
been the decisive factor in a campaign or an entire war.
In the first chapter of his work on the Influence of Seapower
Upon History he attempted to identify "those factors which tend
to make a nation a great seapower." After an examination of these
factors: geographical position, physical conformation, extent of
territory, national character, population and governmental institu
tions, he came to the not very startling conclusion that England,
through the possession of the right combination of them, was
uniquely fitted to be the mistress of the seas. Interestingly enough,
the United States also possessed the potential to become a great
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naval power if the country could acquire suitable bases, enlarge its
merchant marine, complete the "proposed Isthmian Canal" across
Central America, and of course build an "adequate" navy.
It was this first part of Mahan's thesis that most interested the
would-be empire builders and big navy men of the 1890's, but it
was his answer to the second question-what should the Navy
do?-that was to have a more lasting effect in the naval profession.
Like Luce, Mahan was a great believer in the immutable
principles of strategy which would be "discovered" by the use of
the comparative method in the study of history and military
strategy.As he told the class of 1887, "History being the record of
experience, if exhaustively studied, brings out all the variable
factors which enter into war.Principles and historical illustrations,
each is a partial educator, combined you have in them the perfect
instructor." 2 9
We cannot entirely understand Mahan's seapower book unless
we remember that he was not merely writing history or making
out an argument for a large navy but like the 18th-century
philosophers was "going up and down the field of history"
searching for immutable principles of strategy and tactics. By the
"comparative method" historical situations could be compared
with contemporary ones in order to discover the correct principles
of action.A good example is Mahan's long digression on the use of
fire ships in the third chapter of the Influence of Seapower Upon
History. Observing that "there is on the surface certain resem
blances between the fire-ship and the part assigned in modern
warfare to the torpedo cruiser," he then launched into a detailed
account of the fire-ship with the explanation that "an appreciation
of the character of fire-ships and the circumstances under which
they attained their greatest usefulness, and of the causes which led
to their disappearance may perhaps help in the decision ...as to
whether the torpedo cruiser pure and simple is a type of weapon
destined to survive." 3 0 One purpose of Mahan's book, then, was
to furnish historical examples which could be systematically com
pared with contemporary naval conditions and thus provide
material for the discovery of "correct principles."
Mahan conceded that the main advantage of studying the tactics
of former battles "is rather in forming correct habits of thought
than in supplying models for close imitation," 3 1 but in the area of
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strategy, he had no doubt that the basic principles had changed
very little. "The movements which precede and prepare for great
battles which, by their skillful and energetic combination, attain
great ends without actual contact of arms, depend upon factors
more permanent than the weapons of the age and therefore
furnish principles of more enduring value. 113 2
Scholars have recently called attention to Mahan's tendency to
take his historical analogies too literally. 3 3 Conservative in
outlook, he saw the naval questions of his time mainly through the
eyes of the 18th century. In typical fashion he dismissed the
torpedo boat as a serious weapon because "in the days of sailing
ships, which have made nearly all naval history so far," the fire
ship and the gunboat had proven unsuccessful, and "there is little
reason to doubt that the experience we have yet to gain in this will
be like the experience the world has always had heretofore. 113 4
Yet it was not the use of history, in itself, which made Mahan's
work suspect. In the late 19th century all naval analysts routinely
employed historical examples. Lt. Washington Irving Chambers,
one of the most progressive and technical-minded officers of his
generation and later a pioneer in naval aviation, urged that the
Naval War College establish a permanent Department of History to
encourage " ...that study of the past which is an essential
foundation to an intelligent preparation for the present and
future." 3 5
Comdr. William Wirt Kimball, in challenging Mahan's estimate
of the torpedo's effectiveness, himself resorted to historical
analogy. Neatly turning Mahan on his head, Kimball told a War
College class that the ancient "galley is the analogue of the
modern battleship" and the torpedo boat the equivalent of the
more modern sailing ships which appeared in the 16th century.3 6
It was Mahan's conclusions rather than his methods which angered
the Navy's young technocrats.
If history was to furnish one-half of the base for a science
of war, military strategy was to furnish the other. Bliss and
his successors were present to furnish the naval officer with a
knowledge of military strategy and tactics but the systematic
adaptation of military science to naval strategy was left to
Mahan.
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To Mahan, and to many other military writers in the 1880's
"strategy" still meant the writings of Jomini. Antoine Henri
Jomini was a military historian and theorist who began life as a
Swiss banker and rose to become "general de brigade" in
Napoleon's Army. Switching sides late in 1813, he became
military advisor to the Czar and helped to found the Russian
Military Academy. Throughout the first half of the 19th century,
his Precis de l'Art de la Guerre exerted as much influence and was
followed as slavishly by military men as Mahan's own works were
later to be by naval officers.3 7
Mahan's father, Dennis Hart Mahan, had been one of the leading
American expounders of Jomini during his long career as a
professor at West Point and it was natural that the military science
which the younger Mahan sought to adapt to naval needs would be
that of his father's mentor. In organization and emphasis his
lectures on 'naval strategy follow closely the ideas of Jomini. Like
Jomini he stressed "concentration" ("which sums up in itself all
the other factors of military efficiency in war"), "lines of
communication," "strategic points," etc., all of which would have
seemed familiar to 19th-century military strategists.
Mahan's strategic writings, however, were more than merely an
adaptation of Jomini. Here for the first time was a systematic
treatise on the correct use of naval forces in peace and war. What
is more, the measures prescribed were diametrically opposed to
traditional American practice.
Mahan provided a powerful and persuasive answer to the
advocates of coast defense and commerce raiding. His histories
pointed up the fact that commerce raiding had never won a war
and that it had been the ability of the stronger navy to gain
"control of the sea" and deny its use to the enemy that had been
decisive in the end. To those who argued that the main function of
the navy was to protect the seacoast cities, he replied that "the
proper main object of a navy is the enemy's navy."3 8 To gain
"command of the sea" battleships not cruisers were necessary, and
since the rule of concentration was the key to success at sea as
well as on land, the battleships should be combined into a single
fleet to be flung into action at the decisive point. Was it not one of
Jomini's "fundamental principles" "to bring one's major forces
successively to bear upon the decisive areas of a theatre of
war ...maneuvering in such a manner as to engage one's major
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forces against parts only of those of the enemy." 3 9 Most
important of all, Mahan's works stressed Jomini's belief in the
close I connection between diplomacy and warfare, between the
political and the military aspects of foreign policy.As he later told
the War College Class of 1909, "I cannot too entirely repudiate
any casual word of mine reflecting the view that 'political
questions belong to the statesman rather than to the military
man.' ...I very soon learned better from my best military friend
Jomini. " 4 0
Mahan's work occupied a central place, but not the only place,
in the crusade against traditional strategies. Officers who favored
an offensive high seas strategy centered on the battleship found a
natural home in the Naval War College. Mahan's colleague at the
College, Professor J.R. Soley, had told a meeting of the Naval
Institute as early as 1878 -that it was "a grievous mistake to look
upon the navy as primarily a force for commerce raiding. " 4 1
Professor of Tactics Lt. John Forsyth Meigs was informing
students that:
It might first appear ...that naval warfare might with
advantage be made a war upon commerce alone ...and that
therefore there was no use in building ships of the line ....
But history positively stamps this policy as false. Never has a
powerful impression been created in war by mere commerce
destroying. The control of the sea has again and again
powerfully contributed to deciding great wars and the fate of
nations....But this control has been and must always be
decided by battleships, by ships that when united in fleets
can overcome the enemy's fleets.4 2
The three members of the War College Board, Luce, Sampson
and Goodrich all favored an offensive fleet. In 1885 Sampson and
Goodrich had dissented from the Endicott Board's recommenda
tion to fortify everything from Florida to the Great Lakes by
calling for "armoured seagoing warships " which would "act
offensively and not be confined to the defense of ports." 4 3
In 1889, Luce summed up the arguments of the battleship
advocates in an article in the North /American Review. "The
battleship," contended Luce, "is the very foundation of the Navy.
The United States has no battleships therefore she has no Navy."
The role of the Navy,he pointed out,was essentially offensive "as
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contrasted with coastal fortifications which are defensive."
Cruisers were merely auxiliaries; they were built to run away from
battleships not to fight them. "One of the functions of light
infantry is to protect the flanks of the army. Our cruisers are to
protect the flanks of what? Nothing! There is no main body, no
line of battle, no battleships, no navy, nothing but accessories." 4 4
"The United States," declared Luce, "needs twenty battleships at
least." Four months after Luce published his article the first
copies of Mahan's book, which was to give such powerful support
to the big-navy case, began to appear in the bookstores.
Other members of the War College faculty had not been idle.
Discussing Luce's article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
Comdr. P.F. Harrington, lecturer in tactics at the College, pointed
out that "cruisers cannot prevent the descent of a hostile naval
force upon our coast" and expressed the hope that "a dozen
armored vessels will be built as soon as the material can be
obtained."4 5
The first official expression of the big battleship view came in
the report of the so-called "Naval Policy Board," which Secretary
of the Navy Tracy had appointed to "study the naval require
ments of the United States." Four of the seven members of the
Policy Board had been associated with the War College. 4 6 The
Board's report, which the New York Herald promptly labelled "a
piece of naval fanaticism," 4 7 called for the construction of 20
first-class battleships, 12 second-class battleships, and 5 third-class
battleships as well as 100 torpedo boats. For the coming year the
Board asked for an immediate start on 70,000 tons of shipping "as
much as possible of this aggregate tonnage to be in battleships." 4 8
Tracy promptly disavowed the whole report as madness and
Senator Hale declared that not a single member of the Congress
endorsed the Board's views. Yet, whether due to Mahan, or to the
Board, or to Luce, or to Tracy himself, the idea of a battle fleet
had been planted, and in 1890, the first American battleships were
authorized by Congress.
The War College's interest in a battleship navy was the logical
byproduct of the professional ethic which Luce and others hoped
to establish for the Navy. A battleship fleet, operated by
professionals on the high seas, according to the scientific principles
of Mahan was more in keeping with the new professional image
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than commerce raiding and coast defense. These smacked too
much of amateurism and improvisation, of the old tradition of
privateers and forts manned by militia, to suit the War College
strategists.
More important than professional aspirations, however, the
technological imperatives of the late 1880's and 1890's seemed to
point toward a battleship navy. By 1890 much of the technical
confusion of the previous two decades had been resolved and a
recognizable capital ship type had begun to emerge. At the same
time the development of the telegraph and of fast steam
men-of-war which could' hunt down raiders appeared to make the
danger of commerce raiding less acute.
By the late 1890's, the battleship fleet, able to contend for
command of the seas, at least in the waters adjacent to the United
States, had become the accepted basis of American naval policy.
Virtually all American naval officers now proclaimed their belief
in, and understanding of, "seapower." In 1894 Lieutenant Calkins
confessed to his War College auditors that Mahan's work had made
his "crude and formal statements" on the primacy of coast
defense "out of date," while public men like Theodore Roosevelt
and Henry Cabot Lodge seized every possible occasion to
enlighten their fellow civilians on the mysteries of naval strategy.
In this victory of the seapower advocates, Mahan played a most
important role. Although his War College colleagues held precisely
the same views as the master and had often come to them at an
earlier date, it was Mahan's lectures and writings, with their
literary polish, their air of historical scholarship and scientific
exactitude, which made the "science of naval warfare" credible to
the public. "Since the appearance of the scientific and philo
sophical works of Captain Mahan and Admiral Colomb," observed
Lt. Washington I. Chambers, "even the layman has come to
recognize that naval strategy has its broad and indefeasible
principles."4 9 It was for this reason that Mahan's name was
endlessly invoked even by those who had come earlier to the same
conclusions.
In the conversion of American opm1on to the concept of
seapower as embodied in the battleship fleet the War College had
made a major contribution to American public policy. It was a
splendid triumph of professional ideology over amateurism but, in
the end, it would exact a heavy price from the profession.
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CHAPTER V

A SEA OF TROUBLES

Unfortunately for Luce and his supporters the year in which the
Naval War College was launched was also the year in which the
voters elected the first Democratic President since Buchanan. This
fact greatly complicated the problems of the College in its struggle
for existence over the next years. But it was not the sole, or even
the most important, cause of its troubles. A more basic cause may
be found in a fundamental American aversion to war and
institutions connected with war and a distrust of the abstract and
theoretical. These, together with the usual bureaucratic suspicion
of anything new, go far toward accounting for the time of troubles
upon which the College now entered.
It is doubtful whether Grover Cleveland in the hectic early
weeks of his administration gave much thought to the Navy or to
any project as insignificant as the War College; but his new
Secretary of the Navy, William C. Whitney, certainly did. If
Chandler was the model of the corrupt political boss, Whitney was
the model of the patrician reformer. Married to the wealthy
daughter of Senator Henry B. Payne of Ohio, he had made a
fortune in the street railways of New York City. At the time of his
death in 1902 he left an estate of $23 million, ten town houses
and a string of racehorses. 1 "In spite of great wealth," notes his
biographer, "he remained a Democrat throughout his life." 2 As a
young lawyer in New York he had joined Samuel J. Tilden in the
fight against' the "Tweed Ring." Appointed Corporation Counsel
for the City of New York, he cleaned up his department, fought
Tammany and became identified with the reform wing of the
Democratic Party. He was one of Cleveland's managers in 1884,
contributed liberally to the campaign fund and was rewarded for
his services by being given the Navy Department.
With Gideon Welles and Benjamin F. Tracy, Whitney was one of
the great 19th-century Navy Secretaries. He put a stop to the
boodling in the navy yards, reorganized the Bureaus and
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introduced competitive bidding and modern methods of account
ing in the supply departments. In the course of his administration
he added more than thirty warships to the Navy including two
small battleships and an armored cruiser, and while Chandler's
ships had invariably proved to be costly failures, Whitney's ships
were usually sound investments.
When Whitney took office, in March 1885, the more unsavory
aspects of Chandler's reign had begun to come to the attention of
the public. The newspapers screamed for his head. A new
Secretary of the Navy was needed, declared the Century Magazine,
"to cleanse the department of its rottenness. " 3 The Boston Post
charged that under "crooked Chandler" the Navy Department's
record had been one of "crookedness, jobbery, inefficiency and
failure." 4 Whitney agreed. He looked upon his predecessor as the
embodiment of corruption and once intimated to a reporter that
Chandler was fortunate to have escaped jail.5 It was natural that
Whitney would view any of Chandler's works with misgivings and
the War College, being one of Chandler's special projects, naturally
came under suspicion.
Whitney had other reasons to look askance at the War College.
In September 1884, when Mahan had received his invitation to
become a member of the War College staff, he had written Luce
that
I ought to go home at once and be given until next summer
to get up the work ... the ship is worn out and ought to go
to San Francisco now but if they choose to hold onto her a
while longer the executive is quite capable. 6
Accordingly Mahan had written to Whitney requesting that he be
relieved of command. Whitney responded with an indignant letter
in which he characterized Mahan's request as "weak and un
worthy" and informed him that "a good commander should not
complain over assignments.117 Mahan stayed on the coast of South
America until the summer of 1885.
Despite his misgivings Whitney was not at first opposed to the
War College. In his first annual report he praised the work of the
College and observed that it "fills what has hitherto been a serious
want in our system of Naval Education." 8 The course of events
would soon alter his view.
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Of all the Navy's senior officers Luce was perhaps the most
skillful lobbyist. In the past he had not hesitated to campaign
stubbornly and persuasively for measures which he believed
would improve the service. "That meddling garrulous sailor" was
the way the New York Herald described him in 1887.9 As the
battlelines were drawn the Admiral and his supporters could
count upon some influential political support. Luce's son was
married to the sister-in-law of the rising young Representative
from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge, while Washington C.
Whitthorne, one of the leading Democratic members of the
House Naval Affairs Committee, was an old friend. In the
Senate, Luce had the support of William E. Chandler who was
elected Senator from New Hampshire in 1886 and later of Lodge,
but his principal ally in the 1880's remained Senator Nelson
Aldrich of Rhode Island.
In 1885 Aldrich had been able to secure an appropriation for
the College in the Sundry Civil Appropriations Bill and the
following year he was responsible for having the North Atlantic
Squadron sent to Newport during the College session. 1 ° For the
year 1887 Aldrich and Luce hoped to secure an appropriation of
$12,000 for the War College, but the prospects were not
promising.
Whatever goodwill Secretary Whitney may have held toward the
College had long since dissipated. "I yesterday ordered a good
sized class there" wrote Commodore John G. Walker to Luce in
August 1886, "and I shall hope to tide over the college until it has
more friends. I have had pretty hard work to carry it, as the
secretary is not at all in its favor." 1 1
Just as support for the College was bipartisan, so to some
extent was the opposition. In the House the enemies of "ex
travagance" were led by Representative William McAdoo of New
Jersey and Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama, both Democrats, but
one of its most determined foes was Representative John R.
Thomas, a big Navy Republican from Illinois. In the Senate the
chief opponent of the War College was Eugene Hale, Republican
of Maine, who in all other respects was an advocate of naval
expansion and a formidable opponent in debate. 1 2 "If I succeed
in getting an appropriation for the Naval War College at all, it will
be all that I shall be able to do" wrote a discouraged Aldrich to
Luce. 1 3
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If even "big-Navy men" in Congress had trouble making up
their minds about the War College, so, too, did the naval officers.
The service in general was divided between those who were merely
indifferent and those who were openly hostile. Among the latter
could be numbered the Bureau Chiefs, with the exception of
Walker, and Capt. F.M. Ramsav. the Superintendent of the Naval
Academy, who in 1884 had. written to Luce that "I cannot see the
advantage in cutting down the present course for Cadets in order
that a post-graduate course may be established for officers.
Neither can I find a reason for establishing another Naval
Academy. " 1 4
The view that the War College was a "post-graduate school" or a
"second Naval Academy" was common among naval officers for
many years after the College's founding. Even among the few
supporters of the College there were some who held this
misconception and from time to time an officer would recom
mend that the War College be removed to Annapolis or Wash
ington where its work could be "co-ordinated" with the work of
the Naval Academy or the Navy Department. Luce, on his part,
failed to see any distinction between those who were opposed to
the College and those who were merely opposed to having the
College at Newport. To the end of his life he continued to view
any suggestions for moving the College from Newport as a plot to
destroy the institution. 1 5
For the year 1887, the supporters of the College asked an
appropriation of $12,000. Admiral Porter had observed in his
report that since the government spent $15,000 on each cadet
graduated from Annapolis, it should not be difficult to find
$12,000 for the War College. 1 6
On 25 February 1887, a full-dress debate was held on the floor
of the House over the issue. The sponsors of the bill, John R. Buck
of Connecticut and Henry J. Spooner of Rhode Island, read
extracts from Whitney's Report praising the College and pointed
out that Congress had just appropriated $200,000 for the Army
Cavalry School at Ft. Leavenworth. 1 7
Representative McAdoo led off for the opposition, deploring
the "great misfortune that our military schools should be
established in connection with watering places and characterized
in certain seasons of the year as scenes of social display and
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dissipation. 111 8 Representative Thomas opined that the War
College building was "such that no Christian community would
allow it to be used even as a poor house." 1 9 Representative
McAdoo had "no doubt" that the student officers "will find some
time to devote to the festive dance and to the giddy maidens who
disport themselves on the rocks in sunbonnets." In vain did
Spooner protest that the College session began after the Newport
"season" had ended, and that "the giddy maidens do not disport
themselves on the rocks in November." Undaunted, McAdoo then
described with a knowing air how the young ladies "found quite a
romantic charm in strolling on the shining beach with the
epauleted embryonic Admirals of our decaying and dilapidated
Navy."
Hilary A. Herbert, chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee,
then took the floor. He was in favor of a postgraduate course, but
it should be held at Annapolis not Newport. "What other college
has a post-graduate course away from it?" He hoped that Congress
would "nip this thing in the bud.'' The appropriation was defeated
by a vote of 81 to 70.
In the Senate the measure was introduced by Aldrich and
carried without debate but in the conference committee Hale
stubbornly opposed the appropriation and it was eventually
defeated.2 0 Some money was found for the College in the Yards
and Docks Bill but the appropriation did not mention the College
by name. The Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1886 made
hardly any mention of the College and the next year it was
omitted altogether. As Luce wrote to Chandler: "We still need
Congressional recognition . . . . We have been beaten every session
thus far, getting money it is true, but failing of recognition.'' 2 1
Luce now redoubled his efforts. Looking around for more allies,
he remembered young Theodore Roosevelt whom he had met
while they were both serving on the New York Board of
Education. Roosevelt was already a naval historian of some note
having published a book, The Naval War of 1812, and might,
therefore, be interested in the work of the College. Moreover, he
was reported to have powerful friends in the councils of the
Republican Party. Luce wrote to Roosevelt informing him that
"there. is no question in my mind that your work [on the War of
1812] must be accepted as the very highest authority we have on
the subject" and that it would be used as a textbook at the War
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College. "May we not hope, " Luce inquired, "that the study you
have given to the early history of the Navy will lead you to take
some interest in a naval institution now struggling through the ills
of infancy." 2 2 Would not Roosevelt visit the College and meet
Mahan "who would be glad to explain the objects and ends he has
in view."
In the same spirit Luce wrote to Washington C. Whitthorne of
the Naval Affairs Committee:
I am very glad indeed to see your name on the Naval
Committee and the Navy is to be congratulated on having
such a friend where friends are so much wanted ... I beg to
commend to your notice the College recently established on
an Island in Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island.
This College has so far failed to win the favorable opinion of
the Chairman of your Committee not I believe from a lack of
merit on the part of the institution itself but from a belief
that the institution should be engrafted upon the Naval
Academy at Annapolis. As this belief has been shown by
expert testimony to be ill-founded, ... I sincerely trust all
opposition to the College may cease and that the very
moderate estimate [$14,400] asked for by the Secretary of
the Navy may be allowed by your Committee.2 3
By these methods Luce succeeded in winning over all but three
of the members of the Naval Affairs Committee and received an
appropriation of $10,000 by a large majority.2 4
Luce's lobbying activities, however, aroused the wrath of
Secretary Whitney who wrote to his wife that " ...these officers
have been working behind my back all winter.... I finally awoke
to the fact that the whole thing was being set up and worked in
Congress behind me .... I will wipe the whole thing out shortly"
he promised grimly. Whitney went personally to Capitol Hill and
used his influence to have amendments added to the appropria
tions bill.2 5 The effect of these amendments was to consolidate
the War College with the Torpedo Station on Goat Island in
Newport Harbor much to the delight of the Bureau of Equipment
which now took possession of the War College building and made
it part of the Training Station. In a statement to the press Whitney
explained that the change had been made in the interests of
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economy. "A channel less than half a mile wide flows between
these two institutions and yet Congress is asked to provide for
each separate and distinct institution." 2 6
The College was transferred to the Bureau of Ordnance and
placed under the Officer in Charge at the Torpedo Station. As
Mahan was quick to point out, the College could not long survive
under this arrangement:
If by consolidation is meant the merging of two lines of
thought radically distinct under a single directing intellect,
the result will be the destruction of one of the two ....If
consolidation means that the development of the art of war
and of torpedo manufacture are to be carried out by the
same man one or the other will dwindle and die and the
sufferer will be th� art of war.2 7
To Luce "+he consolidation was the act of enemies of the College
done with malice aforethought." 2 8 The Torpedo Station was "not
properly a school at all but simply a factory having,during a small
part of the year, a school attached to it ....It had nothing in
common with the War College." 2 9
Mahan was appalled at the disastrous turn of events and
more than a little angry at the lobbying activities which had
brought down the Secretary's wrath. He complained to Luce
that "certain friends of the College ...initiated a course
directly opposed to my views of what was politic and what
was in the best interest of the institute. They did this without
the slightest reference to me. The end result was that the
Secretary 'blew his top'." 3 0 Whitney soon discovered that
Mahan's services were needed to select a site for a new Navy
Yard-at Puget Sound.
The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, upon whom the War
College had now been bestowed, was not overjoyed with his new
charge. "I suggest for your consideration," he wrote to the
Secretary of the Navy, "the evident advantages of discontinuing
this [College] class. " 3 1 "I am not very sanguine about the
College" reported Walker to Luce. 3 2
Fortunately, the Commandant of the Torpedo Station and new
President of the College was Caspar F. Goodrich who, with Luce
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and Sampson, had planned the College in 1884. Goodrich kept the
school in operation by ordering the officers assigned to the
Torpedo Station to attend the College classes. A friend of
Whitney, Goodrich attempted to persuade him to ask for an
appropriation for a new College building. In 1889, the Secretary
finally consented to have an amendment inserted into the Naval
Appropriations Bill which provided $10,000 for a building.
Whitney's view of the College had not changed, however. He still
failed to see any need for the institution. As for the appropriation,
"I am doing this merely because Goodrich wants it but why he
wants it I am blessed if I can understand. " 3 3
Luce and Mahan were determined that the new building should
be erected on Coasters Harbor Island not at the Torpedo School at
Goat Island. Luce even went so far as to write to the Department
of the Army, which held title to Goat Island and leased it to the
Navy, urging them to reassert their claim to the property. The
island was vital to "the defenses of Narragansett Bay," Luce
declared, and the Navy should not be allowed to maintain any
installation there. The Commanding General, Maj. Gen. John M.
Schofield, like Luce a disciple of Upton and a crusader for
advanced professional education, replied tongue-in-cheek, that he
would give "the important subject" of the defense of the bay his
"fullest attention." 3 4
On 21 January 1889, another ludicrous debate was held in the
House over the proper location for the War College building. This
time Luce's old friend "Bottle" (Representative Charles R.
Boutelle of Maine), a former naval officer, led the War College
forces. Well-coached by Luce, Boutelle pointed out that "there is
no connection between this War College and a torpedo station." It
would be absurd he declared "to erect this large and expensive
building upon a mere boulder in Newport Harbor." 3 5 The Naval
Training School which had taken over the building on Coasters
Harbor Island was "now using it for a singing school, a boxing
class, and for all I know a bicycle track." The War College should
be restored to Coasters Harbor Island and the boys of the Training
School should be returned to the wholesome influence of the
training ship New Hampshire (which at the moment was creaking
and shivering at its anchorage in windswept Narragansett Bay).
The opponents of the College answered in kind. Coasters
Harbor Island, Representative Herbert asserted, was desired by the
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War College officers "because it affords better facilities for
reaching the pleasures of Newport." 3 6 The previous arrangement
had led to atrocious waste. "Here were two schools side by side,
two sets of officers, two different buildings, different clerks... . "
In the end, Congress approved the appropriation "for the
construction of a building for use by the Naval Torpedo Station
and War College" but failed to specify the site for the building.
The friends of the College had won a delaying action.
The election of 1888 brought the return of the Republicans and
raised the hopes of the College's supporters. In November, Porter
wrote to Luce that "the Republican Administration may take
advice if we can get a Secretary who wishes to run the Navy on
true principles and does not allow a lot of shysters to run it for
him. In that case we may in the end have the War College." 3 7
The new Secretary of the Navy was Benjamin F. Tracy,
erstwhile Civil War General, lawyer and longtime intimate of New
York's "Boss" Thomas C. Platt. Although he had had no previous
experience in naval affairs, he proved to be the equal of Whitney
in administrative ability and his superior in intellectual acumen.
Under Tracy the U.S. Navy began the transition from a cruiser
force into a modern battle fleet.
No sooner had Tracy taken office than he received a long letter
from Luce outlining the history and purposes of the College and
urging him to appoint a board of officers to examine the merits of
the consolidation scheme. "It is believed that the consolidation
measure was in the interests of neither the College nor of the
torpedo school nor yet in the interests of economy, and
consequently it was not in the interests of the naval service. " 3 8
Tracy replied that he understood the need for a War College and
would do his best to support it.3 9
J.R. Soley, who had given the first lectures on international law
at the College, had been named Assistant Secretary of the Navy
and the College was placed under his control. Soley's first act was
to reappoint Mahan to the War College. Secretary Tracy agreed
not to act on the congressional authorization for a new building
until Congress agreed to place it on Coasters Harbor Island and in
June 1890, Aldrich and Chandler succeeded in securing congres
sional approval for the change.
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Despite this favorable turn of events the College continued to
have its troubles. Mahan was ordered to special duty in the Navy
Department in 1890 by his friend John G. Walker, Chief of the
Bureau of Navigation, in order to enable him to draw up war
plans. Since a replacement for him could not be found in time, no
classes were held that year. In 1892, the Chilean crisis and the
consequent demands for all available officers likewise made it
impossible to hold a class.
The following year classes were resumed and Mahan was again
ordered as President. The 1892 elections, however, brought the
return of the Democrats and, by 1893, it was time for Mahan to
go to sea again.
Mahan l. .. d written to the Navy Department requesting that he
be excused from sea duty in order to continue his studies and
promising to retire at the end of 4 years if his request was
granted.4 0 At the same time Luce wrote to Senator Aldrich urging
him to appeal to the Secretary of the Navy to have Mahan's orders
changed.4 1 To the old Admiral with his faith in education and
science it seemed that any reasonable man would see at once the
utility of allowing Mahan to pursue his research. As he wrote to
John F.Meigs:
If the broad statement were made that the College
faculty ...is building up a new science and must be left free
to work at it, at least until the foundations are laid, it would
not require a professional man to see the reasonableness of
the request that the College faculty be let alone for the
present....42
Here Luce misjudged the temper of his time. If the trustees of the
leading universities could not see the reason for a graduate school
devoted to pure research, if the officers of the medical schools
could not see the need for laboratories, would the Navy
Department and the Congress really be able to see the need for an
institution concerned with "building up a new Science "?
The answer was not long in coming. At the Navy Department,
the College's old enemy Commodore F.M. Ramsay had succeeded
Walker as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Ramsay turned down
Mahan's request with the observation that "it is not the business
of naval officers to write books."
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Luce now appealed to Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, but all
to no avail. On 1 May 1893, Roosevelt wrote to Mahan: "Last
evening . . . I went up to see [Assistant Secretary] McAdoo who
is much more civilized today but can do very little. I fear all hope
for the War College, which is nothing without you, has gone; our
prize idiots have thrown away the chance to give us an absolutely
unique position in naval affairs." 4 3 In May 1893, as the Cleveland
administration took office, Mahan went to sea in command of the
new cruiser Chicago.
The new Secretary of the Navy was Hilary A. Herbert, who as
Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, had opposed the
first appropriations for the War College. Herbert was not a "little
Navy" Democrat; indeed he continued to advocate large naval
expenditures right through the depression of the 1890's. His
opposition to the War College was based mainly on his fear that it
would grow into another expensive autonomous bureaucracy like
the Navy Bureaus.4 4 It did not take much persuasion on Ramsay's
part to convince Herbert that the College was of no use and ought to
be discontinued. In the summer of 1893, Herbert embarked for
Newport on the U.S.S. Dolphin on the pretext of making an inspec
tion tour but actually to abolish the College. The Dolphin's skipper,
Capt. B.H. Buckingham, a friend of Luce, suggested that Herbert
read Mahan's latest book, The Influence of Seapower Upon the
French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812 to while away the time.
By the time the Dolphin reached Newport, Herbert like Theodore
Roosevelt and Kaiser Wilhelm had become a firm Mahanite. Upon
his arrival he declared that "if this institution has produced nothing
more than this book it is worth all the expense incurred for it. " 4 5
After his "conversion" Herbert always regarded himself as a
friend of the College. He maintained a steady correspondence with
the president and even suggested subjects for lectures.4 6 Yet he
continued to rely heavily on Ramsay's advice. "Ramsay was the
principal obstacle," Bradley Fiske later recalled, "not because he
represented the thought of the Navy, which he did not, but
because he had a good deal of ability in the line of organization
and detail and mainly because he was Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation." 4 7
Whether out of personal malice, bureaucratic jealousy or
genuine doubt about the utility of the College, Ramsay used his
powers to make the continuance of the War College difficult.
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Although there were large numbers of officers in the 1890's
unassigned or on shore duty Ramsay was extremely grudging in
assigning any to the War College for teaching or instruction. 4 8
Those few who were assigned were often "detached" in the midst
of their studies.
The experience of Washington I. Chambers was typical. One of
the most promising younger officers in the service, Chambers had
been asked by Mahan in 1892 to join the War College faculty.
Capt. Francis Higginson, Chamber's Commanding Officer in the
new cruiser Atlanta, readily approved his transfer and sent him off
with the admonition that "there are so many men in the Navy
who can drill a division but few who could do the exacting
intellectual work of the College. " 4 9
Arriving in Newport with a sense of having been summoned by
destiny, Chambers discovered that in addition to his position at
the War College he had been assigned additional duty at the Naval
Training Station. 5 0 Assigned to relieve an ensign as commander of
a division of apprentices, Chambers complained to the Department
that he could not wet-nurse the apprentices while trying to teach
at the War College. 5 1 Chambers' sharply worded letter to the
Department almost earned him a court-martial but, in the end, it
had its desired effect and the lieutenant was relieved of his
additional duty at the Training Station. Nevertheless the Bureau of
Navigation continued to find chores for him, ordering him to
observe the sea trials of new ships in Narragansett Bay and, in
December, he was peremptorily ordered to turn over his quarters
at the War College to an officer of the Training Station. 5 2
It was the existence of the Training Station in close proximity
to the War College which posed the most serious threat to the
latter's survival. Ironically Luce had played a leading role in the
establishment of the training system or "naval apprentice system"
which had been set up in 1875 to train boys between the ages of
16 and 18 for the Navy and Merchant Marine. Luce believed that
this training must take place aboard ship in order to "accustom
them from the very start to a life aboard ship." 5 3 In 1889 control
of the training system was transferred from the Bureau of Equip
ment and Recruiting to the Bureau of Navigation. By 1893 the old
sailing training ships which had housed the apprentices had worn
out or been sold and the officers of the Training Station began to
cast covetous eyes on the War College classrooms and quarters.
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Ramsay was able to convince Secretary Herbert that for
administrative convenience the College ought to be merged with
the Training Station. The last of the old training ships, the New
Hampshire, had been transferred to New London and the naval
apprentices who had been housed in her were left stranded on
Coasters Harbor Island. No place on the island could be found for
them and some of them had to be housed in tents. Would it not be
wiser, Ramsay urged, to quarter them in the War College? The
result was an order consolidating the War College and Training
Station under the senior officer of the Training Station. The
College was delivered up to the tender mercy of Ramsay's ally
Captain Francis M. Bunce, who boasted that "in six months my
boys will be eating their grub in the lecture room of the War
College." 5 4 By the time of Mahan's departure, the officers of the
Training Station had already moved into the quarters at the
eastern end of the War College.5 5
Into this unpromising situation stepped the new president of
the College, Capt. Henry C. Taylor. Taylor was born in Washing
ton, D.C. in 1844. His father, Frank Taylor, a well-known
publisher, had named him Henry Clay in honor of the senior
Senator from Kentucky who was his intimate friend and political
idol. As a young man, Henry Taylor possessed many of the
qualities of his namesake: great persistence, tact, courage, when
courage was necessary, a gift for compromise and above all, an
easygoing, likable personality which made it difficult for even his
enemies to dislike him. 5 6 Generally considered to be one of the
Navy's most capable officers and an expert tactician, he also
dabbled in mathematics, wrote light verse and even tried his hand
at a novel.5 7 Today he is remembered, when he is remembered at
all, chiefly for his service in the Spanish-American War, in which
he was captain of the Indiana at the battle of Santiago, and
commander of the convoy which transported General Shafter's
Army from Tampa to Cuba. It was in his 4-year term as president
of the War College, however, that Taylor was to make his most
lasting contribution to the Navy.
Just before he left the War College Mahan had recommended to
Secretary Herbert that Taylor be sent as his successor. Herbert
agreed and Taylor was ordered to Newport.5 8 If he held any
illusions as to what his new job would be like, they were soon
dispelled by a letter from Ramsay which he received shortly
before his appointment was announced.

Naval War College photo

View of Coasters Harbor Island about 1900 showing the close proximity of the Training Station, War College and other
installations

(J1

°'

66
If the College is to be continued on its present basis and
another president is to be ordered to it I shall be very glad to
see you go there and will do all that I can to support you in
conducting it. I will be perfectly free however and say that
looking at matters from a purely naval viewpoint ... I am
not in favor of continuing it on Coasters Harbor Island ... I
am strongly in favor of higher education of officers and am
ready to assist it in every way in my power but I do think
that the present War College System has very much the
appearance of a farce ....Of course, I fully appreciate and
realize the value of books written by Captain Mahan but as
these books can be read by any officer in the Navy it seems very
foolish to send officers there to have them read to them.5 9
Taylor soon discovered what sort of "support" he could expect
from the Bureau of Navigation. In December 1893 Ramsay
appeared privately before the House Naval Affairs Committee and
urged them to discontinue the appropriation for the War College.
At the same time, the Training Station put forward a demand for
the remaining War College buildings, despite the fact that two "old
Navy" steamers, the Richmond and Lancaster, had arrived at
Newport to replace the New Hampshire. 6 0 "The motive at the
bottom of all this" wrote Taylor to Admiral Luce "[is] a personal
feeling of jealousy against yourself and Mahan and a resolute
intention to remove all traces of the excellent system founded by
yourself.... I could not believe until I had seen it, to what
distance personal envy would reach." 6 1
With the Secretary indifferent and the Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation hostile, Taylor concluded that only an appeal to the
general public would save the College. A man of wide experience
in civic affairs, he undertook to gain support for the College not
merely by appeals to influential political figures but by enlisting
the force of public opinion in the cause.To this end he wrote and
lectured to boards of trade, civic groups, patriotic societies and
schools all along the East Coast. Articles and news releases were
skillfully planted in the Boston Herald and other papers and
"interviews" were arranged for friendly newspapers with promi
nent naval officers who favored the College.6 2 "My idea, Ad
miral," wrote Taylor to Luce,
is that only public opinion will force the Secretary to coerce
his chief advisor for there has already been brought to bear
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Henry C. Taylor in dress uniform as a Rear Admiral
U.S. Navy pboto
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upon him all the weight of Senators and Representatives, of
seven Bureau Chiefs and a lump of correspondence from me
which, if it does not kill, must permanently enfeeble him.6 3
Nor did Taylor forget that "the interests of the War College and
the people of Newport run in the same direction." In February
1894, Taylor wrote to Governor William Brown of Rhode Island
who replied that "I shall be pleased to receive from you any
suggestions as to action on my part which might tend to
counteract the movement for removal and abolition." The
Governor referred Taylor's letter to the state senate accompanying
it with observations on "the value of the College to the City of
Newport and the state." 6 4
The president also appealed to the students and former students
of the College to spread the gospel to their colleagues.As he told
the class of 1895: "It is what you shall say,officers,most of you,
of long experience, that is to constitute the most potent factor in
the College's future." 6 5
Among many students and faculty of the 1890's, the harrass
ment and hardships inflicted by the Navy Department served to
produce a feeling of embattled solidarity in a crusade against
conservatism and obscurantism. Writing to Luce about the large
number of students prematurely detached by the Bureau of
Navigation, William McCarty Little observed: "There is one good
thing; that the detached go away mad and disgusted thereat,and,
perhaps for that, are more effective as preachers through the very,
as it were, 'persecution' than they would otherwise be." 6 6 "I went
to the College as its friend, but must admit returning from it as a
partisan " wrote one staff member, "and I hope never to miss an
opportunity of saying a good word in its favor." 6 7
In all his lobbying, Taylor was careful never to cnt1c1ze the
Navy Department directly. "In anything that you write please
remember to count the Secretary as always with us in opposition
to a mysterious force," he cautioned Luce.6 8 Typical of this
approach was an article by Taylor in the North American Review
in which he observed that "Notwithstanding much opposition
among the ultra conservatives in the Navy ...a more secure
tenure of life seems to be promised to the War College by the
earnest interest of the Secretary of the Navy." 6 9
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Faculty and students, 1896. Luce is in civilian clothes. Standing
beside him is Richard Wainwright, a future Aide for Operations.
In the back row, third from the right, is William A. Moffett, a
founding father of Naval aviation.
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Despite Taylor's caution, Secretary Herbert, alarmed at the fuss
he was raising, ordered him to keep silent. On 10 March Taylor
wrote Luce:
The Secretary has notified me that any attacks upon the
Training Station by friends of the College will bring about
the College's immediate abolition.... We may double and
twist to evade being swallowed up as much as we please but
any movement of resistance means death.7 0
But Taylor had done his work well. His campaign, along with
the fast-growing prestige of Mahan's works, soon made the College
too popular with lay opinion to be attacked directly. As Taylor
wrote to Luce:
The hostility in a few high places continues.... The inten
tion of the opposition is believed to be now to get me away
from here ...but I think I can say to you that if this is done
it will be done too late and that the study of the art of war
will go on.7 1
By the spring of 1895 Taylor was confident that the College
was "moving forward rapidly in the mind of the Secretary and as
far as it can be judged, throughout the Navy." The lecture lists for
the coming session were "filling almost too fast." 7 2 Secretary
Herbert was indeed beginning to take a more active interest in the
College. "I did not suppose so many officers had been detached "
he wrote to Taylor. "I directed Ramsay to furnish me a
memorandum showing how this happened." 7 3 With the replace
ment of Ramsay by Robley D. Evans in October 1895, the
greatest threat to the College had passed.
It is easy to attribute the early vicissitudes of the College simply
to the evils of party politics in the 1880's and 1890's.7 4 In fact,
the situation was much more complicated. Misunderstanding,
professional jealousies, bureaucratic rivalries as well as party
politics all played their part. Above all it was the novelty of the
War College experiment and the seeming abstract and esoteric
quality of its work which made even big Navy men look askance at
it. It was not difficult for a Congressman to grasp the implications
of a battleship. The implications of the War College, though more
far-reaching, were not so easily grasped.
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CHAPTER VI

WAR GAMES AND THE WARS OF THE FUTURE
Certainly he that will happily perform at
sea must be skillful in making choice of
vessels to fight in; he must believe that
there is more belonging to a good man of
war upon waters than mere daring.

Sir Walter Raleigh.

History of the World

The years in which Taylor was battling the Bureaus were also
the most fruitful years in the development of the College. It was in
these years that the College began to study in earnest the
important strategic and tactical problems of the day and to
develop its own distinctive methods of instruction. The course of
study, which during the first years had varied in length from 1 to 3
months, was finally fixed at 4 months under Taylor's administra
tion. The classes remained small, averaging around 20 officers, but
the Department continued to send them on a regular basis and in
1895 Taylor was given a permanent staff to plan the year's work
and act as instructors.
The most important developments during these years were in
the curriculum of the College. Until 1893 the course had consisted
mostly of lectures supplemented by individual study and exercises
with the launches. Under Taylor the lectures were continued but
played a less important part in the program.

The year's work centered on a "main problem," a hypothetical
war situation to be analyzed by the staff and students. When a
class arrived at the College it was divided into sections of about six
officers, each section being assigned a portion of the main
problem. The section prepared monographs on an aspect of the
problem, drew up war charts and defense plans and wrote sample
orders and directives. 1
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An excerpt from the problem of 1895 shows the type of work
that the College demanded from its students in the 1890's:
War is declared October 1. October 20 the enemy's fleet
masks Sandy Hook entrance. Force is 6 of the line, 10 heavy
cruisers, 6 scouts, 10 torpedo boats. Forts and mines forbid
present active attack.... Enemy also assembles in Halifax a
force prepared to descend upon our coast between Boston
and New York. This force will sail from Halifax November
10; consists of 10 line, 20 heavy cruisers, 20 torpedo boats,
and 10 destroyer and scout class, also a corps of 30,000 men
of all classes in 100 transports.
Our entire force assembles at Gardiners Bay and New
London. This force is 5 line, 5' heavy cruisers, 10 light
cruisers, 1 ram, 2 dynamiters, 5 scouts and 10 torpedo boats.
The enemy's probable plan being to approach New York
with the Halifax fleet via Long Island, prepare plan of
meeting his demonstration. Show best disposition of our
forces.
Halifax fleet gains touch with Sandy Hook force ...occu
pies in force the Dutch Island Channel and lands its troops on
the line Narragansett Pier-Wickford.
Indicate change in our strategic plan to meet this demon
stration.
Shall we risk being attacked or closely blockaded in
Gardiners Bay when Fisher's Island and the Sound are
occupied?
Shall we attack in Narragansett Bay?
Shall we take up new position near New Rochelle?
Shall we put out to sea?
Tactics
Our force in Gardiners Bay is ready by November 15 when
enemy's Halifax force appears. We then occupy the line
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Gardiners Bay-Fisher's Island-New London. The enemy is
with convoy in Buzzard's Bay for two days keeping in close
touch with us by scouts. This touch is never lost.
Discuss the situation as to tactics.
Shall we attack?
Night attack or day attack?
In what formation?
What can be done with torpedo boats?2
Through these methods the graduates of the Naval War College
became accustomed to making quick decisions to cope with
rapidly changing situations. The war problems, although somewhat
unrealistic in nature, were nonetheless invaluable in giving the
officer student the "feel" of war situations and in teaching them
the techniques of command.
To stimulate interest in the work of the College, Taylor
arranged to have the annual problem printed in the U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings and also sent copies to leading educators and
journalists. The response was enthusiastic. "All who are
acquainted with educational methods must perceive at a glance the
value of an actual and visible problem ...," wrote president Daniel
Coit Gilman of Johns Hopkins. "If those in opposition could or
would read this problem," declared Adm.L.A.Kimberley, "they
would be forced to acknowledge that they were trying to bar the
road to the line of the Navy ...mastering a science of the most
vital importance...." 3
In addition to the problems, a reading course was begun which
included the works of Jomini, Mahan and Colomb on strategy and
Bainbridge-Hoff, Colomb and Foxhall A Parker on tactics, as well
as books in history, geography and international law. 4 In keeping
with the approach of Luce and Mahan, the War Cqllege course
emphasized the broader political-military aspects of naval warfare.
Subjects assigned for the student essays included such questions as
"Are the strategic conditions concerning the navy of any country
invariable?" "Do alliances between different countries change the
strategical disposition of navies?" and "What effect have coaling
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stations on strategy?" 5 The faculty dealt with such topics as "The
commercial and political conditions existing in the regions
affected by the proposed Interocean Canal" and the "Effect of
commercial and colonial interests on the course of history. " 6
Until Taylor's time, the War College launches had been used
mainly to practice ramming. Under Taylor they were employed as
miniature fleets in experiments with all types of tactical prob
lems.7
The most spectacular development in the War College during
the 1890's was the war game. It was the war game which gave the
War College course its distinctiveness. It captured the popular
imagination, both lay and professional. "When I come on to
Newport," wrote the new Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Theodore Roosevelt, "I want to time my visit so as to see one of
your big strategic games." 8 In 1895, Harper's Weekly observed
that·through the war game "the War College has taken a new and
successful departure and the year's work has been peculiarly
practical and progressive." 9 A newspaper went even further in
1896, declaring that "Every naval campaign which it is possible to
conceive that the United States might be called upon to undertake
has been anticipated on this little board." 1 0
Secretary of the Navy Hilary A. Herbert, on a visit to the War
College in the summer of 1895, spent the entire period observing
the war games and was reported to be "well pleased by what he
saw."11 The man responsible for introducing this most successful
of Taylor's innovations was not, however, Taylor himself but a
retired Navy Lieutenant, William McCarty Little.
William McCarty Little was a familiar fixture of Newport in the
1890's. A tall, broadly built man with a small close-cropped
mustache, he could often be observed, at the end of the day,
emerging from the Redwood Library a book in one hand and the
other thrust stiffly behind his back. Never looking up from his
book he would wend his way through the narrow streets and
around the corners of Newport with the assurance of a sleep
walker, followed always by his faithful dog. 1 2
Little had been graduated from Annapolis in June 1866, just
too late for the Civil War. He had had a distinguished career in the
Navy until 1882, when a freak accident deprived him of the use of
one eye. Despite his outraged protests, he had been retired. He was
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living in Newport, frustrated and bored, when Luce, under whom
he had served on the U.S.S. Minnesota, arrived and had him
attached to the War College Staff. He remained there the rest of
his life.
For almost 30 years Little was "the attendant spirit" and
guardian of the College. Often working without pay, partly
supported by his devoted wife, Anita Chartrand, Little con
tributed more than any other man to the internal development of
the College. More important still, he provided an element of
continuity between the founders of the College and the second
generation of Navy reformers who came to be associated with it in
the years before World War I.
Little gave his first lecture on war gaming in 1886. War games
had been played in European armies for many years and were
occasionally played on a voluntary basis by officers of the U.S.
Army. The first practitioner of the Naval War Game was also the
father of modern naval tactics, John Clerk.
Like Jomini, Clerk had originally been a banker but unlike
Jomini he was totally without military experience, had never seen
a battle and had never been to sea. A Scotsman with many friends
in the Royal Navy, Clerk was concerned about the generally
indecisive nature of most 18th-century naval actions. His Essay on
Naval Tactics which first appeared in 1790 soon became the bible
of the Royal Navy and Nelson is reported to have kept it under his
pillow. In working out his system of tactics, Clerk recalled that
"having convinced myself of the effects that would follow a
change of system, it was my practice to criticize the method of
carrying a fleet into battle by fighting them over again by means
of small models which I constantly carried in my pocket, every
table furnishing searoom." 1 3
Despite the success of Clerk's game, however, European navies
made no further use of war games until 1878 when one was
introduced into the British Navy by, naturally enough, Sir Phillip
Colomb.1 4 It was Colomb's game that Little attempted to
introduce to the American Navy in his 1886 lecture. 1 5 The lecture
seems to have had little impact and further study soon convinced
Little that a whole new system of war games would have to be
devised to meet the needs of a modern navy.
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Lieutenant (later Captain) William McCarty Little
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Although Clerk and Colomb furnished Little with his original
idea, much of his system of war games, like Mahan's system of
strategy, was borrowed from the Army.1 6 At the time that Little
began his work only three works on war games had appeared in
the United States. Only two of them were by American authors
and all of them were intended for use in simulating land warfare.
The Germans had gone farthest in developing the war game and all
three of these works were in some way adaptations of German
games and techniques.
The first work to which Little turned was a series of lectures
entitled Explanation and Application of the English Rules for
Playing the War Game by Col. John Middleton which had
appeared in 1873. Little seems to have been particularly
impressed by two passages which explained the advantages of the
game:
Games may be so arranged as to be suitable for all ranks, by
representing the minor operations of war as well as the
greater ....One of the great advantages of this game is that it
obliges everyone taking part in it to think deeply, and that on
the most important points connected with our profes
sion ... it teaches officers playing it ... to give orders clearly
and concisely, and shows distinctly the value of time.1 7
At the same time that Little was studying Middleton's game, he
made the acquaintance of Maj.William R. Livermore, the foremost
American authority on war gaming, who visited the College in
1889. Livermore had written the first American work on war
games in 1879. At the time he had been strongly influenced by a
work on war games published in 1877 by Capt.George Neumann
of the German Army. In his Regiments-Kriegspiel Neumann had
proposed that "a standard value based on experience" be used to
decide the outcome of encounters and to assess losses.1 8 This
method of "rigid umpiring," Livermore believed, was the one best
suited to American needs. He observed that in Germany where
there were "many officers with wide experience both in the field
and in war gaming" more discretion could be given to the umpires.
In the United States, however, "such men are not always available
in the small garrisons into which the American Army is
divided." 1 9 Livermore's American Kriegsspiel therefore, had an
elaborate set of rules "designed to cover every conceivable situa
tion" and the need for an umpire was reduced to a minimum.
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At about the same time that Livermore's game appeared, Lt.
C.A.L. Totten of the 4th U.S. Artillery devised a series of war
games intended for National Guardsmen and junior officers which
ranged in difficulty from very simple exercises to an elaborate
"advanced game." Totten's game contained a number of impor
tant innovations and improvements on the European games. He
considered the method of consulting the dice in Kriegspiele to be
"far too limited and rigid" and substituted instead an elaborate
system of "probability tables" designed to show the chances of
success for any given encounter. Whether or not a unit could
advance, retreat, maintain its position, etc., was determined by
reference to the tables and throw of the dice. Likewise, the
outcome of an engagement was determined by reference to the
table (veteran troops engaging new troops had a four to one
chance of victory, etc.).2 0 A copy of Totten's game like
Livermore'sKriegsspiel soon found its way into the War College
library where Little examined it with great interest.
Using the Army games as a model, Little attempted to devise a
series of games for use by the officers of the Navy. By 1893, he
had perfected his system and in the following year the war games
became a regular part of the curriculum.
Little devised three types of games. The "dual game" designed
to simulate an action between two ships was based partly on
Colomb's game but utilized American tactical concepts. The ships
were represented by celluloid stencils 3 inches long and dice
were used for determining hits.2 1 The tactical game representing
an action between two fleets or squadrons was played on a large
board representing the surface of the ocean on a scale of 10 inches
to 1 mile. Following the method of Totten a chart was utilized
showing the probabilities for hitting the target at various distances,
and from different angles and the endurance value of different
types of ships. 2 2
Livermore's method of rigid umpmng was followed in the
strategic game which represented an action between two or more
opposing navies. Here the rules were fixed and specific. "If two
fleets meet with odds of 2 to 1, the inferior will be removed; with
odds of 3 to 2 the inferior loses one-half; with odds of 4 to 3
the inferior is destroyed but the superior is crippled for the re
mainder of the game. " 2 3

A drawing by the noted illustrator Rufus Zogbaum of war gaming at the Naval War
College in Harper's Weekly, February 3, 1895.
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The most innovative aspect of Little's games, as he himself
reorganized, was "the presence of the enemy as an active factor
i.e. a separate player." 2 4 Earlier war games like Clerk's lacked this
element as did the map maneuvers and staff rides then in use at
the Army's advanced schools.2 5 For this reason many members of
the College staff came to feel that the war game was actually more
valuable than fleet maneuvers.2 6
Whether or not it was superior to actual maneuvers, the Naval
War Game possessed many obvious advantages. It was inexpensive.
It could be played almost anywhere by all ranks. It could be used
to represent any type of fleet or class of ships and the composition
of the forces engaged could be varied at will. Most important of
all, the war game was a valuable analytical tool. As Luce told the
class of 1910:
That the naval game board has its limitations goes without
saying ...but by its means can be demonstrated what should
be done with a fleet and particularly what should not be
done.... By working out by means of the game board a
number of "don'ts" all visionary schemes of battle tactics
may be eliminated, leaving any one of a few safe and
thoroughly practicable methods.2 7
Useful as the war game was as an analytical tool, this was not its
primary purpose in the mind of its inventor. Like everything else
at the War College, it was designed to help the naval service
develop into a real profession. The factor which most hindered
the development of the profession, in Little's opinion, was the fact
that in normal times the military man could not really practice his
art. He might train for it, study it, but in time of peace there
seemed to be no way in which he could gain experience in the
practice of his calling. As Maj. S.W. Livermore, a member of the
College Staff, put it: " ...in time of peace, officers have not the
same opportunity as lawyers, physicians and others of acquiring
practice from their daily occupation. Experience in the art of war
cannot be gained simply by attending to duties aboard ship or in
garrison." 2 8
The purpose then of the war game was to afford the
professional an opportunity of practicing his craft in peacetime.
More than this, however, it was hoped that the war game might
help to counterattack the indifference of the country to matters
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connected with defense. C.A.L. Totten, in explaining the need for
his war game, observed that:
Abroad all the elements of the body politic are soldiers; from
the cradle to the grave they learn war, practise its arts and
study its preparations ....How different it is here, where we
have well nigh forgotten a struggle than which all history
records none more fearlessly entered into, more sternly
contested-or one that cost relatively more in time or
treasure. And yet we are together as wholly and deeply
absorbed in the mild pursuits of peace, as yesterday we were
with all our energy and resource plunged into the ruder
actualities of civil war. 2 9
In a similar vein William L. Rodgers spoke of "counteracting the
unfavorable influence of peace upon naval administration and
character." It was necessary, said Rodgers, "to keep in mind the
conditions of war ... to maintain these conditions before the
service is the subject of the Naval War College." 3 0 Little hoped
that the interest exerted in military matters by the games might
lead to needed reforms in the Navy.
The Navy Department [he told the class of 1912) was or
ganized without the compelling element of war. As in our
history war seems to have been the only thing that had the
requisite power to compel and as we cannot have actual war
why not have recourse to artificial war. It possesses the advan
tages without the disadvantages....Fancy what it would be if
the yearly war game could be made to excite the same service
interest as the West Point-Annapolis football match.3 1
The introduction of the war game and the annual problem
served to focus the attention of the War College on the nature of
future wars. The views of the naval officers on this subject were
far different from those of his fellow citizens.To most Americans
war was probably avoidable, certainly undesirable and in any event
could be fought by a body of citizen soldiers springing to arms at
the moment of danger. Their hero was the talented amateur, the
improviser, the natural genius, not Moltke but Garibaldi, not
William T. Sherman but Andrew Jackson.
To the military professional, war was natural and inevitable. Its
inevitability was a recurrent theme in the writings of almost all
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naval officers. Stephen B. Luce pointed out to the readers of the

North American Review that "from the frequency of wars both in

ancient and modern times even up to the present writing it is
impossible to escape the conviction that they are the result of
fixed law and not the products of human institutions established
and admitting of being abolished by the commonwealth of
nations." 3 2 The naval officer was ever at pains to remind his
civilian readers that the chronic instability of international
conditions and the fragility of human nature made the recurrence
of war a foregone conclusion. In this work, of course, Alfred
Thayer Mahan, through his books and articles, was to play the
leading role. As early as 1890, he was warning his fellow citizens
that "there is no sound reason for believing that the world has
passed into a period of assured peace outside the limits of
Europe." 3 3
The strong strain of Social Darwinism which runs through the
writings of Brooks Adams and Josiah Strong could also be found
in the writings of the naval officers. When Josiah Strong wrote in
1900 that the world had entered "the final competition of
races " 3 4 he seemed merely to be echoing Lt. Comdr. Richard
Wainwright, one of the War College lecturers, who declared in
1897 that "the struggle for existence among the nations is
ceaseless, vigorous and relentless. The law of the survival of the
fittest is as true for the political aggregation as for the indi
vidual."3 5 "Suspend the struggle, well called the battle of life for
a single moment," warned Luce in an article, "and death claims
the victory.· ' 3 6

Like good Darwinians, naval officers attributed the occurrence
of wars to the economic rivalries of nations. As French E.
Chadwick told an entering class of the Naval War College," ...we
must look forward to dealing still with those primitive passions
which show so little sign of abating; the fierce thrust of gain,the
pushing of this or that race to the wall in the contest for
commercial gain which has been at the bottom of most wars and
will be the chief, if not the only cause of war in the future." 3 7
"What is the thing most apt now to disturb the equilibrium of
good feeling between two countries?" demanded Bradley A.Fiske,
"is it not the same thing that is most apt to disturb the
equilibrium of good feeling between two men? Is it not competi
tion for money or its equivalent?" 3 8

84
Significantly, the United States appeared to be entering upon a
new era in her foreign economic relations. The Naval Policy Board
established by Secretary Tracy warned that "there are not wanting
indications that this comparative isolation will soon cease to exist
and, that it will gradually be replaced by a condition of affairs
which will bring this nation into sharp commercial competition
with others in every part of the world." 3 9 A few months later
Mahan declared that "outside, beyond the broad sea there are
markets of the world which can be entered and controlled only by
vigorous contest to which the habit of trusting to the protection
of statute does not apply." 4 0
One "indication" of great changes was the proposed construc
tion of an interoceanic canal across Central America linking the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. "The political and international
aspects of the situation," pointed out Henry C.Taylor, "must not
be disregarded. No trade can flourish if dominated and repressed
by the power, military, naval or diplomatic of a foreign nation."41
In a subsequent article, he predicted that:
The currents of trade will be reversed in their direction [by
the canal] ... the completion of the canal must in the nature
of things extend our interests and influence to the southward
and even to the canal itself. There will then come upon
us ...some duties with reference to the Nations of Central
America whose establishments are too limited to enable them
properly to defend themselves.4 2
The man who most thoroughly developed all the implications of
the canal was, of course, Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan believed
that the canal, by placing the United States astride the trade
routes of the world, could contribute immensely to the strength of
American seapower. When the canal was completed the United
States would occupy a strategic position similar to that which
England had occupied in the early 19th century. On the other
hand, if the United States failed to exploit her position by
building an adequate navy, the canal could well become a source
of danger. "Militarily speaking," Mahan warned, "the piercing of
the Isthmus is nothing but a disaster to the United States in the
present state of her military and naval preparedness. " 4 3 Com
mander Sampson saw in the canal a new challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine:
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When any two nations become involved in war, the one that
has the most powerful navy will attack the commerce of the
other where it converges on the canal. . . . Are we prepared to
defend the neutrality of the canal? Not one European nation
would be deterred from any course of action except in so far
as it would bring on the disapproval of this country. The
Monroe Doctrine is therefore a right that we must maintain
by force.4
The defense of the Monroe Doctrine was a popular argument
for naval expansion. Lt. John M. Ellicott warned that "to uphold
the [Monroe] Doctrine against all odds we must have a powerful
fleet" and that until a respectable fleet had been created, the
United States was in jeopardy of national humiliation "by seeing
some foreign power deliberately ignore our doctrine."4 5
Not only was war far more likely than most civilians supposed,
but once war came there would be little opportunity for inspired
improvisation. The day of the talented amateur was over. Future
wars would be short and sharp. As Capt. Charles H. Stockton
observed: "Naval operations have such possibility of quickness and
vigor in execution and increased length of reach that the time
permitted for defense is correspondingly short. "4 6 Victory would
go to the side which was most thoroughly prepared. An opponent
less prepared would never be able to recover from the devastating
initial attacks of his enemy. "Of all things which contribute to
success in war," declared Little, "preparation holds first place."4 7
The short, sharp, well-prepared wars of the future would be
directed and largely conducted by well-trained professionals. They
would be limited, rationally directed affairs.
John Shy and Russell F. Weigley have recently called attention
to the American popular predilection to think of war in "total"
terms.4 8 War, when it came, required a total effort of the
population and had to result in the total destruction of the enemy.
As Shy observes, military security was believed to be "an absolute
value like chastity or grace." The concept of war developed at the
Naval War College was quite different. As viewed from Newport,
war was not a total popular effort designed to annihilate the
enemy but a limited enterprise, subject to rules and directed by
professionals. The prominent place assigned to international law in
the curriculum of the Naval War College testified to the
seriousness with which the naval officers regarded the "rules of

86
war." As one group of naval officers wrote to the Secretary of the
Navy, "war is primarily a relation between governments repre
sented by definite armed forces and should not be an occasion for
unrestricted lawlessness or license. If any war is not to involve the
civilization of the world at large, its operations must be restricted
closely to its immediate purpose."4 9 A young instructor at the
Naval War College in the 1890's admonished students that the idea
"that war means the total ruin or complete wiping out of the
enemy ...would be the negation of all progress, naval and
social." 5 0
The Naval War College desire to keep wars limited and subject
to rules was not inspired solely by humanitarian motives. A
limited war would be conducted by professionals and not subject
to the whims of public fear and anger. Naval officers repeatedly
expressed anguish at the extent to which public opinion or
"sentiment" rather than national political and military calculation
had influenced the conduct of American wars. "Sentiment rules
the world" declared Washington I.Chambers, quoting Napoleon to
a War College class, "and he who leaves it out of his calcula
tions ...can never hope to lead." 5 1 Because of the democratic
character of the United States, the influence of sentiment was
especially strong there. "In all wars in which the United States has
been engaged," observed the class of 1901, "public opinion has
been all-powerful, not only having actually brought about our
wars ...but having dictated the lines of campaign." 5 2 Comdr.
William Wirt Kimball warned naval planners that "our experiences
in the pseudo-war with Spain clearly indicate that ...public
opinion will be our actual commander-in-chief" in future wars as
well.5 3
Convinced of the importance of rational professional planning,
the War College Staff turned with enthusiasm to the preparation
of war plans for the United States. Although the ultimate aim of
the Naval War College leaders was a powerful offensive fleet, they
recognized that "the wars for which we must plan, at least for the
next few years, are defensive on our part and to be waged against
enemies probably superior to us on the sea. " 5 4 Despite the rapid
growth of the "new Navy," naval officers were still acutely
conscious of their Navy's numerical inferiority�o other modern
fleets. "Until some continuous effort is made to establish and
maintain a navy of first rank ...the prospect of war with any of
the great naval powers of Europe must impose upon us a study of
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defensive problems," observed Carlos G. Calkins. 5 5 Consequently,
the "annual problems" of the 1890's centered on the defense of
the American coast. American naval strategy, while offensive in
theory, was profoundly defensive in practice.
Great Britain was the country most frequently chosen as the
imaginary enemy. With the world's largest navy and excellent
bases in the new world, Britain appeared to pose the gravest
potential menace to American security. In keeping with the
prevailing climate of opinion, commercial factors were expected to
be. the primary cause of any future Anglo-American quarrel. In a
lecture to the Naval War College in 1894, Capt. Charles H.
Stockton predicted that "when the overproduction of this country
is relieved by free commerce and lower prices, a rivalry will begin
with Britain for the markets of the world. " 5 6
Stockton's prediction appeared about to materialize a year later
in the summer of 1895, when the Venezuelan boundary dispute
appeared to bring the United States and Britain to the brink of
war. In June 1895, Secretary of State Richard Olney dispatched a
strongly worded note to London invoking the Monroe Doctrine
and demanding that the British submit the dispute to arbitration.
The following December, President Cleveland went before
Congress to announce that the United States "would resist by
every means in its power the appropriation by Great Britain of any
land, which, after investigation, we have determined of right
belongs to Venezuela." The War College exercises had suddenly
taken on an uncomfortable air of realism and Captain Taylor was
summoned to Washington to prepare war plans.
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CHAPTER VII

FROM "WAR PROBLEMS" TO WAR PLANS

The naval situation which confronted Captain Taylor in January
1896 appeared at first sight to be almost hopeless. The United
States had one first-class battleship, two second-class battleships
were nearly completed and the armored cruiser Brooklyn had been
launched. 1 Opposed to these, the British had some 40-odd
battleships and 16 modern armored cruisers. 2 But Britain's naval
resources were stretched thin. Relations with France were strained
over affairs in the Far East and Africa. Russia was distinctly
unfriendly and the Kruger telegram seemed to be a clear indication
of Germany's attitude. As a result, England made no move to
reinforce her heterogeneous array of small cruisers and gunboats
on the North American Station. "The Admiralty never had a
sufficient margin of superiority over the dual alliance alone, to
contemplate strengthening the British squadrons in American
waters. " 3
Nevertheless the problems which confronted Taylor were
serious. Until the new battleship Massachusetts was commissioned,
the North Atlantic Squadron would be inferior even to the British
"Flying Squadron," then being formed in England, and Taylor
could not know what other reinforcements the British might be
willing to send to the North America Station. 4
The Naval War College problem of 1894 had dealt with the
defense of New York and southern New England against a British
attack. All of the American armored ships (battleships, monitors,
armored cruisers) were to concentrate in Nantucket Sound and
await a favorable opportunity to attack a portion of the British
fleet at night or in bad weather. In the meantime, American
cruisers and armed merchantmen would raid British commerce. If,
by chance, the Americans gained control of the sea, they would
attack Halifax, Bermuda or St. Lucia. 5 The attack on Halifax was
intended to interrupt enemy communications and neutralize the
area as a base for operations against the American coast. The
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invading army of 10,000 men recruited in New England would sail
from Boston, Portsmouth and Portland under escort of the Navy.6
The following summer, the War College continued to refine the
war plan against England, this time taking up the question of the
defense of New England against invasion. Once again, the War
College concluded that the battle fleet ought to be concentrated in
Nantucket Sound from which it might, with luck, attack "some
weak point in the enemy's lines." 7
It is impossible to say what, if any, changes or refinements
Taylor may have made in these plans while at the Navy
Department. Few records of his planning activities have survived.
It is clear from his correspondence, however, that he had begun to
collect information on the Great Lakes frontier, the one area not
closely studied in the War College problems of 1894 and 1895. In
January 1896, Capt. Charles Gridley, later of Manila Bay fame,
was instructed to report on what ships on the Lakes could be
converted to war purposes and, in March, Naval Engineer Ira
Hollis reported confidentially to Taylor on Canadian fortifications
and steamers.8 Taylor apparently planned to utilize American
merchantmen for operations against Canada on the Great Lakes.
In addition, Americans were to capture or destroy the Welland
Canal, thus denying its use to the Canadians.
By the spring of 1896, the crisis over Venezuela had passed and
Taylor had returned to Newport, but the War College continued to
develop its plans for war with England. In the summer of 1896, a
committee headed by Comdr. Horace Elmer reported on the
possibility of a fleet action with the British near the Dry
Tortugas.9 Yet, though England remained high on the War College
list of probable enemies, the outbreak of a new insurrection on the
island of Cuba, early in 1895, obliged the naval planners to turn
their attention to the possibility of complications with Spain.
Even before the outbreak of the Cuban rebellion, the War
College had given consideration to Spain as a possible future
enemy, perhaps as an ally of England. During 1894, three
members of the War College class had been assigned papers on the
subject of "Strategy in the Event of War with Spain." Lt. Comdr.
J.B. Bleecker and Lt. W.E. Reynolds were instructed to consider a
situation in which "difficulties about Cuba cause war with Spain.
Great Britain joins Spain and France joins the United States." 1 0
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Comdr. C.J. Train was directed to study a war involving only the
United States and Spain. 1 1
Perhaps because of the different conditions assumed in each
case, Train and Bleecker came to opposite conclusions about
strategy. Bleecker, although recognizing that the United States
would be badly outclassed by the combined military and naval
forces of Britain and Spain, favored a speedy invasion of Cuba by
the United States before the European fleets could reach the
scene. "We should," wrote Bleecker, "put forth all our energy
towards striking a quick decisive blow before the enemy is
prepared to offer great resistance." The conquest of Cuba would
be "no small undertaking" but Bleecker believed that "the
country would rise to the emergency. " 1 2
In contrast, Commander Train believed that "command of the
sea would play an all-important part" in a contest between the
United States and Spain. "Until the Spanish fleet is defeated and
destroyed, no force should be landed on Cuban shores." Instead
all efforts should be directed toward bringing about the destruc
tion of the Spanish fleet at the earliest possible date.
Interestingly enough, both Train and Bleecker assumed that the
United States would permanently annex Cuba following a war
with Spain. "Cuba," Bleecker declared, "is a valuable island, so
close to our shore and occupying such a commanding and strategic
position . . . that it should not be in the possession of a foreign
power." 1 3 Commander Train was equally certain that "geographi
cally and commercially, Cuba belongs to the United States. Nor is
it probable that a political union can be long delayed." 14
The outbreak of the Cuban insurrection lent added urgency to
the question of war with Spain. By the spring of 1895, both Luce
and William McCarty Little had become convinced that the
coming War College session ought to undertake a full-scale study
of a Spanish-American conflict. In August, Little broached the
subject to Captain Taylor. "I think our suggestions are bearing
fruit," he reported to Luce, "apropos, I mean, of Cuban
matters." 1 5 Little's suggestion "struck [Taylor] as an excellent
idea" and the class of 1895 was assigned both a "general" aud a
"special" problem. The general problem was the plan for the
defense of New England described above. The "special problem"
concerned plans for war with Spain. 1 6 In a memo for the
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Secretary of the Navy, Taylor justified the double workload by
pointing to its "great importance in the near future to the
country" and his expectation that "long before the completion of
the plan certain fixed and indubitable facts as to the strategy and
tactics will be established. " 1 7
The class which considered the problem in the summer of 1895
had available the earlier papers of Train and Bleecker. Although
the latter study had dealt with the possibility of war with Spain
and England, the new plan for war with Spain alone, which
emerged from the deliberations of the class,. was far closer to
Bleecker's study than to Train's.
All references to annexation had disappeared and the "ulti
mate" object of the war was now believed to be "the establish
ment of Cuban autonomy or a republic." 1 8 The plan called for an
immediate attack on Havana by a combined military and naval
force. Havana was "the natural objective" of an American
offensive. It was close to American bases, and was "the com
mercial and military center of the Island."
Unlike most war plans of the 1890's, the War College plan
contained a precise timetable of operations. The entire regular
army, brought up to a strength of 30,000 men, was to constitute
the "advance corps" to be convoyed by the fleet to Cuba on the
15th day after the declaration of war. A "main body" of 25,000
3-year volunteers would follow 2 weeks later. Together with the
fleet, they would make a strong attack against Havana. At the
same time, scouts in the West Indies would keep a sharp lookout
for Spanish forces en route from Europe. These were expected
around the end of the first month. 1 9
In January 1896, Taylor and the staff completed the Spanish
war plan and submitted it to the Navy Department.2 ° Perhaps
inspired by the War College example, the Office of Naval
Intelligence, under the able and ambitious Lt. Comdr. Richard
Wainwright, soon produced its own plan for war with Spain which
called for a "purely naval war" against Spain.
Prepared by Lt. William Wirt Kimball, the Naval Intelligence
Office plan relied primarily upon a blockade of Cuba together
with "harrassment and descents on the enemy's colonies." 2 1 In
the Caribbean, the fleet was to be deployed in three groups, the
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"Havana Squadron" cons1stmg of two battleships and smaller
vessels was to blockade Havana. The "Matanzas and Puerto Rico
Squadron," which included the second-class battleships Maine and
Texas, the battleship Oregon and two light cruisers were to
operate against Puerto Rico, and the South Coast Squadron which
included an armored cruiser and several smaller cruisers was to
blockade the island and watch for the Spanish Fleet.
Kimball's plan also envisioned carrying the war to the Spanish
mainland. For this purpose, it provided for a fourth squadron to
be made up of Brooklyn, New York or Olympia, and the fast
protected cruisers Columbia and Minneapolis.
In the Pacific, the "Asiatic Squadron" of about half a dozen
cruisers and gunboats "should reduce Manila at the earliest
possible opportunity." Kimball gave no explanation for his
suggestion that the war be extended to the Philippines except that
Manila would be useful as a hostage. "Our government could
assure --Spain that Manila would have to pay for every merchant
man captured. " 2 2
Completed in June 1896, Kimball's plan was carefully studied
by the War College staff and students who found it generally
unsatisfactory. A blockade of Cuba, they contended, would be
ineffective, and could not produce decisive results. The Union
blockade of the south during the Civil War had taken 2 years to
become effective. Spain herself had been "blockading" Cuba
against vessels smuggling arms to the insurgents and had failed to
capture more than a handful of them. 2 3 Most important, until the
Spanish fleet had been defeated, no blockade could be attempted.
War games at the College had demonstrated that "the chances of
finding [ the Spanish Fleet] and bringing them to battle are not
good if they wish to evade our fighting fleet and strike our
blockading detachments. " 2 4 The officers of the War College
therefore continued to favor the combined Army and Navy attack
on Havana outlined in their 1895 plan.
By late 1896, the Spanish war plan, like other War College
projects, had become a football of bureaucratic politics. Rear
Admiral Ramsay, possibly aided by Wainwright, persuaded Secre
tary Herbert to convene a special board to review the planning for
a war with Spain. The board was composed of Ramsay's old ally
Bunce, now a rear admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the North
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Atlantic Station, Capt. William T. Sampson, Chief of the Bureau
of Ordnance, Commander Wainwright, Chief Intelligence Officer,
Ramsay and Taylor.
Taylor departed for Washington in mid-December with a
handwritten memorandum on the War College plan to present to
the Board. The memorandum repeated the War College doubts
about the efficacy of blockade and warned against any diversion
of ships to European waters. The War College approved the idea of
a demonstration against the Philippines, suggested in the Kimball
plan, but warned that operations against Spain should be avoided.
"Its military effect as a diversion would be inconsiderable; its
political effect would be to consolidate Spain's internal spirit, and
our ships thus employed will be needed in Cuba." 2 5
Taylor emphasized that schemes for "the reduction of the
Island [of Cuba] by the Navy without the Army or by the Army
without the Navy-have a certain ingenuity [but] it does not
appear that such methods are based upon the principles of war as
deduced from naval and military history." 2 6
The Navy Department Board, under Ramsay's leadership, had
scant time for such arguments. Declaring that they "did not
approve of the plan of operations proposed for the Navy by the
Naval War College" the members of the Board went on to
recommend a plan of their own. In most respects a return to
Kimball's plan, the Board's proposal called for a blockade of the
deepwater ports of Cuba and Puerto Rico. In addition, battleships
were to "destroy the depots and arsenals at Havana and San Juan
by bombardment, compelling at least their temporary abandon
ment or surrender." The Army was also to be allowed to get into
the act. It "should be prepared to garrison and hold places
captured by the Navy and to effect such other operations as may
be necessary." The Manila sideshow was called off with no more
explanation than Kimball had given for putting it in in the first
place. Instead, the Committee directed that the Asiatic Squadron
be employed in conjunction with the European Squadron and
ships from the North Atlantic Station to seize a base along the
coasts of Spain for operations against the Spanish mainland.2 7
Taylor registered a vigorous dissent from the conclusions
reached by the committee. He particularly objected to a campaign
in Spanish waters 3,500 miles from the scene of operations and
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pointed out that without a base for the European Squadron, the
project was both dangerous and foolhardy. He called for "active
aggressive work by both the Army and the Navy to be commenced
immediately" rather than after "acts of blockade and other acts
provided for in the plan shall have proved or failed to prove their
efficacy." 2 8
The Navy Department Board, convened in the waning days of
the Cleveland administration, passed on to the new Secretary of
the Navy, John D. Long, the plan for operations against Spain.
Long and his vigorous Assistant Secretary, Theodore Roosevelt,
also inherited the War College studies and problems deposited in
the Office of Naval Intelligence. Perhaps confused by the
contradictions of the various plans and proposals, Long ordered
the special Board to reconvene in the spring of 1897.
The membership of the Board had changed considerably since
December with new officers occupying the billets of Commander
in-Chief North Atlantic Station, Chief of Navigation, among
others. Only Richard Wainwright remained from the previous
winter. At the Naval War College, Caspar F. Goodrich had
succeeded Taylor as president and Comdr. Bowman H. McCalla,
one of the Navy's leading tacticians, had joined the faculty.2 9
Goodrich and McCalla were as convinced as Taylor that it
would be necessary "to use all of our ships of war on our Atlantic
coast to enforce at once the closest blockade." Aside from
strategic considerations the War College planners expressed grave
doubts about the availability of coal for squadrons operating
against the Philippines and the coast of Spain.3 0
When the Board convened, Goodrich argued strenuously for the
Naval War College approach but was unsuccessful. What emerged
from the Board's deliberations was essentially the Kimball plan
with a proviso for the seizure of Matanzas by the fleet to be used
as a base for future operations by the Army and a supply point for
the insurgents. 3 1
Although the Board's plan of July 1897 was dubbed the "official
plan," it by no means represented administration policy. Five
months after the Board's report, Theodore Roosevelt was un
happily reporting that he had made no progress in persuading the
President to take any action on the plan and had had little more
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success with Secretary Long. 3 2 Nor did the War College believe
that war with Spain was now certain. In the minds of the War
College Staff, Britain remained as a not unlikely enemy.
The annual problem for 1897 again concerned a war against
England. This time the War College explored the possibility that
the enemy, operating from his bases in Cuba and Bermuda, might
strike at the Delaware and Chesapeake Bay areas "in order to
capture the Capital and lay under ransom the cities of these two
Bays." Under these circumstances, the War College believed that
the only correct strategy was to keep the American battle fleet
united and use it to intercept the separate elements of the enemy
fleets before they could unite.
The officers recognized that the approach of the enemy fleet
would probably produce a panic in the cities of the Past coast,
but they insisted that the fleet be kept together. To scatter the
various armored ships of the Navy among the various coastal cities
for purposes of harbor defense would be a fatal error. "While it is
conceivable that the American commander-in-chief may be given
absolute control over his movements, it is hardly probable that he
will be permitted by the government to cut adrift from his base
and follow up the enemy fleet. Yet this is what he should do if
free to move according to the dictates of the military situa
tion. " 3 3 Although the scenario proved to be unrealistic, the War
College evaluation of the effects of a naval threat to the east coast
proved a surprisingly accurate forecast of the American reaction to
the threat of Admiral Cervera's fleet in May 1898.
In addition to England and Spain, recent events had caused
naval planners to add a third name to the list of possible enemies:
Japan. By 1897, American annexation of the makeshift "Hawaiian
Republic" appeared increasingly likely and Japan was concerned
for the rights and future of the many Japanese immigrants in the
Islands. Japan had twice sent a warship to Hawaiian waters to
emphasize her continuing interest in the Islands and, by the
summer of 1897, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt was becoming
increasingly concerned about a possible clash. 3 4 In June of 1897,
Roosevelt gave the War College a "special problem":
Japan makes demands on Hawaiian Islands. This country
intervenes. What force will be required to uphold inter
vention? Keep in mind possible complications with another
power in the Atlantic. 3 5
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The Naval War Board, convened in June 1897 to review the
plans for war with Spain, was also directed to prepare a plan
against Japan.
Once again, the War College and the Board failed to agree on
the matter of strategy. The Board produced a plan which aimed at
"concentrating a sufficient force at the Hawaiian Islands to hold
them against the Japanese fleet" and at the same time leaving a
sufficient armed force for the defense of San Francisco. A fast
cruiser would be sent to the Aleutians to scout for the Japanese
fleet. 3 6 The plan called for a "force to be sent to Hawaii as soon
as possible." The force would "seize Honolulu and await the
Japanese fleet there."3 7 A Japanese expedition against our Pacific
coast was considered highly unlikely since Japan had no bases east
of Hawaii and she would be forced to cbmmit her entire fleet to
the undertaking. In any event, the committee concluded, we had
"sufficient strength in the Pacific" for the present but that when
the Japanese battleship Fuji was completed late in 1898, it might
be necessary to send the Maine to the west coast.
B o wman McCalla subjected the Board's Plan to a thorough
critique. To divide the fleet by leaving a naval force to defend San
Francisco was, he believed, a particularly ill-advised measure. An
attack on the west coast of the United States might be difficult
for the Japanese, but could not be considered impossible. McCalla
predicted that, in the event of a Japanese-American conflict, Great
Britain would adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality toward
Japan and allow the Japanese to purchase coal in Canada for their
operations against California. 3 8
McCalla's reference to England pointed up the fact that naval
planners as late as 1897 were still quite uncertain about what
enemies and how many of them the United States might have to
face in the future. As late as May 1897 Mahan was advising
Roosevelt that the Pacific rather than the Atlantic was the more
likely scene of future conflict. 3 9 Adm. R.R. Belknap, in an
address to the Naval War College in 1897, rated war with Great
Britain, Japan or Spain as equally probable.4 0 Then, in February
1898, the explosion of the Maine in Havana harbor put a
temporary end to all speculation.
The Spanish-American War and its aftermath enhanced the
prestige of the College. Many of its leading spokesmen such as
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Taylor, Goodrich, French E. Chadwick and Bowman McCalla were
soon after promoted to Admiral, and, despite the fact that their
plans had not a�ways been followed, the officers of the College felt
justified in claiming at least part of the credit for American success
in the War. The appointment of Mahan to the Naval War Board
was taken as recognition of the validity of the College's strategic
views and the faculty could also take some satisfaction in the fact
that Admiral Sampson had been a War College man. Sampson's
remark that the College's. charts and defense plans prepared in
1895 were so well executed that he thought them to have been
done during the war was widely repeated as were the comparisons
which many graduates drew between their war-gaming experiences
and their actual service in the war.4 1 One officer who commanded
a scout on the Cuban coast during the war observed that the war
was so much like a war game "that it seems as though I am sure
later to hear Harry Taylor's bell."4 2
Serious problems remained however. The War College con
tinued to be subordinate to the commander of the Newport
Training Station. In addition the College's planning activities had
aroused the resentment of the Office of Naval Intelligence. "The
intelligence office is very particular about anything done by the
College that seems to infringe on its prerogatives," Taylor
remarked to Luce in 1895.4 3 In his report of the following year,
Secretary Herbert declared somewhat optimistically that "a close
union ought to be maintained between it [O.N.I.] and the Naval
War College, both working to the end of meeting all possible naval
problems which might arise from any international difficulty."44
It was not long before proposals began to be heard that the War
College and the Office of Naval Intelligence be merged into one. In
1897, Comdr. Francis W. Dickins, Acting Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation, in a report to Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, recom
mended that "[O.N.I.] be augmented by officers of experience
and all work now done at the War College by its staff removed to
Washington and made part of the functions of the Office of Naval
Intelligence." The main problem Dickins suggested "could be sent
out to the fleet. The country thus having a real war college where
the art of war can only be practically learned, at sea."4 5
Roosevelt who was friendly with both factions attempted to
steer a middle course. When Dickins arranged to have his
recommendations published as an article in the Army-Navy
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Register,

Roosevelt urged Caspar F. Goodrich, the College
president, to publish a reply to Dickins "and have the material
4 6
moderately strong. "
In November 1897, Goodrich's defense of the College appeared
in the Army-Navy Register. He observed that nearly all the
opposition to the College came from officers who had never
attended the College and who had no conception of its real
function. He pointed to the important contribution made by the
German Staff Colleges to the efficiency of the German Army and
declared that the Naval War College was just as indispensable to
the American Navy. Finally he reminded his readers that the War
College had been the only agency in the Navy able to prepare a
war plan for the Navy during the Chilean crisis of 1891 and a
defense plan against the British during the Venezuelan Boundary
crisis.4 7
Goodrich's article disposed of the danger that the War College
would be merged with O.N.I., but the following year a new
menace appeared. When Theodore Roosevelt had gone off to win
the war in Cuba, his place had been taken by a new Assistant
Secretary, George M. Allen. Allen believed that since the War
College was a "post-graduate school " it ought to be moved to
Annapolis so as to be near its "under-graduate school." In
September 1898, Luce, alarmed by Allen's evident determination
to have the College moved to Annapolis, wrote to Lodge:
" ...the end is in sight unless the Secretary of the Navy comes to
our relief....Perhaps it might be in your way to write and ask
Mr. Long whether he knowingly consented to the breaking up of
4 8
the College."
Lodge replied that Long was a warm friend of the College and
"intended to send Captain Taylor there at once." 4 9 Luce pointed
out that:
...recent orders from the department have rendered it
impossible for Captain Taylor to come here.... However
good the intentions of the honorable Secretary his sub
ordinates are gradually but surely undermining the College
and the only way to save it is for the Governor to look into
matters for himself.... Captain Taylor is adverse to coming
to the College to be continually badgered by the Bureau of
Navigation as heretofore. If Governor Long desires to know
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why Captain Taylor objects to his former duty it is very easy
to send for him and thus let the truth come out.5 0
Luce's determination that the College should not be removed
from Newport was a result of his conviction that the College
should be an educational and not an administrative institution. He
believed that if it were transferred to Washington it would
eventually become absorbed by the machinery of the Navy
Department and its educational aspect forgotten.5 1 Even if it were
made a part of the Naval Academy its distinctive character would
be lost since, unlike the Naval Academy, the College had "no
course of instruction and therefore no instructors." The real work
of the College was "the investigation and analysis of problems
which represent conditions of modern warfare especially as would
arise in defense of our own territory." 5 2 Finally, Luce believed
that the College "must be kept North in a cool summer climate
and on deep sea waters, " 5 3 if it was to perform its work properly.
Thanks to the efforts of Luce and his allies, nothing further was
heard of Allen's plan to merge the College with the Naval
Academy.
Yet the most serious problem, the Training Station and the
hostility of the bureaus, remained to be solved. Asked by the
Chief of Navigation, Capt. Arendt S. Crowninshield, to return to
the War College at the conclusion of the war with Spain, Taylor
refused on the grounds that "as president I would be practically
subordinate to my junior in rank at the Training Station." 5 4 The
Bureau of Navigation also announced that due to a shortage of
officers it might not be possible to have a course at the War
College during the summer of 1899.5 5 The new president, Capt.
Charles H. Stockton, warned that "the reasons given for the
suspension of the course this summer will apply with fatal effect
in years to come." 5 6
But the War College was no longer obliged to endure patiently
such setbacks and wait for better times. The war with Spain had
changed things a good deal. The advocates of the College were
now names to contend with. As Aldrich assured Luce: "your
own views and those of men like Sampson, Taylor, Goodrich,
Chadwick and others of their class would be controlling in
Congress notwithstanding the opinions of [Assistant Secretary]
Allen." 5 7
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The MW posture of the College defenders was evident in a
letter from Senator William E. Chandler to Secretary of the Navy
Long, a few months later. "It is not for me to criticize the Bureau
of Navigation," he wrote, "but the Secretary should decide the
question for himself. He should not allow the college to be
destroyed by indirection and by successive steps taken by the
Bureau of Navigation...." 5 8 Assistant Secretary Allen, replying
for Long, hastened to assure Chandler that "the Department is
heartily in favor of that institution." The shortage of officers,
created by the large increase in the number of ships in commis
sion, was alone responsible for the decision not to assign a regular
class to the College. However, the Secretary promised to have the
North Atlantic Fleet visit the College to enable its officers to
attend the course.5 9
The tone of the correspondence was significant. The opponents
and doubters were now on the defensive. Much hostility and
misunderstanding remained but critics could no longer attack the
institution directly.Although far from being generally accepted by
the Line, the War College was now, for better and for worse, a part
of the Navy establishment.
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CHAPTER VIII
POLITICS AND PLANNING
Why then war is peace because
it is a preparation to peace and
peace be but a preparation to war.
John Selden M.P.
1
19 April 1628

The Naval War College's heavy involvement with war planning
in the 1890's pointed up the extent to which it had taken on some
of the functions of a naval general staff. This development, which
Luce had anticipated and tried unsuccessfully to avoid, came
about for two reasons. The first reason was that the Navy had no
general staff. It had eight autonomous bureaus. These functioned
very well in performing their individual tasks, but there was no
arrangement for coordinating their work or for planning cam
paigns or directing the operations of the fleet in war. The second
and more immediate reason was that the Navy had almost no
officers outside of the War College trained in general staff work.
The War College, alone among the Navy's many organs, had the
machinery and the personnel to perform general staff functions
and so, almost absentmindedly, it began to perform them.
The establishment of the General Board of the Navy in March
1900 to advise the Secretary of the Navy on war plans, bases and
general naval policy considerably eased the burden of war
planning. 2 Yet the War College was intimately involved in the
works of the Board testing and refining its war plans on the game
board and acting as a sort of general "think tank" or research
center on questions of naval policy.

As time passed, the War College staff found that its planning
duties were impinging more and more on its educational work. In
October 1911, a special committee appointed by President
Raymond P. Rodgers to consider the subject concluded that "war
plans can best be prepared at the Naval War College and the
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present staff is capable of undertaking them."3 "However," the
committee pointed out, the present staff was already "fully
occupied with their educational duties." If the War College was
to be charged with preparing war plans, it should be given an
additional staff of seven officers. These officers would serve for
2 years and would be "wholly charged with the preparation of
war plans." They should be graduates of the War College
"long course" (introduced in 1911) as well as the usual
"short" summer course.
In order to provide a sufficient number of recruits for the
planning staff, the committee recommended that 15 officers a
year be assigned to the War College long course and 20 to 30
officers to the short course. The total faculty would comprise 16
officers. They would be divided into the "educational staff" and
the "planning staff" consisting of eight officers and seven officers
respectively. On the planning staff, there was to be one director,
two officers to deal with "policy and strategy," two for logistics,
and two for tactical problems.
Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer was unwilling to
enlarge the College staff to the degree desired by the committee
but he did attempt to formalize and rationalize the procedure for

war plans. His General Order No. 116 attempted to define the
precise responsibilities of each agency in the preparation of the
plans. The General Board was to "designate the country for which
a Naval War Portfolio was to be prepared."4 The Office of Naval
Intelligence would provide the necessary information on the
country designated. The Plan would then be prepared by the
General Board "which may call upon the War College for such
assistance as may be given without serious interference with its
educational program."5
The old problem persisted, however. The War College was still
the only agency in the Navy able to do general staff work. When
Bradley A. Fiske became head of the War Plans Division of the
General Board, he recalled that "I knew nothing about making war
plans. . . . I had not been educated in making war plans and I did
not know anybody who had. "6 As a result, the War College
continued to bear a large share of the responsibility for the
preparation of war plans, although officially it was merely
"assisting" the General Board.
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The College's "annual problems" in the decade after the war
with Spain reflected the vastly increased responsibilities and
problems of the Navy. Attention which had been focused on the
defense of the coastline was now extended to the defense of the
entire Caribbean region as well as the outposts the United States
had recently acquired in the Far East and Pacific.

Germany was now believed to constitute the principal menace
in the Atlantic and, until 1905, a source of danger in the Pacific as
well. The Navy's concern with Germany had first become acute in
1898 when a large German squadron under Admiral Diederichs
had worried and provoked Dewey during the siege of Manila. At
the time, Secretary Long had been led to cable the American
Naval Attache in Berlin, instructing him to inquire into the
war-readiness of the German fleet. 7 There had also been friction
with Germany over Samoa after the war and over the disposition
of the former Spanish Islands in the Pacific. The American Naval
Attache in Berlin had reported in 1899 that the possibility of a
German-American War was being "constantly discussed" by
German military naval officers. 8 In 1901, Roosevelt wrote to a
friend that "the only power which may be a menace to us in
anything like the immediate future is Germany." 9 The Venezuelan
crisis of 1902-1903 did nothing to lessen these fears and beginning
in 1900 Germany figured as the hypothetical opponent in War
College problems of every alternate year until the outbreak of
World War I.

The College's studies of the strategy of a German-American War
strikingly demonstrated the power of the war game as an
analytical tool. Years of study and gaming at Newport had
convinced American naval planners that a German attack upon, or
invasion of the American coast was impractical. The Germans
would first have to seize a base in the Caribbean probably in Haiti
or the Dominican Republic or on the Island of Margarita off the
Venezuelan coast before undertaking further operations against
the United States. To prevent this, the American battleships
should be combined into a single "offensive" fleet. The principal
American base should be Guantanamo Bay and the fleet should
concentrate there as soon as possible after the outbreak of
hostilities. With the lesson of the Spanish-American War fresh in
their minds, the War College planners warned that "there is a grave.
danger that the people will try to prevent the fleet's leaving until
the enemy's whereabouts become definitely known."
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In the Pacific, the American ships were to concentrate at
Manila and be utilized for raids on the German possessions in the
Pacific. It was in the Caribbean, however, that the decisive action
would take place. The planners were certain that the attempt of
the Germans to seize a base in the West Indies would result in a
great setpiece battle and that "upon the results of a fleet
engagement will depend the course of subsequent operations." In
the years to come the war plan for Germany would be modified
many times, but the planners never lost their conviction that the
war would be decided by a major engagement in the West Indies
between the opposing surface fleets. 1 0
It is interesting to compare these plans with the German plans
for war with the United States. By a curious irony, the chief of the
German admiralty staff was Vice Adm. Otto von Diederichs, the
man who had confronted Dewey at Manila Bay a few years before.
Von Diederichs inherited a theoretical strategic plan for war
against the United States, prepared in 1898 by Lt. Edward von
Mantey. The admiral lost no time in developing von Mantey's
scheme into a full-fledged "operations plan" for a combined naval
and military attack against one of the east coast cities of the
United States, probably New York. Count Alfred von Schlieffen,
the chief of army general staff, would have none of this, however.
Schlieffen estimated that it would require upwards of 100,000
men for a successful direct invasion of the United States and
suggested a preliminary landing in Cuba as an alternative. Finally,
in the spring of 1903, a "final" operations plan, "Operations Plan
III" was agreed upon by the two services. The plan called for a
lightning seizure of Culebra and Puerto Rico as the first step in a
war between Germany and the United States. German naval forces
in East Asia and the Pacific were to carry out an immediate assault
on the Philippines. The American Naval War College, with a tiny
staff and a rudimentary intelligence system, had thus successfully
predicted the correct German strategy 2 years before the Germans
themselves had actually thought of it. 1 1
In the Far East, things were more complicated. In 1900, the
War College's main problem contemplated a war between the
United States and an ally against Great Britain. 12 Two years later,
the problems envisioned a war in the East between France with
Russia as an ally and Britain with Japan as an ally "into which the
United States is drawn by the murder of some missionaries." 1 3
The following winter, the War College staff played a "triple vs.
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dual alliance" war game designed to simulate a war between
Russia, France and Germany on one side and Britain and Japan on
the other.
The conclusions drawn from these studies were embodied in a
Far Eastern war plan which the College began for the General
Board in 1900. These plans which were to grow into "War
Portfolio No. 2" envisioned a war situation involving Britain,
Japan and the United States on one side, and Germany, France
and Russia on the other. The plan provided for the defense of the
Philippines against the French and the defense of Hokkaido by a
joint American and Japanese force as well as an attack on French
Indochina. The most important part of the plan called for an
attack on Samsa Inlet in Fukien, China, which the Navy hoped to
capture and use as an advanced base for operations against
Kiaochow and Port Arthur.1 4 The advanced-base-in-China idea
had been advocated by the Navy since 1899, and was to cause
considerable embarrassment to American Open Door diplo
macy .1 5 It was only in 1906, after the victory of Japan had
altered the strategic situation, that the project was finally
abandoned.
The emergence of Japan as the predominant naval power in
East Asia after her victory over Russia in 1905 and the subsequent
Japanese-American crises of 1906 and 1907 caused American
naval planners to focus on Japan as the most likely enemy in East
Asia. By 1911, the War College and the General Board had evolved
a basic plan, "Orange," for war with Japan which was to form the
basis of American strategy in the Pacific for the next quarter
century.
The Navy expected that in case of war with Japan, "the
Orange (Japanese) main objective will be to control the Western
Pacific as long as possible and if a decisive action is inevitable to
fight under conditions as disadvantageous to Blue as possible." It
was expected that the Japanese "would attempt to occupy the
Philippines, Guam, Kiska, Midway and Pago Pago." It was not
expected that they would undertake any operations against
Hawaii, the U.S. Pacific coast or Panama until after the
American fleet had been disposed of. "In general," the plan
concluded, "the Orange strategy will be to let the Blue fleet
come to her."
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Under these circumstances the plan called for the American
forces on the Asiatic station to concentrate at Manila. The other
American forces in the Pacific and the Atlantic battle fleet when it
arrived were to rendezvous at Hawaii and then proceed west to
Guam and the Philippines "in order to bring the Orange fleet to
action." The forces already in the Far East were to endeavor to
hold Guam and the entrance to Manila Bay until the arrival qf the
main American fleet, when, as in the Atlantic,the issue would be
decided by a big naval battle.1 6
The War College and the General Board did not always see eye
to eye on questions of naval strategy. The most vexing problem
was the disposition of the fleet. By the end of 1903, the War
College had become convinced, as a result of its experience in war
games, that the battle fleet should no longer be divided between
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The main problem for 1903 had
involved an attempt by Germany to send her fleet to the Far East
before the American Fleet could be brought around Cape Horn
and across the Pacific. As Germany occupied interior lines, it
seemed likely that she might succeed in surprising the Philippines
before the Atlantic Fleet could arrive. To prevent this possibility,
the War College recommended that all battleships be withdrawn to
the Atlantic while Manila and Subic Bay were to be heavily
fortified.1 7
Ironically the War College's recommendations were opposed by
three of its founders: Taylor, Luce and Mahan, who felt that the
unstable situation in the Far East and the likelihood of a Russo
Japanese War required the continued presence of American capital
ships. In a letter to Taylor, Luce opposed "loosening our hold on
the Philippines." "It seems to me," he wrote the Chief of Naviga
tion, "that the storm center is now in Asiatic waters. A truce may
b e p a t c h e d up between Russia and Japan but it cannot last
long....In any event, it appears to me that our diplomacy in the
East requires the moral support of material force.'' 1 8 The three
admirals were seconded by a report from Dewey's aide, Comdr.
Nathan Sargent, in which he contended that the United States
would lose its Far Eastern trade and open the West Coast to attack
if all the battleships were withdrawn. 1 9 Finally,a compromise was
decided upon. The General Board recommended that "as a general
principle " the proper policy was to concentrate all the battleships
in the Atlantic. However, "under present conditions,the detail of
no less than three battleships to the Pacific is advisable. " 2 0
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It was not until 1906 that the American battleships on the
Pacific Station were replaced by armored cruisers and the entire
battle fleet concentrated on the Atlantic. No sooner had this
long-sought goal been achieved, however, than demands began to
be heard that some of the battleships be returned to the Pacific.
The Japanese war scares of 1906 and 1907 brought forth new
demands from the Western States for naval protection. Yet a
persistent fear of Germany led many American leaders to desire
the continued presence of the fleet in the Atlantic. 2 1
In 1910 the War College again clashed with the Navy
Department over the disposition of the battle fleet. The War
College summer conference had worked out a complicated plan to
solve the problem of covering two oceans with a single fleet. The
battle fleet would be stationed at a point equidistant between the
Navy's principal Far Eastern base in the Philippines and its
principal base in the Caribbean. This would place the fleet on the
west coast but battleships would periodically sail westward across
the Pacific and around the world to be repaired and overhauled in
Atlantic coast yards after which they would again move to the
Pacific.
Whatever merit this plan may have possessed, it was entirely
contrary to the plan being worked out by the Navy Department
for consolidating the battleships into an Atlantic Fleet of four
divisions to be based permanently on the east coast. 2 2 Secretary
of the Navy George von L. Meyer, who had helped to draw up this
plan, angrily directed that, in the future, "no note or conclusion"
of the War College was to contradict Navy Department policy. 2 3
Much of the controversy and confusion over strategy in the
Navy was a direct result of the lack of political consultation and
coordination between the armed forces and civilian policymakers.
"It appears to me that the three functions of the government, the
diplomatic, the Army and the Navy work now in what you might
call watertight compartments," Mahan told a congressional com
mittee. "It seems to me that there is very little appreciation in this
country of the relation between diplomacy and the Army and the
Navy." 2 4
The majority of the military professionals in the l 900's took
this condition more or less for granted but the War College, from
its foundation, had stood for a broader and more sophisticated
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view of the relationship between strategy and national policy.Like
Clausewitz, the founders of the War College believed that war was
merely a continuation of diplomacy by other means, and if they
sometimes seemed to feel that policy was too important to be left
to the politicians, they were nonetheless aware that the strategist
and policymaker had to cooperate closely with one another if
either was to be successful.
The course of readings in the early years did much to implant
these views in the minds of the graduates. Jomini considered
diplomacy to be a "sixth branch of the art of war ...which it
cannot be denied is indispensable to any general commanding an
army," 2 5 and Sir Edward Hamley observed in his widely used
textbook that " ...when generals are commissioned by their
governments to execute warlike enterprises the questions which
depend chiefly on diplomacy still must of necessity be solved." 2 6
Above all Mahan's own writings with their emphasis on the
interplay between commerce, politics and warfare helped to
awaken War College students to the wider ramifications of naval
power. Luce and Mahan would have been astounded had anyone
observed of the College of their time as one writer had done of
war colleges in the l 960's that "one is struck by the fact that the
curriculum does not focus on the specific political consequences
past, present,or future of military actions. " 2 7 The men associated
with the College before the First World War took a broader view
of strategy and understood its implications for diplomacy as well
as the implications of diplomacy for strategy.
Trained in this tradition, the officers of the College soon
perceived the futility of trying to "plan" for wars without
adequate political guidance. Did the United States intend to apply
the Monroe Doctrine below the Amazon? Did it intend to back
the Open Door Policy with force in a showdown? Would it try to
restrain Japan in the Far East? Could it expect to have an ally in a
future war? There was almost no contact or coordination in these
early years between the Navy and the State Department and little
more between the Navy and the Army.
To remedy this situation, Comdr. F.K. Hill, Chief of the Wat
College Planning Staff, had proposed in 1910 a "Council of
National Defense" to be composed of the Secretaries of War, State
and the Navy, the chairmen of House and Senate Military and
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Naval Affairs Committees, the chairmen of the House and Senate
Foreign Relations Committees, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the
Aide for Operations and the presidents of the War Colleges.2 8
The following year a bill embodying Hill's proposals was
introduced in Congress by Representative Richmond P. Hobson of
Alabama. Although the bill came to nothing, the hearings held on
the measure show clearly the differences between the War College
concept of war and diplomacy and that held by the rest of the
country.
The Secretary of War, John M. Dickinson, supported the bill
but professed to see no reason for having the Secretary of State as
a member of the Council. The chief advantage of the Council as
Dickinson saw it, would be that "legislation recommended by this
type of Board would have more congressional support than if it
were merely recommended by the Army. " 2 9 Hill sharply dis
agreed; the experience of the War College, he contended, had
shown the necessity for political guidance in drawing up war plans.
"We cannot make proper strategic plans unless the statesmen tell
us what the policies are! " 3 0
The controversy between the College and those who believed
that diplomacy was beyond the purview of military men con
tinued behind the scenes. Their differences were pointed up in the
"Report of the Special Committee on War Plans." Secretary Meyer
in a memorandum to the War College had outlined a scheme for
preparing permanent war plans with the cooperation of the War
College, the General Board, and the Office of Naval Intelligence.
In his memorandum he declared that "it is not considered that
political discussions or economic dissertations on the probable
causes or effects of the war [in the war plan] are desirable." 31
The Committee replied that "the War College Staff desires to
emphasize the intimate relations between policy and war and
consequently between policy and war plans." After quoting
Clausewitz on the interrelations of war and diplomacy, the
Committee pointed out that "plans not based oncthe interrelation
of the enemy's and our own motives are of little value," and that
"it is necessary to state the motives on which the plan is founded
in order that it may be correctly interpreted." 3 2 Furthermore,
"revision of a plan the basis of which is not set forth cannot be
undertaken intelligently.''
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The controversy came to a head a few months later in March
1912, when the General Board submitted to the War College for
comment a proposed plan of campaign against Mexico. The War
College Staff replied by suggesting that a joint Army, Navy and
State Department team prepare the war plan for Mexico.
The Navy Plan [ observed the staff] appears to be drawn up
with a certain vagueness as to what is to be accomplished by
going to war and how it is to be done. The plan lays upon the
government the necessity of prescribing the scope of opera
tions. But who is the government? As it seems to the War
College the government is the President and his cabinet acting
upon the advice of the Joint Board. The General Board is
thus relying on the President to decide without information
upon the very point which it is the duty of the General
Board, acting through the Joint Board to advise him-namely
the scope of operations necessary to accomplish the mission
undertaken.3 3
In answering the War College's criticism, Adm. George Dewey,
Chairman of the General Board, voiced the sentiment of all those,
civilian and military, who believed that military men should limit
themselves to "purely military questions." Dewey declared:
A naval war portfolio is a concrete work for a specific
practical purpose and brevity and clearness demand the
elimination of all matter which does not bear directly on the
purpose in view .... It would seem that many of the details
of a naval war portfolio might be developed independently of
consultation with the State and War Department since they
neither effect nor are effected by their plans. Further, why
include hundreds of pages of extraneous matter? 3 4
He then proceeded to outline an argument which would become
quite familiar to Americans in the l 950's:
It is a fact well understood that all commanders should
thoroughly understand the policy of their country, but since
they are the prime instruments of war and the object of war
is to defeat the enemy, that object is best attained when
defeat is complete. A commander-in-chief should therefore
rarely be influenced by ulterior motives.3 5
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In the end the advocates of "strictly military considerations"
won out. The gulf between the policymakers and the military
already very wide became even wider as the military abandoned
any attempt to understand "political" questions. At the War
College, this trend was reflected in the shift from the "global
strategy" emphasis to tactical problems and "basic professional
training" of the l 920's. 3 6
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CHAPTER IX

A NEW GENERATION

During the years which followed the Spanish-American War,
the College continued to expand and develop its curriculum to
meet the needs of a rapidly growing Navy. In 1900, the permanent
staff besides President Capt. Charles H. Stockton, included Lt.
William McCarty Little, Lt. William R. Rush and Lt. John M.
Ellicott, all of whom had served under Luce. In addition, Rear
Adm. Caspar F. Goodrich and Capt. French E. Chadwick, who
succeeded Stockton as president at the end of 1900, were assigned
to the College for special duty. 1
These years marked the transition between the "first genera
tion" of reformers associated with the War College and those who
were to guide its fortunes up to the eve of the First World War.
The old generation, men like Luce, Taylor, Mahan and Chadwick,
continued to take an active interest in the College and often
returned to serve on the faculty, but more and more of the actual
work of administration, planning and teaching was shifted to the
younger officers like William L. Rodgers, Dudley W. Knox, and
later William S. Sims, with William McCarty Little serving as the
link between the two generations.
Nearly all of the younger men had been students of Mahan or
Luce and shared their basic views about the nature of war and the
officer's place in society. They differed in being more technically
oriented, less concerned with the broader problems of global
strategy and more preoccupied with the immediate problems of
improving the fighting efficiency of the Navy.
Except for Admiral Sampson, the older generation of War
College reformers had not been innovators in the area of weapons
technology. In contrast some of the younger men like Bradley A.
Fiske, William L. Rodgers and William S. Sims led the way in this
field. In the years after the Spanish-American War, the College was
to make important contributions to the design and evaluation of
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warships. In these same years however the curriculum and
outlook of the College became more narrow and technical.
The very innovations introduced by the younger officers, in
novations which in the short run led to great improvement in
the training and subsequent performance of naval officers, in
the long run resulted in the decline of the College as a center
of original research.
The second generation of naval reformers was anxious to apply
the tools of the War College to the solution of practical naval
problems. As line officers with a growing sense of professionalism,
they were less and less willing to leave the selection and design of
naval weapons to civilian engineers, chemists, and metallurgists,
the Navy technical bureaus or the Congress.
From the beginning the founders of the War College had argued
that tactical and strategic considerations, not technical ones,
should dictate the design of naval weapons. "In the navies of
today," complained Henry C. Taylor, "if a form of ship or some
ingenious invention of weapons is considered and found to be in
itself a formidable engine of warfare, it is simply accepted without
reference to any tactical system ...." 2 Similarly, Comdr. P.R.
Alger, the War College's ordnance expert, lamented that, while "in
the days when sea fighting was the frequent occupation ofa naval
officer, ships were designed for fighting purposes....Now, a
ship's armament appears to be considered rather in the light of an
accessory to be determined at the convenience of the de
signer...." 3
If a warship was to be designed "from the standpoint of the
tactician rather than the constructor"4 then it followed that the
line officers, who best understood the principles of the new
"science of naval warfare," should have the deciding voice in the
selection and design of warships. "Who is to best know the needs
of successful warfare if it is not the tactician?" demanded William
Bainbridge-Hoff, the War College's first instructor in naval tactics.
"Why limit his powers? He claims the right to [help] make as well
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as use his arms ....
By the end of the 1890's, the naval war game had provided the
line officers of the College with a tool for analyzing and testing
the warship designs of the technical bureaus. Employing a logic
which would be readily understood by the modern systems
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analyst, they proceeded to appraise critically the Navy Depart
ment's shipbuilding policies.
First to come under fire was the "armored cruiser." This was a
very large fast cruiser displacing up to 14,000 tons with an armor
belt and protection to her "vital parts." Her chief functions were
scouting, patrol, or commerce raiding but her main armament of
7, 8 or 9-inch guns was often powerful enough to enable her to
take her place in the battleline. At the moment the British were
preparing a design for an even more powerful type of armored
cruiser, the "battle-cruiser" which would be the same size as a
battleship and carry eight 12-inch guns at a speed of 25 knots.
War College studies soon demonstrated the low "cost-effective
ness" of this warship type. As a fighting ship, the armored cruiser
was "not as valuable for the line of battle as some other types
which could be built for the same money." 6 As a scout it was
several times as costly as a light cruiser or armed merchantman
which could perform these functions almost as efficiently. 7
Even the battleship did not escape the scrutiny of the War
College analysts. War games in 1901 and 1903 had convinced the
College staff that American battleships suffered from serious
tactical defects. In the 1901 war games in which the hypothetical
opponent was the German Fleet, the Blue Fleet, representing the
United States, had lost every game but one, which was a draw.
Although the American ships were as well protected as the
German and carried more powerful guns, the committee found
that the American ships "must close to 4,000 yards to defeat the
enemy with gunfire. We have not the superior speed to close to the
chosen range or to keep that range once we have it or to prevent
the enemy from closing." 8 In addition, the fact that the Black
(German) battleships carried torpedo tubes gave the Black Fleet a
great superiority in this branch of weapons and made closing to
short ranges extremely dangerous. On the other hand, the superior
speed of the Black Fleet would make it impossible to prevent its
ships from closing to torpedo range if they so desired.
Traditionally American warships had been designed to have the
heaviest guns and the best protection at the expense of speeg.
Now the War College had taken the opposite view and recom
mended that these advantages be sacrificed to speed. As Capt. Roy
C. Smith, a member of the Tactical Committee, put it a few years
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later: "We should not allow possible opponents to build ships of
generally similar type but faster." 9 William L.Rodgers summed up
the recommendation of the committee as to the best type of ship
for the American Navy by pointing out that "the presence of
torpedoes increases the probability of a long-range gun action and
therefore suggests the suppression of guns of intermediate calibre
and the application of all available weight to torpedoes, increase of
the number of heaviest guns, protection and motive power." 1 0
Two years later Rodgers outlined his proposal in greater detail
in a confidential memorandum to the Navy Department. In 1903,
the typical battleship carried four heavy guns, usually 12-inch, and
a number of guns of "intermediate calibre," 6, 7, or 8-inch. This
arrangement supposedly made sense because the less powerful 6 or
8-inch guns could fire faster than the 12-inch guns and it was also
generally believed that the smaller guns were more accurate.
Rodgers took exception to this view by pointing out that:
... the present [Russo-Japanese] War as well as the late
Spanish and Chinese Wars, show a preference for long-range
fighting where the intermediate calibre guns are compara
tively ineffective especially against the intermediate armor of
six to seven-inch thickness, but where heavy guns would be
effective. 1 1
For this type of long-range fighting, Rodgers urged, medium
calibre guns were useless: " ...at long ranges the remaining
velocity and consequent accuracy and striking energy of heavy
guns is proportionally higher.... [I] t is also to be borne in mind
that large calibre guns shoot better and are protected by heavier
armor." 1 2 There were also advantages in range finding and in
simplifying the problem of ammunition supply. "Therefore,"
concluded Rodgers, "ships armed with nothing but heavy guns,
adequately protected will establish such a superiority during the
approach of the enemy who has intermediate guns that he will be
unable to overcome it."
The idea of an all big-gun battleship was already under
consideration in naval circles when Rodgers proposed it in his
report. The year before Rodgers, the distinguished Italian naval
constructor Vittorio Cuniberti had written an article entitled "An
Ideal Warship for the British Navy" for the 1903 issue of Jane's
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Fighting Ships in which he proposed a ship of 17,000 tons,
24-knot speed, 12 12-inch guns with 12-inch armor and no
secondary battery at all except for light antitorpedo weapons. I 3
In the same month that Rodgers was preparing his memorandum,
a British Admiralty design committee under the direction of
Admiral Sir John Fisher had completed the initial design for
H.M.S. Dreadnought, the first all big-gun battleship.I 4 In the
United States an obscure American naval officer, Homer C.
Poundstone, had prepared a design for a ship of 19,000 tons
carrying 12 12-inch guns in 6 double turrets, with 11-inch armor
with a speed of 18 knots.I 5
A few months after Poundstone completed his design the Navy
General Board requested the Bureau of Construction and Repair
to prepare a design for a battleship to carry "twelve heavy turret
guns, none of which shall be less than 10 inches and at least four
of which shall be 12 inches, the secondary battery being not above
3 inches."I 6 In Rodgers' opinion,
The design comprising 4 twelve-inch and 8 ten-inch guns now
being developed by the Bureau of Construction and Repair
does not seem to give full weight to the tactical points above
enumerated ...the only logical point of rest is to avoid the
double calibre and have as many of the heaviest calibre as can
be adequately protected.I 7
Rodgers outlined four feasible types of ships. On a displacement
of 17,200 tons it would be possible to have 10 11-inch guns in 5
double turrets, or, if the displacement were increased to 19,400
tons, 12 11-inch guns in 6 turrets. Alternatively, the armament
might be 10 12-inch guns in double turrets on a displacement of
18,300 tons or 12 12-inch guns on a ship of 21,100 tons. He
recommended that the 12-inch gun be adopted "because of the
advantage gained by its greater penetrating power." The ship's
armor "should be evenly distributed over the vital parts and the
light guns which will not be manned in a fleet action, need no
armor at all."
Little seems to have come of the War College's recommenda
tions. In the same month that the Rodgers report was drafted, the
Board on Construction had replied to a question from President
Roosevelt concerning the feasibility of Poundstone's designs that
"nothing has transpired during the past year which would justify
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extensive changes in the main battery of vessels building or
recently designed. " 1 8 The first American big-gun ships were not
begun until July 1906. By this time the Dreadnought was
preparing for sea trials.
The fact that War College planners had produced a design for a
dreadnought a year before the British testified to the increasing
sophistication of the War College approach to the study of naval
warfare. This new sophistication was also reflected in the
curriculum of the College. The course of reading was gradually
enlarged until by 1910, it included over 100 books. Among them
were the works of Mahan's two French disciples, Darrieux and
Daveluy, as well as books by Corbett, Moltke, Wilkinson, and
Clausewitz. 1 9
The most far-reaching changes in the method of instruction
came about in 1912, when Little and his younger colleagues
introduced "the applicatory system" into the curriculum. The
exact origins of the applicatory system remain somewhat obscure.
Certainly its introduction owed a good deal to the system of the
same name in use at the Army War College. Comdr. William L.
Rodgers made extensive notes on the applicatory system during a
tour of duty at the Army War College from 1907 to 1909. 2 0
The applicatory system in use at the Army War College was a
type of case method instruction designed to teach the principles of
war "by concrete example rather than by bare statement of the
principles themselves. " 2 1 The system had three parts: the estimate
of the situation, the writing of orders and the evaluation of the
plan through staff rides or map problems.
The estimate of the situation was a standardized method for
evaluating a military problem and arriving at a desirable course of
action. It consisted of a series of steps or parts in which the
commander first derived the appropriate mission for his own
forces, considered the probable strength and intentions of the
enemy, discussed the courses of action open to his forces and,
finally, stated his decision.
Having completed his estimate of the situation, the student
then turned to writing his orders. This involved the use of a
standard order form based on the German staff "Operations
Ordnung," and had five parts. These were "information on enemy
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and friendly forces; the plan of the commander-in-chief; specific
orders to subordinates; orders to supply services; and information
on the whereabouts of the commander-in-chief during the opera
tion."2 2 Finally, the student's solution would be evaluated
through map problems, staff rides and conference discussions.
At about the same time that William L. Rodgers was studying at
the Army War College, Maj. John H. Russell, a future Marine
Corps Commandant, was serving as a member of the Naval War
College staff. Russell had obtained an English translation of
General Otto von Griepenkerl's Letters on Applied Tactics, a book
of "canned" tactical problems for use in the applicatory system
and this book came to the attention of William McCarty Little.2 3
Little was immediately struck by the idea of adapting the
system for use at the Naval War College. He carefully studied the
Letters on Applied Tactics and then formed a committee
composed of himself, Lt. Comdr. C.T. Vogelgesang and Major
Russell to work out a set of naval problems and solutions for use
by War College students. In adapting Griepenkerl's problems to
naval use, Little added the war game devices of an opponent, and a
time limit and thus converted them from tactical problems or map
problems into map maneuvers. The map maneuver was simply a
war game played out on a map instead of on a game board. Like
the war game it could be used to simulate conflicts of different
magnitudes. The four basic types of map maneuvers devised by the
College staff were intended to represent "the operations of single
squadrons, operations of several squadrons, combined operations
and operations of national navies."2 4
The larger map maneuvers provided the student officers with
excellent experience in general staff work. When a problem had
been decided upon, the staffs of both sides would prepare
monographs on the armed forces of the two states and their
economies, supplies and natural resources. In the next phase they
prepared studies of the time required for mobilization in each
state. Then studies were prepared of the logistic capacities of each
side and estimates made of the time necessary for supplies from
the main bases to reach the theatre of operations. The last phase
was the actual conduct of the map maneuver as a two-sided game.
The first papers on the "estimate of the situation" were
delivered by Lt. Comdr. Frank Marble in 1910 and Comdr. C.T.

119
Vogelgesang in 1911. Late in 1911, William L. Rodgers returned
to the Naval War College as president fresh from command of a
battleship, and set about making the applicatory system-estimate,
order writing, map maneuver-the core of the War College
curriculum.2 5
These seemingly prosaic pedagogical devices actually marked
the emergence of a revolutionary approach to naval command.2 6
The "estimate of the situation" approach provided an orderly
uniform and logical basis for strategic planning while the use of
the standard order form meant the acceptance of the principle
that subordinates should be granted wide discretion to use their
own judgment and make decisions at their level of responsibility
with only very general guidance from their superiors.
Combined in the applicatory system, the estimate, order form
and map maneuver made possible the creation of doctrine in the
Navy. The War College officers realized that modern naval forces
had grown too large and complex for a single commander to
control all the details of their operation. On the other hand,
subordinate commanders could not be expected to improvise
something on the spur of the moment. As Comdr. Dudley W.
Knox, one of the creators of the applicatory system, observed:
It is important to determine whether our operations shall be
offensive or defensive ...whether fleet will form in single
column or alignment of groups ...whether destroyers will be
employed during the day or only during night action ...the
determination of such matters leads to a concept of
war ...to leave such questions to individual choice invites
the present state of chronic indecision.2 7
What was required was doctrine. Griepenkerl, one of the
originators of the term defined it as "a code of principles
definitely held by superiors and thoroughly understood in spirit
by subordinates." 2 8 Comdr. William S. Sims compared it to the
plays of a football team which each member of the team is able to
execute simply by hearing the number of the play called by the
quarterback.
The standard order form made doctrine possible for the first
time in the Navy. By sending identical clear and concise orders to
all his subordinates, a commander could ensure that his plans
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would be carried out precisely as he had envisioned them. As
Dudley W. Knox put it: "The object of doctrine is to furnish a
basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by subordinate com
manders of a force in accordance with the intentions of the
commander-in-chief without the necessity of referring each
decision to a superior. "2 9
The introduction of the "applicatory system" pointed up the
increased influence which German military thought and methods
of education now exerted on the War College. It is not difficult to
understand the appeal of German ideas to the men who were
anxious to improve the curriculum of their school. Since 1870, the
Germans had exerted great influence in American military circles.
Clausewitz had first been translated, into English in 1873 and
American military periodicals in the 1870's and 1880's devoted
much space to the methods and accomplishments of Moltke, von
der Goltz and Gniesenau. In 1891, Col.Theodore A. Dodge of the
U.S. Army had suggested in an article in Forum that Moltke's
approach to war might also be useful for the Navy:
Navy warfare stands over a volcano.... The future naval
battle will yield vast surprises and will result in enormous loss
of life ...the work done by von Moltke is typical of what
the needs of the future must be. The swashbuckler has gone
for good. In his place has come the intellectual; the
hard-working student of war.3 0
Army officers like Tasker H. Bliss, assigned to the War College as
lecturers, did much to bring the new German ideas to the
attention of naval officers. In 1896, Henry C. Taylor could
observe with some justification that the chief effect which German
military science had had upon the U.S. Navy had been the
establishment of the Naval War College.3 1
In the 1890's, the War College was quick to call attention to its
similarity to the German Staff Colleges. Henry C. Taylor, in
explaining his additions to the curriculum in 1895, had declared
that he was "following the example of Count von Moltke who
caused the German officers to prepare themselves in advance for
actual war by the study of hypothetical military situations."3 2
The example of the German Staff Schools was again invoked by
Caspar F. Goodrich in his defense of the College in 1897 and in
1900; the General Board proudly reported that "the summer's
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work of the College is largely similar though not on so great a
scale, to that of the German War Schools under the General
11
Staff. 3 3 In introducing the applicatory system William McCarty
Little had been .careful to establish its respectability by pointing
out that "this system is the ground work upon which the Germans
have been building for so many years their wonderful development
11
in leadership and in knowledge of the art of war. 3 4
The older War College leaders soon succumbed to the new fad.
Mahan had been unacquain.ted with Clausewitz and the German
writers when he began his work at the War College. When he
became familiar with Clausewitz in the 1890's, he immediately
became a convert and professed to see no fundamental differences
between Jomini and his new mentor. 3 5 Even Luce was soon
quoting German generals and appealing to the example of the
German Staff Colleges in his articles. 3 6 If the intellectual
guideposts for the College in the 1880's had been Jomini, Clerk,
Mahan and Colomb, in the l 900's they were Clausewitz, Bud
decke, Moltke and Griepenkerl.
If the Germans had become the model for the American Naval
War College, the War College in turn had become the model for
similar institutions in all other navies. As early as 1894, the
Russian Naval Attache had written to Henry C. Taylor requesting
"programs, lectures, textbooks and other material which would
aid the Navy Ministry in establishing a School of Naval War
11
fare. 3 7 The following year the first foreign students were
admitted to the College. By 1910, all of the principal naval powers
had War Colleges modeled on the one at Newport. 3 8
It is interesting to compare these colleges with their American
model. All had a course of at least a year in length and the German
and Italian schools had a 2-year course. 3 9 The course at the
American College was still 3 months. Most of these schools had
classes of from 50 to 100 students and even the Norwegian Naval
College had more students than its American counterpart. Alone
among the navies of the world, the American Navy required no
examination of those entering its War College and gave no
preference in promotion to War College graduates. 4 0
The shortcomings of the College had long been apparent to its
supporters. In 1910, Luce had written Secretary of the Navy
George von L. Meyer:
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The College has a president but no students....It would be
satisfactory if we could get five junior officers to take a
course for one year. The summer "conferences" are ex
tremely valuable but as they last only four months compara
tively few officers derive any material benefit from them.4 1
There was also a shortage of officers available to serve on the
faculty. In 1910, there were 760 captains, commanders and
lieutenants in the U.S. Navy but the Department was unable to
find four of them to assign to the faculty.42 Nor was the College
any more popular with the potential students. The Navy Depart
ment made no attempt to encourage an interest in attending the
College among the younger officers and very few applied. Luce
observed that when the Navy had established a School of Steam
Engineering over 200 officers had applied to be included in the
first class of 20. In the same year the Naval War College had
received no applications.4 3
For some time the War College staff had been endeavoring to
have a "long course" of 1 year in length established at the College
but the Navy Department had refused all requests with the
explanation that it had no officers to spare. Finally Little was sent
on a special mission to Washington to persuade the Navy
Department to assign 20 students for 1 year of instruction.For 2
hours Little attempted to convince his old friend Rear Adm. R.F.
Nicholson, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, of the value of a
long course. At the end of a long argument Nicholson, with an air
of finality, produced a list of "priorities for assignment of officers
on active duty." The War College was at the bottom of the list.
Little was silent for a few moments. "Reggie, 11 he exclaimed, still
eyeing the list, "I know of only one way for us to obtain the
officers you know and I know we need for high commands in our
future Navy. Turn the list upside-down! " 4 4 The following year
the first class of four students began the long course at the Naval
War College.
Perhaps Admiral Nicholson had been genuinely moved by
Little's arguments or perhaps it was only coincidence but the first
quartet of officer-students assigned ,.to the War College's long
course represented an unusual collection of talent and intelligence.
One of the four in particular, a tall handsome sailor, with a neat
close-cropped beard, was a decidedly odd duck.While at Newport
he had been observed in attendance at Women's Suffrage meetings
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and it was rumored that he had even made a speech at one.4 5 He
was known to be an advocate of such radical and upsetting ideas as
long-range gunnery and single-calibre battleships, and in 1908 he
had even had the temerity to write an article in the U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings challenging the view of the great Mahan on
American battleships. His name was William Sowden Sims.
_In addition to Sims, the class included Comdr. Josiah S.
McKean, who was later to head the Material Division of the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations and ended his career as a Vice
Admiral; Capt. Earl H. Ellis of the Marine Corps who was to
pioneer in the development of amphibious warfare; and Comdr.
Yates Stirling, a future rear admiral and Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Fleet.The War College staff included Comdr.William Veazie Pratt,
a future Chief of Naval Operations and Dudley W.Knox,all under
the direction of Rear Adm William L. Rodgers.Altogether,it was
a remarkable group of officers and they were to bring the new
methods of instruction to a high level of effectiveness and spread
the gospel of the order form and the estimate of the situation
throughout the Navy.
Having served as Inspector of Target Practice during Theodore
Roosevelt's administration and coming to Newport fresh from the
command of a battleship, Sims did not find the prospect of a year
at the War College very exciting. "It may be," he wrote to his
wife, "that I can get some duty I like better ... something in
closer touch with practice and less on the theoretical side."4 6
Within a few months, however, Sims had been converted to the
War College idea and in 1911 he was busily drafting a memo
randum to the Secretary of the Navy on making it more effective.
The lecturers, he observed, were very fine as far as they went,but
their influence "is limited to those who hear them. "4 7 In the same
way the permanent staff studies "have not been fully utilized but
buried in the archives." The short summer conferences were
likewise not very useful since
...the consideration of various questions is disconnected
from year to year. One year a persuasive speaker on one side
may procure a vote for torpedo nets. The next year a reverse
decision will be reached. Even if the same conclusion can be
arrived at, the conclusion, so far as I know, has no direct
effect on policy, will be academic, and will produce no
results.4 8
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Sims was determined to apply the ideas and techniques he had
learned at the War College to the "practical" business of the Navy.
When he left Newport to take command of the Atlantic Fleet
Destroyer Flotilla in 1913, he wrote that "the torpedo fleet could
be made into an enormous game board ...an exceedingly valuable
school for trying out all kinds of maneuvers."4 9 Sims then
proceeded to introduce War College ideas and methods into the
operation of the destroyer flotilla. His principal assistants in this
work were Dudley W. Knox and William V. Pratt, both of whom
had been at Newport. Together they began a system of "con
ferences" modeled on the conferences on strategy and tactics
which they had attended at the War College. In these conferences
the officers of the flotilla worked out a basic doctrine to guide the
work of the destroyers. By this method Sims was able to reduce
the dozens of pages of written orders which had previously been
necessary to carry out any operation to a few basic instructions
and code wcrds which all cotnmanders familiar with the basic
doctrine would understand.5 0
While Sims was working with the destroyer flotilla his class
mates in the long course were also having some success in
introducing War College methods in the battle fleet. After a hard
struggle they were able to convince some of the senior officers to
adopt War College methods of writing orders, holding tactical
conferences, etc. The new methods greatly improved the ef
ficiency of the fleet and won many converts to the College.Adm.
F.E. Beatty, who commanded a division of the Atlantic battle
fleet, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy,
Since the 3rd of July my flagship has been under the
command of an officer who has passed through the long
course at the War College. The several problems assigned to
me have been fought by me in accordance with plans
suggested by that officer. The results have been most
unbelievably convincing and satisfying.... I recommend that
no captain be promoted to Flag rank without a War College
diploma or be allowed to serve as chief-of-staff or flag
lieutenant without such training.5 1
Gratifying as these successes were, Rodgers was still unwilling to
settle for a yearly class of only four students.He submitted a long
report to the Secretary of the Navy in which he recommended a
class of 15 students for the long course and 15 for the "short"
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summer course. The best time for officers to be assigned to the
College, Rodgers suggested, was when they were between 30 and
35 years of age. About one-half of the students should be
lieutenant commanders and the other half should be lieu
tenants.5 2 Rodgers also recommended that the staff be increased
to 10 officers, all graduates of the long course, who should serve
for 2 years.
The man who was to put these reforms into practice, however,
was not Meyer but the new Democratic Secretary of the Navy,
Josephus Daniels. Daniels was not a popular figure in naval circles.
Naval officers usually expressed the view that he might mean well
but that he "did not understand the Navy," a euphemistic way of
saying they considered the former North Carolina newspaper
publisher something of a country hick. They snickered at his
attempt to improve the lot of the enlisted men and to encourage
education in the Navy. He infuriated them with his order
forbidding intoxicants in the wardrooms. Contemporary naval
officers often depicted him as one of the obstacles to progress in
the Navy. Yet it was Daniels, more than any previous Secretary,
who was responsible for putting the War College at last on a
regular footing and enabling it to reach all of-the Navy's officers
for the first time.
A visit to the College in June 1913, and a long conversation
with Adm. William L. Rodgers convinced Daniels that the valuable
resources of the College were not being fully utilized.5 3 Immedi
ately afterwards, he issued a memorandum reorganizing the work
of the College. The memorandum set up three types of courses.
The "elementary course" of 3 weeks was intended for junior
officers of the Atlantic Fleet. It consisted "principally of the
solution of problems and tactical maneuvers along with lectures on
War College methods of treating military situations."5 4 The
"preparatory course" was similar to the old short course and was 4
months in duration. It included the subjects covered by the
elementary course plus the first part of the "long course."
Approximately one-half of the time was spent on tactical
problems on the game board. The other half was devoted to
strategic problems, chart maneuvers and papers on professional
subjects.
The third course, officially designated "the War College
Course," ran for 16 months and consisted of a 4-month
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preparatory course with 12 months of advanced work. The faculty
was to be selected from among the graduates of the "War College
Course." In addition, a series of correspondence courses was also
established which soon had an enrollment of over 500 officers. 5 5
The enrollment in each of the two longer courses was fixed at
about 20 officers who were to be assigned on a regular basis.
For the first time in its history the War College was able to rely
on receiving a large fixed number of students each year. For the
first time the instruction period was long enough to train them
properly. More important still, through its extension courses, it
was now able to reach many more officers than could ever be
accommodated at Newport.
Of all the Navy Secretaries it was Daniels, the pacifist editor
who had never been to sea, who perhaps best understood the
nature and purposes of the War College. Certainly he did more
towards furthering its mission than any of his more warlike
predecessors. It is somewhat ironic that the men who were later to
accuse him of incompetence and lack of understanding of their
profession derived much of their "professional" outlook from the
institution which he had helped to foster.
By Daniels' day, the younger generation of War College officers
had accomplished much. They had firmly established the compe
tence, if not the absolute right, of the line officers to pass on the
acceptability of naval weapons. They had successfully adapted the
most modern principles of German military science to the study
and teaching of naval warfare, and they had expanded the size,
scope and duration of the War College classes beyond anything
known in the 1890's.
Yet the price was high. The Germans and their American
disciples thought in terms of "basic professional training" which
they understood to mean the study of concrete problems in
tactics, logistics anci administration rather than speculation on
broad questions of strategy and policy. In contrast, Luce and his
collaborators had regarded the College as an institution for the
"study of the art of war in its broadest sense." 5 6 In the early
years, one member of the College staff had even suggested to
Little that "the College ought to be known generally as the 'War
College' rather than the 'Naval War College."' 5 7 The War College,
explained Luce, was a place where "officers meet together to
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discuss questions pertammg to higher br:anches of their profes
sion."5 8 The emphasis was always on the discovery and elucida
tion of the principles of war.
This view of the War College mission was well illustrated by an
exchange between the Chairman of the House Naval Affairs
Committee and Capt. French E. Chadwick, then president of the
Naval War College:
Chairman:
Chadwick:
Chairman:
Chadwick:

The thing you make the most specialty of
is the summer course.
No.
We hear more about it in the summer than
in the winter.
Yes,but that is a secondary part of it.5 9

The most important aspect of the War College work,Chadwick
explained,was the development of the art of naval warfare.
By way of contrast, Capt. William S. Sims declared in a lecture
to the Army War College in 1914 that "the development and
increase in the state of military knowledge [is] in reality
secondary aims of a War College; that the primary mission was
TRAINING [emphasis in original] of officers in the conduct of
war."6 o
Sims' speech marked the end of a gradual evolution in the War
College philosophy. In the early years both Luce and Taylor had
emphasized the theoretical, unstructured and cooperative aspects
of the War College program "We must avoid absolutely demand
ing or sequestering work from the class," observed Taylor. "More
work and better work will thus be obtained than by making any
part of it obligatory." 6 1 Luce explained to an entering group of
officers that "the members of the Staff are in a sense pioneers who
have gone ahead to blaze the trail, to make your path straight.
They do not pretend to be teachers but are familiar with the
college machinery and can show you how to use it." 6 2
As early as 1897, however, president Caspar F. Goodrich had
predicted that: " ... the time may come when, after the college
shall have collected a large amount of professional wisdom ...it
may ...frankly demand recognition as an authority upon the
subject with which it deals." 63 By 1914 Rear Adm. Austin M.
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Knight was speculating on whether the College had not indeed
become "an institution speaking by authority to a group of
officers who are not only students but pupils. " 6 4
Sims and his associates were at least partially aware that they
were embarking on a new course. "The War College and its
followers are at the turn of the roads," observed William Veazie
Pratt in 1913; "before us somewhere lies the correct way, but that
way is not too clear at all, neither is it entirely free of dangers." 6 5
To Sims, Pratt and Knight, however, the need to prepare officers
for higher command in a rapidly expanding and changing Navy
seemed far more urgent than adding to the stock of theoretical
knowledge about the art of war. Only gradually did it become
apparent that this emphasis on professional training was having a
deleterious effect on the War College as a whole. The applicatory
system was excellent for teaching naval officers what was already
known about naval warfare. It was of little use in helping them
solve new problems or cope with new techniques of naval warfare.
Significantly, the introduction of the new German techniques
coincided with the demise of the study of history at the War
College. The chair of naval history had been vacant ever since
Mahan had left it in 1894. No further studies in naval history were
undertaken except as "historical studies in tactics and strategy for
application in chart maneuvers." As a result theoretical work in
the areas of history and strategy was allowed to stagnate. Mahan's
lectures, reread to the class each year, were elevated into a dogma.
Later leaders of the College failed to realize that the rapidly
changing technology of the 20th century required that the
concepts of grand strategy be continually revised to keep up with
the rate of innovation. The College had been founded for this
purpose, but the emphasis on tactics instead of strategy, "case
studies" instead of history, rendered it incapable of fulfilling its
function. As a result, the College, and the Navy as a whole, were
unequipped to deal with the vast technological changes of the
First World War and after, changes even more revolutionary than
the transition from sail to steam.
The applicatory method carried with it the same disadvantages
as the "case method" in law which it closely resembled and with
which Little delighted in comparing it. While it made the study of
war more precise, it also limited its scope. As the "case method"
served "to turn attention still further away from the task of giving
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the student a syntopic view of the scope and function of law," 6 6
so the applicatory system tended to lead to the neglect of the
more fundamental questions of war. A 1954 War College staff
study observed "the emphasis placed upon sound military decision
resulted in the concentration of a great deal of attention upon
operations problems. The purely pedagogical necessity of limiting
their scope fostered a limited outlook as well. " 6 7
While the officer's knowledge was deepened it was also
narrowed. By the l920's, the study of broader questions of
strategy had become "subordinate to preparation for higher
tactical command or ' grand tactics' as the conduct of fleet actions
was known in those days." 6 8 "Much of our thinking and study
was channeled into tactical lines," recalled Vice Adm. Robert B.
Carney. "We had a one-battle Navy. " 6 9
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CHAPTER X

APPLYING THE "SCIENCE OF NAVAL WARFARE"

In the first decade of the 20th century the emergent American
professions moved confidently to apply their special knowledge
and expertise to the problems of their country. Doctors aimed to
r-id the country of quacks and fakirs and to make the new con
cepts of public health into a national program. Professional social
workers replaced philanthropists, clergymen and other amateurs in
the management of charity work, and professional foresters moved
to apply the new sciences of hydrography, forestry and geology to
the management of the nation's natural resources. "The rhetoric
and symbolism of [these] years," observed Samuel P. Hayes, "is
filled with images of science and technology efficiency and system
and 'business-like' alternatives. " 1
Similar developments were taking place in the Navy. At the War
College the new science of naval strategy provided the theoretical
framework and the war game an admirable analytical tool for the
analysis of naval problems. Line officers who in the 1880's had
stood in awe of the new technology and been resigned to the
power of Congress and the technical bureaus were now demanding
a controlling voice in the formation of naval policy. Bradley Fiske
observed that "By reason of our growing familiarity with the
principles of war as taught in our Naval War College there has been
an increasing agitation over the subject of giving the Navy a more
efficient organization. " 2 As Fiske suggests, the movement for
greater professional control soon took the form of a dispute over
the organization of the Navy Department.
Before the Spanish-American War the Navy was administered
by eight separate and almost autonomous "bureaus" which had
no common head except the Secretary of the Navy. When a new
ship was built the Bureau of Ordnance supplied the guns, the
Bureau of Construction and Repair supplied the hull, and the
Bureau of Steam Engineering supplied the engine. No one
coordinated the work of the three bureaus to ensure that the parts
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would fit together properly, and most of the line officers who
were to fight the ship had little say in its construction. So
self-contained and independent were the bureaus that attempts to
make them work in harmony often led to ludicrous results. One
Congressman related the story of the U.S.S.Despatch which had
been ordered to Cuba to deal with an emergency there.
The Ordnance Bureau gave orders to have her immediately
loaded with shot and shell and the crew worked all the next
day to get her ready. But when the Bureau of Construction
and Repair heard of the matter they declared that she
couldn't stand the load so the crew worked all night taking
them off again.3
All eight of the Navy bureaus performed administrative or
technical functions. None of them was concerned with directing
the operations of the fleet in war, or with preparations for war or
even with war plans. As a result of the bureau system the Navy
Department was so organized that the naval officers designed,
built and maintained the warships while the civilian Secretary of
the Navy operated the fleet.
To the reformers connected with the War College this state of
affairs appeared intolerable. Strong opponents as they were of
"technicism" in the Navy, they saw it encouraged and perpetuated
by the structure of the Navy Department. In their view this
structure left to the civilian Secretary the duties which they
considered to be the most important function of the naval officer:
preparing the fleet for war and directing its operation.
Lt. Comdr. Yates Stirling a student in the first "long course" at
the War College, who had spent his year in Newport in a study of
naval administration, argued that
the object for which a Navy exists is war, and war to be
waged successfully needs to be planned and carried out by
men familiar with such specialized and scientific work ... in
any military organization superiority or precedence must be
conferred on that side which directs war in preference to the
side which provides the means.4
The reformers in the Navy had borrowed heavily from the
natural sciences and from German military concepts to form their
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"science of naval warfare." The branch of this "science" which
concerned itself with administration, however, drew most of its
inspiration, at least rhetorically, from still a third source: business
management. The reformers in the Navy had an intense admiration
for the "captains of industry" who were the focus of so much
attention in their day.5 Bradley Fiske, upon being introduced to
the members of Wilson's cabinet, observed that "none of them was
a man of brilliance like Frank J. Sprague [ of General Electric] or
the administrative capacities of Mr. Thayer, President of Western
Electric or several other men I knew in New York. " 6 Naval
officers often appealed to the example of business when advo
cating some reform or innovation. Capt. French E. Chadwick
explained to the House Naval Affairs Committee that the Naval
War College "bears the same relationship to the Navy as the
surveying staff of a railroad to be built bears to a railroad," 7 and
Capt. W.P. Cronan in urging the advantages of doctrine in naval
operations, stated that "It [doctrine] has long been recognized
and employed by the great commercial companies of our
country . . . with a degree of success which has brought great
wealth to many of them. "8 In fact the officers' attitude toward
business and the businessman was strangely ambivalent. On the
one hand, they affirmed that competition for money and trade
was a universal, unchanging characteristic of man and the chief
cause of wars. On the other, they deplored the shallow commercial
spirit of their time. The businessman was despised for his narrow
materialistic aims but admired for his efficiency and ingenuity in
achieving them.
The analogy which the reformers drew between their profession
and business was not after all very startling. Had not the
corporation been the first large-scale organization in America, and
did not the New York Central in 1850 employ more men than the
entire U.S. Army? The railroad managers in particular had
developed a set of ideas remarkably similar to those which Luce
and his followers espoused at the turn of the century. Like the
naval officers, the railroadmen aimed to have their calling elevated
to the dignity of a "profession" with its own methods and its own
distinct body of knowledge. "Railroad practice in this country,"
declared Henry Varnum Poor, editor of the Railroad Journal, "has
long since attained the dignity of a science." 9 Railroadmen like
Charles Francis Adams, Albert Fink and Charles E. Perkins
attempted a systematic treatise on railroad management in which
they drew frequent parallels between the "science" of railroading
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and other sciences and between their "profession" and others such
as medicine and the ministry. Perkins of the Chicago Burlington
and Quincy declared that his study of railroad administration was
really an attempt to "discover the natural laws of railroad
management." 1 ° Charles Francis Adams, speaking to a group of
students at Harvard, compared the professions of law, medicine
and railroading and found "not too much to choose between
them." "Indeed it may be safely said that the railroading
profession includes all professions. " 1 1
The movement towards a science of management, begun in the
railroads, soon spread to other fields of business. In 1903,
Frederick W. Taylor published his pioneering article on "Shop
Management" and 8 years later, he attempted a systematic study
of business administration in his classic Principles of Scientific
Management. By 1912 Louis Brandeis would declare that "manu
facturing, merchandising, transportation, and finance" were "new
professions which must soon gain recognition." 1 2
Like contemporary businessmen, naval officers were concerned
with means of rationalizing and controlling organizations of
unprecedented size and complexity. War College analysts recog
nized, as did businessmen, that the vast growth in the size of
modern organizations together with improvements in communica
tions like the telephone, the telegFaph, the radio and the
typewriter all tended toward increasing centralization of adminis
tration and control. Yet the new organizations were far too
complex to be controlled, in all details, from the top down. As
corporate management expert Arthur S. Dewing observed, it was
virtually impossible for a single individual to manage these vast
new enterprises. 1 3
The problem, as both the naval officer and the industrialist
recognized, was, in the words of Adm. William L. Rodgers, "how
to preserve the higher control and, at the same time, to grant
initiative and discretion to subordinates. " 1 4 Innovative managers
like Charles E. Perkins solved the problem through decentraliza
tion, or as he called it, "local self-government." 1 5 The War College
solved it through the applicatory system, particularly the standard
order form, which, while fully informing subordinates of the
commander's intentions, left the matter of execution largely to
their own initiative.
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Yet, despite the striking similarity between developments in
business and developments in the Navy, the influence of the two
upon one another was not as great as might be expected. The
writings of the naval reformers give little evidence that many were
familiar with the contents (as distinguished from the titles) of the
works by engineers like Frederick W. Taylor or railroad theorists
like Poor and Albert Fink. 1 6 Indeed their lack of familiarity with
business sometimes led them into ludicrous errors as when Henry
C. Taylor declared that the function of a railroad board of
directors was to "think for the railroad." This definition would
have amused Henry Varnum Poor who, after studying the boards
of directors of various railroads, had concluded that their
ignorance and incompetence was the chief obstacle to business
success. "Directors," observed Poor, "can tell us nothing [and] for
the best of reasons, that they generally know nothing about their
roads." 1 7
The persistent parallels which the naval officers drew between
their profession and business seems then to have been a rhetorical
device, a means of making their ideas and their profession more
acceptable to the public. At the end of the 19th century the big
businessman commanded enormous prestige, even among his
opponents. It was the part of wisdom for the Navymen to make
their ideas more palatable by pointing out how "business-like"
they were. An appeal to the example of the German General Staff
would have been more candid and more relevant but to the
average American the German Army was a small thing when
compared with the U.S. Steel Corporation or the Pennsylvania
Railroad.
Beneath the rhetoric about "efficiency and business methods"
lay the desire to have the operations of the Navy subject to the
coordination and control of the line officers. What Luce and the
founders of the War College wanted was an officer or board of
officers who would perform the military functions of the Navy
Department which were then being performed by the Secretary of
the Navy or not being performed at all. This new office or board
would be staffed by men familiar with the new "science" of war
and thus able to perform the task of preparing war plans, and
directing the operations of the fleet.
One of the earliest proposals for a naval general staff appears to
have been that of Capt. A.P. Cooke in 1886. 1 8 In an article
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entitled "Naval Reorganization," which appeared in the U.S.Naval
Institute Proceedings, Cooke recommended "a commission made
up of officers from the Office of Naval Intelligence to execute the
office of Admiral of the Fleet." This would give the Navy
Department "an establishment corresponding to the general staff
of an army." 1 9
Soon after its founding the Naval War College had taken up the
question of naval administration. The first lectures on general staff
work were delivered by Lt. C.C. Rodgers in 1888, and at the
beginning of Taylor's administration the College began a thorough
study of the subject. Being a believer in the "lessons of history and
the comparative method," Taylor approached the subject of naval
administration in the same way that Mahan had approached naval
strategy. "The organization of the great commercial companies
was examined and military and naval history searched to find
conditions analogous to our own." 2 0
Not surprisingly the War College concluded that what was
needed was a general staff somewhat similar to the German Great
General Staff.
The results [ of the study] emphasized two conclusions,first,
the vital importance of keeping the fleet prepared for war
and second the necessity of a general staff to attain that
preparedness....The German methods, nearer than any
other, are what are needed for us after they have been
modified.2 1
Taylor hoped that the nucleus of a general staff might be
formed by combining the Office of Naval Intelligence and the
Naval War College into an advisory board. Mahan thought that a
start might be made by appointing a planning board headed by a
chief of staff to prepare war plans and advise the Secretary. Like
his colleagues Mahan fell back on the analogy with business. "A
steady incumbent [in the office of chief-of-staff] would become
like the president of a great railroad or other business corporation,
himself an embodiment of policy, the consistency of which on
certain general lines is a recognized advantage." 2 2
Secretary Herbert, however, remained reluctant to make any
radical changes in the organization of the Navy Department. In
1896,Taylor wrote to Luce that:
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He [ the Secretary] is now (confidential) using the College as
a general staff and me as chief-of-staff with considerable
powers; but he will not move in the direction of making a
permanent staff ... for he regards the Chiefs of Bureau as an
excellent organization for peace-time conditions.2 3
When the new Republican administration took office in 1897,
Taylor and Luce pressed the plan upon Assistant Secretary
Theodore Roosevelt who wrote Taylor that he "entirely agreed."
But he was unable to persuade Secretary of the Navy John D.
Long to take any action on the proposal.2 4
Despite the lack of any concrete results the seed of the idea of a
general staff had been planted. The speculations of the College in
the 1890's were to grow into the full-scale debate over naval
administration which was well under way by 1900. In the midst of
the debate Mahan recalled that "the present scheme to my mind
derives directly from the War College and from Taylor's experi
ence there."2 5
With the coming of the Spanish-American War Luce and Taylor
renewed their agitation. Luce pointed out that the Navy Depart
ment had been obliged to appoint a Naval Strategy Board to advise
the Secretary on the operations of the fleet. "An irresponsible
board," however, was not enough. What was needed was a
permanent and responsible general staff. The Strategy Board, he
contended, was merely a group of "hastily caught up officers each
varying from the others in previous mental training and habits of
thought."2 6 The following year Secretary Long requested Taylor,
who was then serving as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, to
report on "what concrete things should be done at present in the
development of a General Staff." 2 7
Taylor began with a summary of the War College philosophy.
"The underlying principles of a military force are the same afloat
as ashore." The conduct of war was similar to the conduct of
business.A large railroad, for example, needs
...a group of men who have, as their principal work, to
think for the railroad, to observe rival lines, to consider the
local laws, and above all, to watch the future and prepare
their systems to draw all possible advantage from
events ...as they occur. These duties, usually performed by
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Boards of Directors or central committees of management,
are similar to those which, in a military force, are performed
by a general staff whether called by that name or not.2 8
He then recommended that the Secretary appoint a permanent
board of five officers: "the Chief of the Office of Naval
Intelligence and his principal assistant, the president of the Naval
War College and his principal assistant and the Chief of the Bureau
of Navigation " who were to "meet frequently and consult as to
war plans and information." The board should also have the
function of "indicating with authority to the Bureau Chiefs the
supplies for the fleet necessary to its maintenance and efficiency;
of deciding the types of ships to be recommended to the
Secretary; the number of men and officers needed for the fleet,
the amount of coal to be stored and the location of future
dry-docks." In fact the Board should advise and report to the
Secretary on "all questions affecting the fleet's efficiency." This
Board was to meet once a year with the senior officer of the Navy,
the Commander of the North Atlantic Fleet and their chiefs of
staff to review the war plans and make suggestions.

A few weeks after Taylor's report was completed Secretary
Long issued a General Order creating a General Board to prepare
war plans and coordinate the work of the Office of Naval
Intelligence and the War College.2 9 In other ways, however, the
General Board fell short of Taylor's proposal. It had no legal
existence but served at the pleasure of the Secretary; moreover, it
was not responsible for its recommendations and had no authority
to implement them. This did not satisfy the reformers in the Navy
who wanted a permanent board with authority to implement its
decisions.
Long refused to make the board a permanent body or to ask
Congress to formally recognize its existence.He feared that once a
permanent chief of staff were to become entrenched in the
department he would usurp the powers of the Secretary.3 0
The Boston Herald agreed, observing in an editorial that
...the scheme proposed by Captain Taylor ...would make
the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation a kind of supreme
Admiralty Lord without check or hindrance.Neither Admiral
nor Secretary would have any authority that he would not
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have the means to frustrate if he so desired....It is long
since we have examined a neater plot to concentrate vast
authority in one person.3 1
The Navy reformers and their opponents had run squarely up
against the whole complex problem of civil-military relations in a
democracy. All American naval officers supported the principle of
civilian control. On the other hand, being masters of a special and
complex science,they felt that they should be allowed to run their
own profession just as the lawyer or doctor ran his.As a member
of the War College Planning Staff put it:
...the system can be changed by the people being made to
realize that the business of their Navy like any other business
should be principally in the hands of men who have made it
their life's work and study.When President Wilson appointed
the board of bankers who will be at the head of the new
banking system he did not select doctors or chemists, he
selected bankers, men known to be experts in their line; and
it should be the same in the affairs of the Navy.3 2
Comdr.William Bainbridge-Hoff had expressed a similar view 30
years earlier in an address to the Naval Institute. "We can always
count, I fancy, upon a civilian performing the duties of the
Secretary of the Navy although such a condition of affairs would
not be tolerated for a moment in any industry which expected to
be successful.... " 3 3 "I fear we shall have to have a change in the
whole temper of our people," wrote young Theodore Roosevelt to
Capt. William F. Fullam "before they understand that in military
matters only the military should be listened to." 3 4
One effect of the War College's emphasis on global strategy and
on the close relationship between foreign policy and strategy was
to emphasize the need for strong civilian control and guidance in
the formulation of naval policy. Paradoxically, however, this
emphasis had also bred in the War College men an intense distrust
for politicians. Bradley Fiske in his memoirs described his career
of reform in the Navy as a "continuous battle against the political
influences that sap the strength of the nation." 3 5 The officer§ of
the War College and the General Board, trained in the Mahanite
concepts of geopolitics, felt that they had a firmer grasp of the
country's needs, especially its naval needs,than did the politicians
who were motivated by "selfish " interests. In Fiske's words,"the
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opposition to a general staff has been political, the efforts for a
general staff have been national." 3 6 Luce took the same view.
"Appointments to the Navy Department are not made in the
interest of the Navy." He wrote to the Navy League: "The Navy
has always been made a convenience of; men have been put at the
head of the Department solely for political reasons." 3 7
A general Staff was necessary,explained Yates Stirling,because
...at present there exist too many influences political and
otherwise that ignorantly interfere in the purely naval duties
of preparing and fighting the Navy.... A general Staff would
grow, in time,to command such prestige that its say on naval
matters would become the last word to the American People.
Civilian interference, then, in purely naval things would be
eliminated.3 8
Naval officers professed to see no contradiction between their
ideas and the principle of civilian control of the military. Few of
the people involved in the general staff campaign saw the complex
problems of civil-military relations which their scheme raised.
Luce indignantly dismissed the whole question. "Navies are not
dangerous to civil liberty. The sailor has always been loyal and
true. This may be shown to be true by the testimony of all history
both ancient and modern ....The safety of a navy lies in the
loyalty of the seaman to his flag." 3 9
It may clear up the matter [suggested William L. Rodgers] to
ask if von Moltke the greatest chief-of-staff the world has
ever seen was ever superior to his superior the king .... Von
Moltke was just as subordinate to his king as any person in
his army. The king naturally followed his advice in certain
prescribed matters but he followed the advice of his
physician in certain prescribed matters.4 0
Rodgers wrote his report before the experience of Germany in
the First World War finally "cleared up the matter," but even for
the time he showed a remarkable lack of understanding of the real
issues involved. The reforming naval officers like Rodgers and
Luce thought in terms of "efficiency." They saw needed measures
blocked by politicians and concluded that they knew better than
the self-seeking civilians what was good for the Navy. The civilians
often did not understand the necessity for the things the officers
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demanded. On the other hand, they clearly perceived the political
dangers in some of their requests. The longtime chairman of the
Senate Naval Affairs Committee, Eugene Hale, observed at the end
of his career: "As I look back upon the years ... I recall that the
more we have done for the military the more they have claimed. It
is the thought of the Army and Navy that the government is run
for the benefit of those establishments."4 1 The officers accused
the politicians of sacrificing the effectiveness of the Navy to
political considerations. The politicians accused the officers of
attempting to undermine civilian control. By the beginning of
Theodore Roosevelt's administration the stage was set for a full
dress confrontation between the advocates of "efficiency" and the
guardians of "civil liberty."
The assumption of the Presidency . by Theodore Roosevelt
seemed to promise great things for the Navy. The new President
was personally acquainted with Mahan, Luce and Taylor, had
lectured at the War College, and was known to be interested in
improving the Navy. Perhaps he might also be interested in
improving the Navy Department as well.
Soon after the President took office, Henry C. Taylor and the
new Inspector of Target Practice, William S. Sims, began to press
upon him the need for further reforms in the administration of the
Navy.4 2 In 1904, they succeeded in persuading Secretary of the
Navy Moody to sponsor a bill providing for a permanent General
Board of seven officers to perform "such genera.l military duties as
the Secretary may from time to time direct." The opponents of
the bill were led by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Charles H.
Darling who declared that "the bill smacks too much of militarism
to be consistent with the spirit of our institutions." 4·3 Congress
agreed and failed to act on the measure.
Four years later, the reformers tried again. Henry C. Taylor had
died in 1904, but Sims and Comdr. Albert L. Key, the naval aide
to the President, supported by Luce and Mahan, carried on the
fight. The Navy Bureau Chiefs, who felt themselves threatened by
the proposed reforms, were now ranged with the opposition. Sims
succeeded in having Roosevelt include a recommendation for a
general staff in his Annual Message for 1908. Meanwhile a new
Secretary of the Navy Truman Newberry had come into office
with a plan of his own for reorganizing the Department which he
proceeded to put into effect. Newberry's plan did not satisfy the
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reformers. "The Department is more of a muddle than ever,"
Luce wrote to Sims. "That is what this so-called reorganization
amounts to."4 4 Sims continued his campaign and succeeded in
having the President appoint a board composed of both civilians
a nd n a v a l officers to consider the organization of the Navy
Department.
The Board, which included ex-Secretaries William H. Moody
and Paul Morton, Luce and Mahan, met in Washington in January
1909, and endorsed Newberry's changes as a temporary measure.
They also recommended that a commission be appointed to
consider a permanent reorganization of the Navy Department. In
accordance with this suggestion, the President appointed a second
commission with the same membership as the first, which came to
be known as the "Moody Board." The Moody Board submitted
two reports. The first, a statement of "general principles," was
drafted by Mahan and set out the reformers' case, complete of
course, with historical allusions.
The duties of the Secretary divide under two principal heads
closely related, but generally distinct, civil and mili
tary.... For the direction of the military duties no sub
ordinate provision corresponding to the bureaus on the civil
side exists in the present organization established by
statute.4 5
The commission's second report proposed to remedy this
situation by reorganizing the department along lines suggested by
Luce in two memoranda which he had submitted to the Secretary
of the Navy in 1907.4 6 The plan called for the formation of five
grand divisions, one for nonmilitary shore establishment work, one
for naval operations, one for personnel, one for inspection, and
one for material. The most important was the operations division
which would combine the General Board and the Board of
Construction under a "Chief of Naval Operations" who was to be
"the sole responsible advisor" to the Secretary.4 7
By the time the Moody Commission completed its report the
Roosevelt administration had only a week to serve and Congress
took no action on the measure. Taft's Secretary of the Navy,
George von L. Meyer, attempted to salvage what he could of the
plan by setting up a system of "Aides" who corresponded to the
heads of division in the Moody scheme.
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The Aides system, especially the establishment of the "Aide for
Operations" was a significant step toward achieving the goals of
the line officer reformers. Although the functions of the Aide for
Operations was advisory only, he still possessed large authority. He
had jurisdiction over ship movements, target practice, intelligence
and, in conjunction with the War College and the General Board,
over war plans.4 8 However, Josephus Daniels, who succeeded Meyer
as Secretary of the Navy in 1913, was suspicious of the Aides system
a nd uninterested in schemes for achieving greater "efficiency"
through further line officer control of the Department.
By the end of 1914, Bradley A. Fiske, the current Aide for
Operations, had concluded that Daniels was hopeless and began
plotting with Representative Richmond P. Hobson of Spanish
American War fame, to have a provision incorporated into the
Naval Appropriations Bill creating a Chief of Naval Operations.
Hobson's bill was drafted by a group of Fiske's staff officers
including Dudley W. Knox, William P. Cronan and others who had
participated in the War College's discussions and studies of naval
administration. Their bill provided, in effect, for a naval chief of
staff with a staff of some 15 war planners and authority to issue
orders directly to the fleet.
Daniels denounced the measure as "a plan to Prussianize the
American Navy" but finally accepted a modified version which
provided for a Chief of Naval Operations "who, under the
Secretary shall be charged with the operations of the fleet and its
readiness for war and be charged with its general direction. " 4 9
The Chief of Naval Operations provided for in the amended
Hobson Bill had broad responsibilities but limited powers. Unlike
the Bureau Chiefs, he could not issue orders in the name of the
Secretary. For the post of CNO, Daniels passed over every flag
officer in the Navy to appoint Capt. William S. Benson. Benson
had never been associated with the radical reformers. He had
attended the short course of the Naval War College in 1906, but he
specifically declared that "I do not pose as a theoretical War
College officer; I am simply a plain sailor and a practical naval
officer." 5 0 Nevertheless, he was soon using War College graduates
in important posts. Capt. Roy C. Smith headed the Office of
Target Practice and Capt. Josiah S. McKean headed the Material
Division, while Capt. Volney 0. Chase, a graduate of the second
"long course" became Assistant for Operations.
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Benson's low-key approach and the efficient performance of his
subordinates soon won him favor with Secretary Daniels. In the
summer of 1916, the Secretary, who had grudgingly accepted the
creation of the office of CNO less than 2 years before,
enthusiastically endorsed legislation which greatly strengthened
that office. The rank and title of the Chief of Naval Operations
was raised to Admiral, outranking all other officers except
Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, and "all orders issued by the
Chief of Naval Operations were to be considered as emanating
from the Secretary. " 5 1
The establishment of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations marked a great step forward in the administration of
the Navy Department. Although it did not satisfy Fiske and some
of the more radical reformers who felt that the Chief of Naval
Operations was still too dependent on the Secretary for his
powers, the system was efficient enough to stand the test of two
World Wars. The reorganization of the Navy Department was
perhaps the most valuable and enduring product of the College's
"business" approach to war.
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CHAPTER XI
EPILOGUE: THE LONG TWILIGHT
The War College emerged from World War I with its reputation
greatly enhanced. In a conflict which confronted the Navy with
problems of command and control, staff work and planning of
unprecedented size and complexity, the performance of Admiral
Sims' staff in London, particularly the American Naval Planning
Section, largely manned by War College veterans, the work of the
Naval Advisory Staff at the Paris Peace Conference, as well as the
important commands held by War College graduates, demonstrated
the value of War College methods and training. 1 "It took the World
War to prove to the service at large the inestimable value in a
practical way of this school" recalled William Veazie Pratt. "In fact
it was Admiral Benson, our CNO, who told me after the war how
much he felt he owed to the College whose doctrines, by this time,
had become partially disseminated throughout the naval service." 2
Other officers agreed. "After years of effort," observed Capt. J.K.
Taussig, "the Naval War College has at last come into its own. " 3
The reactivation of the War College was never questioned in the
aftermath of World War I as it had been after the war with Spain.4
Sims, now a four-star admiral, returned by his own choice to head a
greatly expanded Naval War College with a staff of 15 and a student
body of more than 60 officers. Yet this success was more apparent
than real. Sims had been turned down on his most important
request, that an assignment to the Naval War College "be given
p r e c edence over every other personnel need of the service." 5
Neither William S. Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations, nor
Secretary Daniels, although strong supporters of the War College,
could be persuaded to go along with this idea. The result, as Adm.
E.C. Kalbfus later observed, was that "right up to the early l 940's, a
number of officers were sent to Newport who had no naval future
but could be spared at the moment." 6
In any case, the personnel policy was not as significant as the fact
that the program of the War College remained virtually unchanged

145
and that the narrower mission envisioned by Sims and Knight was
made the basis of postwar policy at the College. In his opening
address to the class of 1919, Sims described the College as "a
board of practical fleet officers brought together here to discuss
and decide ... questions of how we would best conduct naval
war." Upon completing the course, a student should be able to
estimate a situation correctly, reach logical decisions and prepare
plans and orders.7 Nothing was said about the development of the
art of war or about probing the causes of war and peace, subjects
which had obsessed Mahan and Luce, but which found small place
in the postwar College.
Throughout the next two decades virtually every attempt to
reorient or broaden the curriculum ended in failure. In 1922,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. called a
conference to study the program of the Naval War College.Among
other things the conference recommended that a department of
history be established to offer "reading courses in naval history,
analytical study and discussion ... " but the recommendation was
not implemented.8
The most ambitious attempt to break out of the narrow mold
was made during the presidency of then Rear Adm. William Veazie
Pratt from 1925 to 1927.Pratt came to the War College convinced
of the importance of logistics and of joint Army-Navy operations
in naval warfare and was determined to add these subjects to the
curriculum. In addition, his broad experience in international
affairs had convinced him of the need for an "advanced course for
officers in international affairs. " 9 Pratt also proposed an enlarged
class and an exchange of staff members with the Army War
College.
None of Pratt's measures had any long-lasting impact on the
War College. The logistics course was dropped after a few years.
The proposals for an exchange of staff and an enlarged class were
not approved and whatever tepid interest the Navy took in joint
operations was soon channeled into preoccupation with develop
ment of the Fleet Marine Force.1 0
Meanwhile studies in the
narrow." 1 1 By the early
become merely exercises to
1938, for example, the

area of strategy "became increasingly
l 930's the strategic problems had
test isolated parts of a larger plan. In
"strategic problems " involved the
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operations of a small Blue Expeditionary Force en route to
establish a minor naval base in the Aleutians and an Orange
Raiding Force sent to intercept it. 1 2
In Tactics a great deal of attention was devoted, in the words of
Capt. Harris Lanning, one of the more thoughtful members of the
staff, to studying the "naval battle of the future. " 1 3 If so, the
Tactics Department must have believed that the future would be
much like the past. Students fought and refought the Battle of
Jutland, about which an immense amount of information had
been collected.1 4 Attention was mainly focused on actions
between opposing squadrons of battleships with other ship types
filling supporting roles. Destroyer operations, for example, were
considered primarily in connection with the defense of, or attack
on, a battleline. 1 5
The failure of the War College to come to terms with the new
developments in naval warfare during the interwar period is best
illustrated by its handling of the two most important new weapons
systems: the airplane and the submarine. In 1919, Rear Adm.
Bradley A. Fiske delivered a lecture on "the torpedo plane" to the
Naval War College in which he called attention to the great strides
which had been made in aviation and in the development of the
torpedo and urged the College to "endeavor to foresee and
forecast the use of novel appliances so that when the next war
breaks out we shall have these appliances and the methods to
employ them instantly available.... " 1 6 This was precisely the
type of work which Taylor and Mahan had envisioned for the War
College, but in the interwar period, the College was never able to
take up Fiske's challenge.
It was not that the Naval War College ignored aviation. During
the first half dozen years after World War I, the College had
considered "over 100 problems in which aircraft took an active
part." These included scouting, raids, spotting, attacks on aircraft
carriers, attacks on other surface craft and attacks on sub
marines. 1 7 Yet these studies failed to yield any extraordinary
results. As late as 1940, the War College was pointing out that,
while naval aviation had the advantages of mass, speed and
mobility, it suffered from serious limitatiohs. "It takes 108 planes
to carry as many torpedoes as one squadron of destroyers, and
1200 to carry as many large bombs or large projectiles as one
battleship." As for aircraft carriers " ... whenever possible
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aviation should be based ashore because at an air station it is far
less vulnerable than aboard ship." Carriers were useful chiefly for
scouting. If the enemy's carriers could be knocked out, "we will
gain the advantage of concealing our movements and knowing
where the enemy is. " 1 8
The situation with regard to the submarine was more compli
cated. From an early date the War College had been interested in
this weapon. While he had been expounding the offensive battle
fleet doctrine to his audience at the Naval War College in 1893,
Washington I. Chambers had wondered whether "command of the
sea [might] rest with the submarine or some other type in the
future." 1 9
Beginning around 1900, the College had always included the
question: "What is the field of the submarine in military
operations?" as part of the work in the solution of the annual
problem. The answers varied widely from year to year but the
College seemed to be moving toward evolving a doctrine for
submarines. The 1911 class had asserted that subs could be used
for "attacking shipping and can enter unseen into ports to destroy
ships and drydocks."2 0 The class of 1912 was even more radical,
predicting that submarines could be effective in attacks on
shipping in enemy ports and "in the destruction of all vessels with
which the enemy attempts to control the sea. Under this head may
be included operations against enemy shipping, both naval and
merchant, in any port within the radius of the submarine." 2 1
Whether due to distaste for submarine warfare engendered by
the experience of World War I or a belief that the submarine threat
had been mastered, the Naval War College apparently gave little
attention to the submarine beyond an occasional lecture. In the
war games, submarines were employed primarily as long-range
scouts or screens for the battle fleet.2 2
In neither aviation nor submarine warfare did the War College
undertake the kind of far-reaching analysis to which it had
subjected the ram, the armored cruiser and the torpedo in the
early years. Part of the reason for this failure undoubtedly lay in
the increased emphasis on "grand tactics" where such matters as
the composition of the fleet and basic strategy were taken as
"given." A second cause may well have been the College's
increasing isolation from the centers of naval policymaking. Its
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active involvement in war planning had long since ceased and by
the mid-l 930's the War College President no longer sat as a
member of the General Board.
For whatever reason the War College's graduates were destined
to encounter many more unpleasant surprises in World War II than
had their predecessors in the Spanish-American War and World
War I and in the far more complex and dangerous world of the
1950's and l 960's, it was the civilian policymakers, the "think
tanks," the economists and the systems analysts who were to set
the pace in the debates on naval and national security.
Luce, Little and Mahan died before they had the opportunity to
see their teachings vindicated in World War I but they must have
been aware that they had achieved an immense success. The naval
officer corps had been thoroughly professionalized. It possessed a
growing body of doctrine based on the applicatory system and
grounded in Mahan's systematic theories of maritime power. The
organization of the Navy Department had been modified and
rationalized largely in accord with the ideas of the line officers and
a modern battle fleet had been constructed exceeding in size and
power anything in the 1890's.
Of course, the War College did not, by itself, produce the idea
of seapower, or the battleship navy, or the rationalization of naval
administration. These ideas would probably have been expressed
in some form regardless of the existence of that institution. But
the War College provided a place where these ideas could be
developed, modified, systematized and subjected to critical analy
sis. Before the founding of the War College, the art of naval
warfare was embodied in a few stray articles and debates. By 1910
it had been systematized in Mahan's books, in the "doctrine" of
Knox and Rodgers and in the monumental collection of data
produced by the naval war game. Most important, the War College
insured that strategy and tactics would occupy a central place in
the American officer's professional outlook so that American line
officers avoided the obsession with what Winston Churchill called
"instrumentalities" which bedeviled other navies before World War
1.2 3

It was to be some years more before it came to be recognized
that these successes had not been repeated in the l 920's and
l 930's and in the postwar period. Senior officers, heroes of World
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War II, stoutly insisted that their War College training between the
wars had been of immense value to them; though they sometimes
quietly acknowledged that perhaps refighting the battle of Jutland
and writing a canned "thesis" may not have been the best way to
prepare for the Pacific War. In any case, all ruefully acknowledged
that in the postwar era the War College had been displaced as the
font of strategic wisdom by the think tanks and the Defense
Department.
Like most organizations, the War College could not resist
repeating what it did well and in the end its innovative, even
revolutionary, program became narrow, stereotyped, ritualized,
drained of relevance. This is a phenomenon not unusual for
successful educational institutions, particularly professional
schools.
While the causes of failure are relatively easy to establish, the
causes of the original success are both more interesting and more
elusive. One important ingredient was the relative decay and
stagnation of the Navy in the late 19th century. The miserable
promotion prospects, the surplus of officers and the paucity of
commands meant that intelligent, energetic, ambitious officers like
Bradley A. Fiske, Washington I.Chambers and John F.Meigs were
attracted to the Naval War College. Before the turn of the century
the College was the only place where an officer who wished to do
some hard thinking and research about the basic problems of naval
warfare could find a home and compare notes with his fellow
officers.As Mahan wrote to a British officer:
Here ... [ an officer] examines and tests his so-called
opinions, he really reasons in anxiety lest he fall into some
statement he cannot maintain before a critical audi
ence ...no voluntary institution or association of officers
can ever supply the stimulus to professional thought aroused
by an organized effort of the government.2 4
A second important ingredient was professional consciousness.
Mahan, Luce, Taylor and Meigs could critically evaluate and reject
the "established" American national security policies, i.e., coastal
defense and commerce warfare because to do so was in the
longrun organizational interest of the Navy as a whole. Conversely
the War College staff and students in the interwar period had no
such strong incentive to examine critically the reigning ideas on
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the primacy of the battleship and the inevitability of the decisive
naval battle.
A third factor in the success of the Naval War College was the
relatively high· degree of continuity in the College staff during the
first 3 decades. Luce and Mahan served repeatedly as lecturers and
consultants to the College from the 1880's until about 1910. Lt.
William McCarty Little spent almost his entire career there, and
men like William L. Rodgers made repeated visits there first as
students, than as staff members, and later as lecturers.At the same
time the infusion of new blood in the form of vigorous
iconoclastic younger officers like Dudley Knox, William S. Sims
and Bradley A Fiske brought new ideas and saved the institution
from becoming ingrown. Finally, the continuing opposition to the
College, at least up until the l 920's, converted its supporters into
a band of true believers dedicated to saving the Navy and the
country from technicism, amateurism, inefficiency, bureaucracy
and other terrible evils for which the War College had the cure.
In the 1890's, Mahan and his coworkers could provide the kind
of certainties which the pre-World War I world was always seeking.
In our own era, which has rejected all certainties, what is needed is
not "a new Mahan " but a system of advanced education for
officers which will enable them to think critically and inde
pendently about, in Luce's words, "all aspects of war ...and the
prevention of war."
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NOTES

The following abbreviations are used:
USNIP - United States Naval Institute Proceedings
NHC - Naval War College Naval Historical Collection
NWC Archives - Naval War College Archives
The citation "Naval War College Archives" refers to College noncurrent records and
related historical materials which now form part of the Na val Historical Collection, but
when first used for this study (1966-1967) were located in the Federal Records Center,
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. These papers were returned to the College in 1969 and
were subsequently processed and identified by record groups.
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